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Abstract
I define modes of business-government relations by the actor, which represents 
business. In the association state, business associations are dominant. In the 
company state, the firm directly represents itself. In the party state, access to the 
political system is mediated by parties, with which businesses must identify 
themselves. In the soft state, the personal connections of businesspeople are the 
dominant channel of influence. The existing literature on business-government very 
rarely acknowledges that each mode forms part of the environment of business- 
government relations for the other modes. Of the four modes, by far the least 
attention has been given to personalism.
I find the association state to be weak because large numbers of small firms, weak 
trade unions and the sectoral configuration of Polish business present few incentives 
for the formation of business associations. The company state is usually associated 
with foreign and state enterprises. Foreign direct investment has been relatively 
modest in Poland. When state enterprises directly engage with the state, they tend to 
do so, not as businesses, but in alliance with trade unions. The party state is 
undermined by the high governmental turnover in Poland. It makes no sense for 
business to commit itself to parties, which are only temporary rulers. The soft state is 
found to be the dominant form of business-government relations. The sources of 
personalism are partially hidden behind complex personal histories. However,
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involvement in youth organisations is a powerful predictor of the level of personal 
connections to politicians amongst the business elite.
Fundamental, and unlikely, changes to political competition and economic structure 
are necessary for Poland to become an association or a party state. In contrast, 
foreign ownership is increasing and state ownership is decreasing and transforming 
itself Some of the conditions for personalism are also being undermined. In the 
future, instead of being a soft state, permeated by personal interests, Polish business- 
government relations may move towards the company state.
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Chapter 1:
Introduction
1. Business-Government Relations and Post-Communist Research
The first wave of research on former communist states was defined by a hypothesis 
that has dominated political science over the last century: the hypothesis o f the 
universality of democracy. Some have argued that every comer of the globe can, or 
must, adopt this system, while others have asserted that it is possible in, and suitable 
for, only a small set of countries. The first wave was concerned with assessing the 
chances of the survival of capitalist democracy in former communist countries. This 
thesis concentrates on the Polish case. Capitalist democracy has been consolidated in 
Poland in the sense that no significant group, domestically or externally, even 
considers an alternative system.1 As in other East-Central European states, there is 
little doubt that Polish capitalist democracy will continue into the foreseeable future. 
The focus of the universality hypothesis is now moving south and east of this region.
The second wave of research on former communist states is defined by another 
hypothesis, which has dominated political science for some time: this is the 
hypothesis of the diversity of capitalist democracy. It is now widely accepted that 
what divides capitalist democracies from each other is as important as what they 
have in common. However, there is great controversy about how to define the
1 There are still those who would argue that Poland is a fagade democracy, in which voters have no
real choice and/or politicians have little control over policy. Undoubtedly, there are many limitations 
to Poland’s democracy. However, these limitations are ones suffered by most democracies, including, 
the USA. Poland is definitely not a fagade democracy in the usual sense. Contemporary7 examples are 
to be found in Africa rather than East-Central Europe (See, Larry7 Diamond, Developing Democracy: 
Towards Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), Ch. 1. The debate about
7
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subtypes of capitalist democracy. The second wave of research on post-communism 
seeks to investigate what sort of capitalist democracies are being consolidated in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Often this is done more implicitly than explicitly, but it 
is nonetheless surely correct that this hypothesis underlies the vast majority of 
research currently being conducted on this region. Given the sharp divergence 
between the communist states and the capitalist democracies for over forty years, the 
former communist states make for an intriguing sample with which to investigate the 
global diversity of democracy.
This thesis forms part of the second wave. Its subject has been explicitly chosen to 
contribute to the debate about the extent to which new capitalist democracies of East- 
Central Europe fit into existing categories. The issue of business-government 
relations is a particularly apposite one with which to test the diversity hypothesis in a 
former communist state. This is because it relates so directly to the definition of a 
communist system and to one of the most fundamental challenges in the 
transformation of communist systems.
Marx taught that the economic “base” determined the political “superstructure”. 
Politics was not an autonomous realm but was merely a reflection of power relations 
in the economic system. Communist regimes tried to reverse this relationship by 
completely subordinating the economic sphere to political control. An autonomous 
economic sphere was seen as, at best, a limitation on, and at worst, a threat to, the 
power of the regime. The fusion of politics and economics was perhaps the defining 
feature of communist systems. One of the great themes of the transformation o f
whether Poland can be regarded as a democracy- (in the normal sense of classifying regimes) is one 
that was relevant in the early years after 1989, but is now largely irrelevant
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communist systems since 1989 has been the separation o f politics and economics. 
Of course, completely separating the two is impossible. It is more important to 
concentrate on the establishment of an efficient interface between politics and the 
economy. It is the efficiency of this interface, rather than the completeness of the 
separation, that is the key to the political economy of capitalist democracies. The 
area of business-government relations is perhaps the area in which former communist 
states are most likely to diverge from pre-existing capitalist democracies, since the 
relationship between politics and the economy defined communism and has 
dominated the post-communist transformation. Therefore, this thesis aims to classify 
and explain the system of business-government relations in contemporary Poland. 
This is not just an interesting and important subject in itself, but one that speaks to 
wider concerns about the diversity of capitalist democracy. Both conceptually, and 
empirically, there are enormous ambiguities in the term “post-communism”. The 
next section argues for a particular understanding of post-communism.
2. The Nature of Post-Communism
Post-communism is meant in two principal ways. The first meaning of post­
communism is relatively wide and uncontroversial. It refers to the feet that many of 
the characteristics of countries, such as Poland, are legacies of the communist-era or 
are results of attempts to transform that legacy. This might be called causal post- 
communism. Many authors do not clearly distinguish between this uncontroversial 
post-communism and a more interesting post-communism, which takes the form of a 
path-dependence hypothesis.2 This hypothesis states that because of their distinctive
3 George Schopflin, "The Post-Communist State", paper delivered at the London School of 
Economics, November 1999; David Staik & Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming 
Politics and Property in East-Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
passim., esp. 6-7, 164-165
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pasts former socialist countries will evolve into socio-political systems qualitatively 
different from those in the West or elsewhere. I call this distinctive post­
communism.
Post-communism is a process of rapid and fundamental change, which, although 
precipitated and influenced by the political system, is, to a significant extent, outside 
of its control. In the political sphere, post-communism is largely defined by 
democratization and has a lot in common with similar transitions elsewhere in the 
world. In all such situations, there is initial uncertainty about whether the democratic 
regime will survive, the configuration of its basic institutions, and great uncertainty 
and instability in political leadership and the positions of political parties. Of course, 
communist regimes were very different from other authoritarian regimes and this has 
had a profound effect on the politics of post-communism. In contrast to other 
authoritarian regimes, communist regimes did not just dominate the apex o f the state, 
or even just the state itself: they permeated all of society. Therefore, democratization 
has involved de-politicising many of the lower levels of the state and of freeing many 
functions and institutions from state control altogether. The nature of communism 
has perhaps made the building of democratic political parties more difficult than in 
other democratisation contexts. In post-communism, there is no well-defined class 
basis to build on; neither is there a web of independent organisations and 
associations, which can support political parties. Many post-communist parties are 
based on opposition to communism, past involvement in the communist regime or 
ethnicity, none of which have any obvious relevance to the tasks facing post­
communist policy-makers. Moreover, parties based on anti-communism have a very 
flimsy social base, in the absence of a communist regime, or even the threat of one.
10
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However, what best distinguishes post-communist politics is the overload of tasks 
necessitated by the management and completion of the post-communist economic 
transformation. This is well summed up by the phrase, “rebuilding the ship at sea”.
The economic transformation is much more original than the political transformation 
and gives the political transformation much of its originality. Post-communist 
societies are the first industrial societies into which capitalism has been introduced. 
All other capitalist societies were preceded by traditional agrarian societies of some 
sort. In all of these societies, capitalism evolved to some extent. Obviously, there 
are big differences between pioneers like the Netherlands and England and later 
developers such as Germany and Japan, where public policies were designed to 
promote capitalism. Capitalism, and especially advanced capitalism, requires an 
extraordinarily complex structure of law, regulation and tradition, which protects 
private property, and defines various types of property and their economic 
deployment. Never before has this complex structure of capitalism been introduced 
so quickly, never mind virtually simultaneously, as is the case for post-communism. 
This has meant that for many of the basic economic situations encountered in post­
communism there are no guiding laws, regulations or traditions. For many others, 
the laws, regulations and traditions hamper, rather than facilitate, the operation of the 
market. Yet others are contradictory and some are so vague they could mean 
anything. While this situation is partly due to the limitations of politicians and the 
state administration, it is virtually inevitable in the context of post-communism. 
Well-functioning advanced capitalism is just too complicated to introduce 
immediately. Of course, the introduction of capitalism is far from the only important 
task facing the post-communist political system.
II
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The post-communist state is, paradoxically, both in a very weak and a very strong 
position in relation to business. Its weakness has been described above. It consists 
in an overloading of urgent policy priorities and a regulatory system unsuited to the 
realities of a free market economy. However, in another sense, the post-communist 
state is very strong. It has the discretion to interfere in individual firms with a 
regularity and intensity that is very unusual in capitalist systems, whether they be 
long-established democracies or not. This discretion is both a both a legacy of the 
communist system and a fundamentally post-communist phenomenon. Under the 
communist system, politics and the economy were fused and enterprises were, in 
theory at least, under direct administrative control. However, the post-communist 
transformation in many respects requires even greater control over individual firms. 
It demands a fundamental change in the behaviour and structure of individual firms, 
which communist-era reforms never achieved. These changes have been difficult to 
incentivize through the regulatory system. Therefore, many policy-makers saw 
heavy intervention in management as an imperative of reform.
Capitalist states elsewhere rely much more on laws and regulations that apply to 
general classes of firms or situations. This approach was difficult to take because of 
the sheer complexity of the necessary legal structure, which takes time to establish 
and also because its enforcement requires impartial and expert enforcement, which 
was also lacking in post-communist countries. Just as the inadequacy of the legal 
structure gave business great latitude for freedom of manoeuvre, it allowed the state 
to choose amongst contradictory regulations or to adopt different interpretations of 
vague regulations. Thus, in post-communism businesses have great opportunities to
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evade and influence the chaotic and overloaded state to their own advantage, but they 
are also at the mercy of an unpredictable state, which retains the ability to intervene 
decisively in the situation of individual firms.
The features of post-communism identified above will be kept in mind when 
formulating and testing hypotheses about Polish business-government relations. I 
will return to the distinction between the two meanings of post-communism when I 
assess the wider implications of my empirical findings in the conclusion of this 
thesis. Next, I describe the methods with which I have investigated business- 
government relations in Poland.
3. Methodology
3.1 Comparisons in Post-Communist Europe
Post-communist Europe has been hotly contested by social scientists from three 
principal groups. Firstly, there are country experts who have “marinated themselves” 
in the particular national contexts. This is essential. Those who have not worked 
hard to understand national particularities are likely to misinterpret them, or even 
worse, completely ignore them. Secondly, there are the students of comparative 
communism who have become the students of post-communism. Forty years of a 
shared, and intense, history, is, of course, still very relevant to the contemporary 
situation in this part of the world. Thirdly, there are the students o f capitalist 
democracy, who have, literally and intellectually, invaded post-communist Europe. 
They have sought to apply and modify models of capitalist democracy in an exciting 
new set of cases. Given that many post-communist countries are now capitalist 
democracies, it is virtually illogical to assert that general approaches to capitalist
13
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democracy cannot contribute something useful to the study of those societies. All 
three of these approaches are valid, and all three are much stronger if employed in 
combination. As will be evident from the thesis, the arguments proposed by the 
three groups are rarely diametrically opposed to each other. Rather, each group’s 
arguments tend to be variations on, and re-specifications of, hypotheses proposed by 
the other groups.
Some country experts tend to eschew more general approaches because they assert 
that their countries are “unique”. This view mistakenly underestimates the 
importance of both general approaches and country experts. Uniqueness is an 
inherently comparative concept. Someone who knows nothing about anywhere in 
the world other than Ruritania has exactly nothing to say about Ruritanian 
uniqueness. In social science, uniqueness is not a categorical variable. No country 
or group is completely unique. The question is how unique a country is. More 
interestingly, it is a question of in what respects a country is unique. Country experts 
are important, not just because they have so much to say about “their” country as a 
subject in itself, but also because they can falsify, confirm, modify and inspire 
general theories.
This thesis has not been written by a person who is a member of any of the three 
above groups. Writing a PhD about Poland in the 1990s, there was no option but to 
try to become a country expert, a post-communism expert and a comparative politics 
expert. The approach of this thesis has been to begin at the most general level 
(capitalist democracy), move to the regional level (post-communism) and to devote 
the most energy to investigating how the particular Polish context can be interpreted
14
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in terms that relate to the two wider perspectives. This thesis has been able to draw 
on a rich body of literature on business-government relations in established capitalist 
democracies and a rich body of literature on many aspects of post-communism and 
Poland. However, it has not had the benefit of a rich literature on post-communist 
business-government relations, never mind Polish business-government relations. 
Although, business-government relations have very lately become a major 
preoccupation of the World Bank and other institutions, the existing literature on the 
subject is tiny. An easy way to prove this, is to search any electronic bibliography 
for “lobbying” or “interest groups” and compare the meagre results with the torrent 
of research on “privatization”, “parties”, “institutional reform”, etc. Thus, this thesis 
begins with the great advantage of originality but the great disadvantage of having 
few shoulders on which to stand.
3.2 Structure o f the thesis
This section discusses the way in which I have tried to answer the research question, 
posed in the first section of this chapter. In Chapter 2 ,1 introduce the Polish case, by 
summarising the general characteristics of the past and present Polish economy and 
polity as well as a discussion of the most salient specifically post-communist features 
of contemporary Poland. In Chapter 3, I present a theoretical framework for the 
study of business-government relations. This chapter argues that there are four 
modes of business-government relations in capitalist democracies: association, 
company, party and soft states. In association, company and party states business- 
government relations is dominated by associations, companies and parties 
respectively. The soft state is one in which business-government relations are 
permeated by personal relationships and networks. These modes constitute the
15
XThe ‘Soft’ State: Business-Govemment Relations in Poland -  Chapter 1
dependent variables of this thesis. The key feature of the explanatory approach is 
that the importance of one mode depends on its availability and effectiveness, 
relative to the other three modes. Independent variables are identified for each mode 
of business-government relations. I consider both variables, which are applicable to 
capitalist democracies in general, and variables, which seem to be specifically post­
communist.
I use a wide range of sources in to evaluate the values of the dependent and 
independent variables. The sources may be classified as documentary, qualitative 
interview, and survey data. In Chapter 4, I assess the relevance of the association 
state to business-government relations in Poland. There are no original quantitative 
analyses in this chapter, since the survey data employed in other parts of the thesis, 
suffered from poor quality data, in all but the most basic questions regarding 
business associations. Fortunately, there is a relatively large quantity and reasonable 
quality of documentary and interview data on associations. In Chapter 5, I test the 
relative strength of the other three modes of business-government relations as well as 
explanations purporting to explain their relative strength. The main method is 
quantitative analysis of survey data, backed up by qualitative interviews and 
documents. Chapters 4 and 5 conclude that the soft state is the most important mode 
o f business-government relations in Poland. Although, the results constitute very 
strong evidence, the analysis is mostly at a rather general level. Chapter 6 seeks to 
complement this general analysis with a more detailed case study of labour law 
making from 1997-2001. This issue area was chosen because of the large amount of 
lobbying around it and because of several features that made the personalist approach 
problematic. Thus, its conclusion that personalism was important may well be
16
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generalisable to other issue areas in which conditions are more propitious for 
personalism. The case study is based on documentary and interview evidence. 
Chapter 7 sums up and discusses some general issues arising from the thesis. 
Specifically, it investigates whether the conclusions can be extended beyond Poland, 
and whether they can be extended beyond the 1990s.
Arguments based on a diversity of sources are much stronger than those based on 
one source or one type of source. One of the strengths of this thesis is its diversity of 
sources. When data collected by different researchers working on different projects 
point in the same direction this is a good sign, as is the agreement of qualitative and 
quantitative data. There are asymmetries in the quality and nature of the data and 
methodology used in different parts of the thesis. This, in itself, is not a problem. At 
each stage, an attempt is made to point out the nature of the sources used and this is 
kept in mind when assembling the conclusions of different sections into overarching 
arguments. For example, the labour law case study does not provide a 
comprehensive insider view of policy-making. Instead, it identifies a widespread 
perception that personalism was important and links this perception to a number of 
key events. In itself, the case study offers merely suggestive evidence for the 
importance of personalism in Polish business-government relations. However, in the 
context of the much stronger survey and interview data analysed in the previous 
chapters, it comes to a similar conclusion using a rather different methodology. This 
makes the thesis as a whole more convincing. In the next sub-section, I describe in 
more detail my principal sources.
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3.3 Sources 
Documents
The data used in the thesis are overwhelmingly primary. In terms of written sources, 
the most important are newspaper reports. Here Rzeczpospolita (Poland’s only 
newspaper of record) and Businessman (a business magazine which has been 
published since very soon after the change of regime) were searched systematically. 
Other written sources were used on a more ad hoc basis. These include primary 
sources in terms of official documents and documents produced by business 
associations. While these written sources are important the main claims o f the thesis 
rest largely on survey and qualitative interview data.
Qualitative interviews
I conducted thirty elite interviews in 1999, 2000 and 2002. The interviewees were 
mostly businesspeople involved in lobbying and politicians involved in economic 
policy-making. Three professional political lobbyists and a senior trade unionist 
were also interviewed. Eighteen interviewees are senior representatives of what are 
generally regarded as Poland’s five most influential business associations.3 They 
come from the full range of backgrounds under the communist regime (opposition, 
old regime, emigre, private business, intelligentsia) and represent a wide range of 
sectors, excluding the special case of agriculture (state, private, privatised, small, 
large, sundown, sunrise, mining, manufacturing, services). The eight politicians
3 Krzysztof Jasiecki, 'Organizacje Pracodawcow i Przedsi^ biorcow w Polsce" in Jacek Wasilewski 
(ed.), Zbiorowy Aktorzy Polskiej Polityki (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of 
Sciences, 1997), 177; Businessman, July 1998, 69; Joanna Dzwonczyk and Aikadiusz Sobczyk, 
'Employer and Entrepreneur Organisations during the Transformation Period in Poland" in Jerzy 
Hausner, Ove Pedersen, and Karsten Ronit (eds.) Evolution o f Interest Representation and 
Development of the Labour Market in Post-Socialist Countries, (Cracow: Cracow Academy of 
Economics, 1995), 153-154; Wieslawa Kozek, Spoleczne Organizacje Biznesu w Polsce a Stosunki 
Pracy (Warsaw: Centrum Partnerstwa Spolecznego, 1999), 86
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represented the main political parties in the third Sejm. The full list of interviewees 
is provided in Appendix 2.
The first five interviews were in English and the rest have been conducted in Polish, 
thereby removing one obvious source of selection bias. Almost all of the 
interviewees were contacted independently of all the others, thereby removing the 
threat of a self-selecting group all telling the same story. Qualitative research rarely 
mentions its response rate, even though there is no good reason for this to be kept a 
secret. About 30 per cent of the people contacted consented to be interviewed. This 
represents a fairly good response rate for quite lengthy elite interviews by a bizarre 
foreign student. There seemed to be only one pattern to refusals to cooperate. It was 
impossible to get any representatives of employer organisations in coal or steel, in 
spite of a wide range tactics including intercession by various people. However, 
there was nothing particularly vital about these sectors in terms of the main questions 
of this thesis. This problem does not extend to heavy industry in general or state 
industry in general. For example, the vice-president of the Mining Chamber of 
Commerce did give a lengthy interview. Thus, the sample is quite representative and 
should reduce the likelihood of the bias of a particular individual or faction from the 
business or political elites from distorting the conclusions of the research.
The interviews averaged about forty-five minutes and were semi-structured. Again, 
the first five interviews had a clearly exploratory nature in contrast to the remainder, 
which adopted a largely standardised format. Appendix one contains the interview 
schedules for business leaders and politicians. Although the interview schedules 
give an accurate account of the information sought, and usually obtained, the conduct
19
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of the interviews was not as straightforward as they might suggest. Elites are 
accustomed to saying what they want to say, regardless of the questions they are 
asked. Most of the interviewees had extensive experience with the media and several 
had experience of academic interviews. The topic of business-government relations 
is sensitive in most contexts, and in contemporary Poland it is especially sensitive. 
Moreover, the status of the interviewer as a young foreigner made interviewees even 
more likely to give bland or very one-sided replies. A number of basis tactics were 
used to cope with this situation. The most obvious was preparation. Since the 
interviewees, or at least their organisations, were usually quite well-known, it was 
possible to gain quite a lot of relevant information prior to the interview. So 
questions could be begun, “Of course, it is well known that you ...”, or replies could 
be interrupted with, “But I thought you ...”. However, most interviewees expected 
this basic level of preparation. It was usually necessary to demonstrate that I had 
“inside” information, which was not generally known, or even generally available. 
Inside knowledge could be quickly demonstrated by alluding to information from 
unpublished documents or, better, from other interviews. While such a tactic might 
prevent platitudinous answers it might be seen as aggressive and prevent any answers 
whatsoever being offered. Thus, the impression of inside knowledge had to be 
married to an impression of objectivity and trustworthiness. Indeed, I was happy to 
let many interviews begin with a role reversal in which I would be interviewed as to 
what and who I knew and what information I wanted and what I intended to do with 
the information. Here it was important to emphasise that I was not searching for 
scandal as such, but was interested in the general characteristics of Polish business- 
government relations. My status as an academic and foreigner made it relatively 
easy to convince them I had no interest in attacking any individual, group, or point of
20
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view. If an interviewee did not question me, I would deliver a little speech saying I 
was “directing a research project”, I was interested in X, Y and Z and, crucially, that 
I had been talking to enemy A, ally B, and neutral-but-knowledgeable C. The last 
resort was to directly confront an interviewee with an assertion, or even accusation, 
made by another interviewee. No interviewee ever responded to such a challenge 
with a “no comment”, or “I will not dignify that rubbish with a reply”. On the 
contrary, they would say something interesting like “He would say that because ...”.
I have adopted a conservative attitude to generalisation from these qualitative 
sources. Although the sample is reasonably diverse and representative it is not a 
random sample. Moreover, the content of the interviews was not rigorously 
standardised. Thus, it would be misleading to quantify the responses of the 
interviewees. Even when many of them were asked exactly the same questions on 
one particular issue, it was in the context of different questions been asked in 
previous sections of the interview. Most of the conclusions from the interviews are 
on the basis of an overwhelming consensus amongst interviewees. Where there was 
no such consensus, differences of opinion are noted. The interview methods, 
combined with a reasonably diverse sample of interviewees, and a conservative 
attitude to generalisation, mean that I have a good deal of confidence in the 
interview-based evidence in this thesis.
Survey data
The second main source for the thesis is a survey carried out by the Institute of 
Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences in mid-1998 (ISP survey). The 
survey was concerned with the Polish elite as a whole and sampled political,
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business, administrative, cultural and non-governmental elites. The survey was 
designed to present a general portrait of the Polish political elite. Most of the 
questions were broadly inspired by the power-elite literature, which concentrates on 
the connections between members and sections of the elite, and the pluralism 
literature with focuses on the decision-making process.4 Many of the questions 
asked were directly relevant to the concerns of this thesis. Some relevant data were 
not used because of quality concerns. Notably, the replie^fsome questions relating to 
business associations were not consistent with either other parts of the survey or my 
qualitative research. I was provided with the interview schedule and briefed in great 
detail by the authors of the survey and they have read my quantitative analyses. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that this thesis suffers from the type of misinterpretations 
which sometimes the use of survey data by researchers who have not participated in 
their design.
This thesis uses only the business section of the survey. For this section, three 
hundred respondents were selected from the lists of the five hundred biggest Polish 
firms published by Polityka (quality weekly newspaper) and Gazeta Bankowa 
(equivalent of the Financial Times). One hundred and ninety four interviews were 
carried out making for a response rate of over sixty four per cent, a very good rate for 
a study of post-communist business elites. Since two members of some firms were 
interviewed there is data for one hundred and forty four businesses. In order to 
eliminate selection bias virtually all of the analysis in this thesis is based on one 
individual from each firm. This was done by randomly selecting one representative 
of each firm. Although the researchers were disappointed by this response rate, they
4 Jacek Wasilewski. "Kontekst Teoretyczno-metodologiczny i realizacja projektu 'Elita rzqdzqca i 
wladza elity: wzory powi^ zari mi?dz> elitami w Polsce" in Wasilewski (ed.), Elita Polityczna J998
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mention no pattern of non-response.3 Rather than bias the problem of non-response 
seems to be insufficient cases to perform some statistical operations. Those who 
consented to be interviewed answered the vast majority of the questions. There was 
a widespread refusal to answer a handful of highly sensitive, or even provocative, 
questions. Response rates are noted in all statistical analyses in this thesis.
I also made much more limited use of the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS), developed jointly by the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It is a survey o f over 4000 
firms in 22 transition countries conducted in 1999-2000 that examines a wide range 
of interactions between firms and the state. It includes interviews with 246 managers 
of Polish firms. In contrast to the ISP survey, 115 of the enterprises are small, 108 
medium and 23 large. Like the ISP survey, the BEEPS survey managed to get 
responses to a wide range of very sensitive questions. It has become a standard 
instrument of post-communist political economy and is well regarded.
4, Conclusion: The variable uncertainty of conclusions
The purpose of the previous section was to allow readers to assess the advantages 
and disadvantages of the methods used in this thesis, without being forced into 
giving them the benefit of the doubt or suspecting the worst. An attempt is made to 
continue the spirit of this section throughout the thesis by flagging any 
methodological issues and trying to assess their implications for the substantive 
concerns of the thesis. An important element of this approach is the 
acknowledgement of uncertainty. A conclusion is not a conclusion is not a
(Warsaw: Instytut Studiow Politycznych, 1999). 14-20
3 Wasilewski, ’"Kontekst Teoretyczno-metodologiczny i realizacja projektu", 19
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conclusion. Some of the statements in this thesis are presented with relative 
confidence and justifications for this confidence are offered. Other statements are at 
the level of informed speculation or plausible hypotheses. When this is the case it is 
admitted straightforwardly. While this thesis hopes to have explained some 
important variables, it does not claim to have explained all important variables. 
Some variables remain truly “independent” and are “outside the model”. This is as it 
should be for any sensible empirical work. I also want to emphasise that this thesis is 
in many respects “exploratory”. Although the World Bank and other institutions 
have very recently elevated the importance of business-government relations to an 
axiom, business-government relations has received little attention. The next chapter 
introduces the political and economic environment of business-government relations 
in post-communist Poland.
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Chapter 2:
The Polish Economy and Polity
1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a narrative of political and economic 
developments in Poland over any period of time, nor is it to offer a comprehensive 
snapshot of the Polish political and economic systems at any point in time. This 
chapter merely aims to include information/whiplf ] / essential for studying business- 
government relations in post-communist Poland. The test of the quality of this 
chapter is whether it allows the author to avoid misinterpretations which invalidate 
later arguments about business-government relations in Poland, and whether it helps 
the reader to understand the detailed analysis of Polish data in later chapters.
2. The Communist Polity
In communist regimes the party-state held a monopoly of power. There were two 
principal ways in which regimes deviated from this ideal type. Firstly, they varied in 
the extent to which the qualification for responsible positions in the party-state was 
active political loyalty. Secondly, the regimes varied in the extent to which they 
allowed an opposition to exist. Although Poland was clearly a communist regime, it 
was distinctive in both of these ways.
The official qualifications for membership of the Polish elite changed over time.1 
From the post-war foundation o f the communist regime until the return of
1 Jacek Wasilewski & Edmund Wnuk-Lipiriski, “Poland: Winding road from the Communist to the 
post-Solidarity elite”, Theory and Society 24, 1995, 677-679
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Wfadyslaw Gomulka to party leadership in 1956, the criteria for recruitment were 
largely political. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the party sought political 
loyalty as evidenced by membership of communist organisations in Poland and the 
Soviet Union, or recommendations from the Polish army formed in the Soviet Union. 
In the Stalinist period after 1948, a stress on proletarian social origins was added.2 
Under Gomulka, a combination of political and professional criteria was used. The 
requirement of proletarian origins was dropped and people in responsible positions 
were expected to hold significant educational qualifications. Nevertheless, the 
political element was still more important. Gierek’s leadership (1970-80) stressed 
technocracy and there was a stronger emphasis on educational qualifications and 
professional experience. This was facilitated by the huge increase of qualified 
personnel since the Second World War. The stress on qualifications frequently 
constituted credentialism rather than meritocracy: what mattered was the piece of 
paper, not the abilities of the applicant. These trends had much in common with other 
communist regimes, which also witnessed a general decline in political criteria and 
the rise of a technocracy.
The declaration of martial law in 1981 ^ heralded a sharp divergence between the 
organisation of the Polish political elite and her sister communist regimes. The very 
summit of the regime was now dominated by men who were primarily soldiers rather 
than party functionaries. Moreover, these soldiers were much more committed to 
geopolitical loyalty to the Soviet Union than they were to any ideological view of 
how domestic politics should be conducted. The military regime proclaimed a
" George Kolankiewicz & Paul G Lewis, Poland: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Pinter. 
1988), 51
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further shift towards expertise and away from politics.3 Officially, only a minimal 
requirement of non-opposition to the regime was required. Beyond this the best 
person for the job was to be selected. By this stage, the meaning of political loyalty 
had changed from a positive ideological commitment to a mere willingness to work 
within the system, without questioning its basic characteristics. Even party members 
were relatively passive.4 In addition to a commitment to high levels of education, 
General Jaruzelski introduced some new institutions, which served as alternatives to 
the party as guarantors of political loyalty.5 Although the decline of the party is an 
important feature of Poland in the eighties, party members were still 35 times more 
likely to occupy managerial posts than others. They accounted for three-quarters of 
the total number of managers.6
While the party-state was centralised and huge power lay with the politburo and the 
leader, the regime was always far from monolithic.7 The leadership was 
factionalised and limited elections had given freer expression to disagreements 
within the regime.8 In the late eighties there were three principal factions: those who 
sought to introduce substantial market elements and a rapprochement with the 
opposition; those who sought to promote self-management of enterprises and a re- 
emphasis on a strong party and those who wished to maintain the existing system 
with politics and the economy dominated by a bureaucracy.9 The latter faction 
represented many of the mid-level members of the regime in enterprise management
3 Kolankiewicz & Lewis. Poland, 80
4 Kolankiewicz & Lewis, Poland, 70-71; Frances Millard, The Anatomy o f a New Poland: Post- 
Communist Politics in its First Phase (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994), 38
5 Kolankiewicz & Lewis, Poland, 91-93
6 Jadwiga Staniszkis, The Dynamics o f the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 199,288
' Millard, The Anatomy of a New Poland, 37
8 Kolankiewicz & Lewis, Poland, 73
9 Staniszkis, The Dynamics of the Breakthrough, 120-122; Kolankiewicz & Lewis, Poland, 65
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or local administration. The regime was highly sclerotic and the leadership 
repeatedly failed to implement reforms involving the wider communist apparatus.10
The low morale, weak organisation, low membership and ideological heterogeneity 
of the party were all unusual characteristics of the Polish regime. However, the 
relationship between the party-state and society was the most distinctive 
characteristic of Polish communism. While uncovering differences between the 
organization of the Polish party-state and other regimes entailed delving into the 
murky politics of the party-state, the deviation from the normal communist treatment 
of national society was glaring. Although both were harassed and circumscribed, 
Poland’s large independent peasantry and her strong Catholic Church were largely 
independent of the regime, and in many respects went about their business as they 
had in pre-communist days.11 These were two massive exceptions to the rule that 
communist regimes dominate society and do not allow sources of social power 
independent of the party-state.12 For some authors this difference was easily enough 
to classify Poland along with the “authoritarian” regimes of Southern Europe and 
Latin America as opposed to the totalitarian and post-totalitarian regimes of other 
communist countries.13
Furthermore, the Polish regime was always relatively tolerant of more explicitly 
political movements. The post-war Polish regime was ruthless but flexible. Even the
10 Staniszkis, The Dynamics of the Breakthrough, 126; Kolankiewicz & Lewis, Poland, 171-172
11 Neal Ascherson, The Polish August: The Self-Limiting Revolution (New York: Viking, 1982), GO- 
64; Zbigniew Brzezinksi, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 12-13
12 Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism, new ed., (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 
1966), 318; Janos Komai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992), 360; Leonard Schapiro, Totalitarianism (London: Macmillan, 1972), 63-64
13 Juan J Linz & Alfred C Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996), 256
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five years of Stalinism in Poland were marked by comparatively few executions and 
arrests and a continuing failure to implement the collectivization of agricultural land. 
The events surrounding Gomulka’s return to power facilitated a period of free speech 
when the intelligentsia and students played an important political role.14 The anti­
intellectual and anti-Semitic purges of 1968 alienated the intelligentsia from a 
constructive role inside the party-state.15 However, Gierek’s strategy of “repressive 
tolerance” provided the opportunity for an innovative strategy of resistance to 
communism. In 1976, there had been an outbreak of strikes across Poland, and the 
leaders were quickly arrested. A group of intellectuals decided to defend the workers 
by simply trying to get the regime to obey its own laws.16 This group also co­
operated with the church, and it is this unique alliance, which is conventionally 
credited with the triumph of August 1980,17 when a communist regime signed an 
agreement with striking workers in Gdansk. The Gdansk agreement quickly led to a 
situation in which ten million Poles, including almost one third of the party, had 
joined the independent Solidarity union. With the imposition of martial law by the 
new leader Jaru
late 1980s Poland was by no means a country in which the party-state monopolised 
politics, society and the economy. There was a flourishing sphere of independent 
legal and alegal movements, societies and parties. There was a massive underground 
publishing industry.18 In addition, the party-state had begun to tolerate, and even
14 Nicholas Bethell, Gomulka: his Poland and his Communism (London: Viking, 1973). 195-196
13 Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism (New York: Karz-Cohl, 
1983), esp. 218
16 Jan Jozef Lipski, KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)
1' For example, Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, 2nd ed, (London: Granta, 199\\passim., 
esp. 305. In contrast, see Roman Laba, The Roots o f Solidarity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), esp. 180-181
18 Robert Zuzowski, Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland: The Workers' Defense Committee 
'KOR' (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 257
in 1981, Solidarity itself went underground. However, by the
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promote, private ownership outside the agricultural sphere. The next section 
introduces Poland’s communist economy.
3. The Communist Economy
In orthodox communist regimes the private sector was either virtually non-existent, 
as in the USSR, or of marginal importance, as in East Germany. None of the 
orthodox countries had seriously disrupted the system of central planning with 
substantial market elements. The degree of concentration of the economy varied as 
did the tightness of central control. Czechoslovakia’s economy was much more 
concentrated than that of East Germany but the huge sectoral economic units had 
more independence from the centre than enterprises in the East German economy. 
Some o f the orthodox countries were much richer and more efficient than others. 
There were big differences in the degree of corruption and the importance of the 
black market. Despite all these differences, all the orthodox countries had strictly 
communist economies.
Hungary and Poland were very different, both in terms o f the size of the private 
sector, and, in terms of the nature of the state sector. Both had substantial private 
sectors, which were vital parts of their economies and were encouraged by the 
authorities. In the post-war years, the new communist regime in Poland began to 
systematically persecute and eradicate the private sector, but seemed prepared to 
tolerate individuals engaged in service provision and artisanal production. This 
toleration was partly due to an official view that the state sector was not in a position 
to fill many of these economic gaps. Until the death of Stalin in 1953 the survival of 
the private sector was always in doubt. Thereafter, the sector was dependent on
30
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shifting attitudes towards private enterprise in the party-state. In 1956, the sector 
benefited from a general wave o f liberalization following leadership changes in the 
Soviet Union and in Poland.19 In 1970, there was a shift which allowed more 
entrepreneurs go into business, and allowed them accumulate more substantial 
incomes. Many of them did very well, even in comparison with senior officials.
In the mid-1980s there was a fundamental change in policy as the state decided that a 
large private sector could play an important role in rescuing the Polish economy. 
The private sector was to service the state sector with low-cost supplies. It could
70also provide employment for those released from over-manned state enterprises. 
The eighties saw the rapid growth of new forms of private property, which were able 
to enter the manufacturing and foreign trade sectors on a relatively large scale. The 
first of these were the so-called Polonia firms. Polonia firms allowed expatriate 
Poles to set up businesses in Poland. Later the Polonia firms were largely superseded 
by new legal forms that were the equivalent to private and public limited companies 
(spdlka z ograniczonq odpowiedialnosciq and spolka akcyjna) and by regulations, 
which allowed joint ventures with foreign capitalists regardless of their origin. 
Encouraged by the new attitude of the authorities the state sector started to do 
business with the private sector. In the case of many alegal and illegal ventures the 
actual distinction between state and private ownership began to break down.21 One 
purpose of the plethora of private sector ownership forms and constantly changing
19 Anders Aslund, Private Enterprise in Eastern Europe: The Non-Agricultural Private Sector in 
Poland and the GDR, 1945-1983 (London: Macmillan, 1985), 47-53
20 Kazmierz Poznan ski, Poland's Protracted Transition: Institutional Change and economic growth, 
1970-1994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 102
21 Jadwiga Staniszkis, Dynamics of the Breakthrough, 35; Jacek Tittenbrun, The Collapse o f ‘Real 
Socialism’in Poland (Lonon: Janus, 1993), 165, 182
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regulations22 affecting them was to undermine the cohesion of the private sector. 
The private sector was subject to the whim of the party-state.23 Opportunities for 
entrepreneurs to grow their businesses expanded greatly. In order to do so, it was 
usually necessary to cultivate political connections. Private sector firms often 
evaded rules and obtained exemptions.
In late communist Poland there was a significant private sector. The non-agricultural 
private sector officially accounted for 8 per cent of national income in 1986. The 
real figure was undoubtedly significantly higher24 and the private sector continued to 
grow strongly in the late eighties.25 The private sector was characterised by 
dwarfism as the state sector was characterised by gigantism. The average 
employment in private firms was only slightly above 2 persons including the 
employer and his family.26 The traditional private sector was concentrated in the 
service sector and artisanal production, while newer enterprises were beginning to 
get involved in manufacturing and foreign trade.
In the 1970s the Gierek regime tried to inject new life into the stagnant Polish 
economy, by using Western loans to stimulate demand and invest in high technology. 
The aim of this strategy was to upgrade the economy into more sophisticated 
production and enable exports to the West, with which to pay off loans. There seem 
to be a number of reasons why this strategy failed and Poland found itself in an 
unprecedented economic crisis in 1979, a crisis that effectively continued until the
22 Poznanski, Poland’s Protracted Transition, 214
"3 Jacek Rostowski, "The decay of socialism and the growth of private enterprise in Poland" in 
Stanislaw Gomulka & Antony Polonsky (eds.), Polish Paradoxes (London: Routledge, 1990), 204
24 Rostowski, "The decay of socialism", 199
25 Komai, The Socialist System, 72
26 Rostowski, "The decay of socialism”, 205
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mid-1990s. Contrary to a popular perception, there was some success in increasing 
the volume and quality of exports.27 The regime was not quite as monolithic as it 
had been and much of the new capital was eaten up by wage increases in politically 
privileged sectors. This meant that Poland’s debt began to mount to unmanageable 
proportions by the late 1970s. When the government tried to adjust patterns of 
consumption in 1976 and 1980, it set of political crises. The Solidarity episode of 
1980-81 meant that the government effectively lost control of the economy.
In the 1980s, the party-state sought a solution to its economic problems in a version 
of the quasi-market reforms undertaken in Hungary. Although there had been 
previous outbreaks of economic reform rhetoric in Poland, no serious attempt to 
modify the fundamental characteristics of the communist economy was made in the 
1960s and 1970s.28 In the 1980s a new and shriller outbreak of reform rhetoric took 
place in the context of unprecedented economic and political crisis. The 
“propaganda of success”, typical of communist regimes, and especially characteristic 
of Poland in the 1970s, was replaced with a “propaganda of crisis”. This new 
desperation was a reason to believe that this time the authorities might push through 
substantial reform of the state sector. The basic thrust of the reforms was to replace 
the system of detailed central planning with market or pseudo-market mechanisms. 
The share of material inputs subject to central allocation had decreased from 45 per 
cent in 1986 to 22 per cent in 1988,29 and a number of prices were subject to only 
limited controls. Enterprises were supposed to be “autonomous self-financing units”. 
The system of virtually automatic redistribution from efficient to inefficient
21 Poznanski, Poland’s Protracted Transition, Ch.5
■* Kolankiewicz & Lewis, Poland, 103-104
29 OECD Economic Surveys: Poland 1992 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Development and Co­
operation, 1992), 12
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enterprises was to be severely curtailed. Huge economic units were broken up in 
order to increase responsibility and competition.
On the whole, these reforms were a failure and in no way compared to the modest 
success o f Hungary’s reforms. The key features of the old system reappeared in new 
forms. Directive central planning was replaced by government contracts. Economic 
ministries retained their old role of preparing detailed lists of contracts and 
overseeing their detailed implementation.30 So many exceptions to the new formulae 
and regulations regarding subsidies and profits were granted that the level of 
subsidies changed very little. The main difference between the old and “reformed” 
systems was that subsidies were now granted on an even more ad hoc, uncoordinated 
and explicitly political basis.31 Many enterprises did not obey the spirit and even the 
letter of the new regulations and were very successful in resisting the intended 
economic discipline. Many regulations were badly designed and created perverse 
incentives that were exactly the opposite of those intended by the reform package as 
a whole. Although powerful cartels and associations of enterprises had been broken 
up, they continued to adapt and reform.
The failure of the reforms did not mean that Poland’s state sector retained the 
characteristics of an orthodox communist economy. Instead, the Polish economy 
became a chaotic mutation of the central planning and Hungarian reform models. In 
1988 and 1989 the Polish economy descended into chaos. Strikes, wage hikes and 
pre-election spending by the communist regime were some o f the factors that set off
30 Leszek Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 1995), 279-280
31 Kolankiewicz & Lewis, Poland, 109; Tittenbrun, The Collapse of ‘Real Socialism ’, 78-80, 83-86
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hyperinflation, and much of the population’s abandonment of the Polish currency for 
the dollar.32
4. The Political Transformation
Here, three types of exit from communism will be defined simply by the relative 
control of the old regime and the opposition over the transformation. In the case of 
collapse the old regime has virtually no control over the transformation towards 
democratic capitalism; in a negotiated exit the old regime and the opposition share 
control over the initial transformation and in a regime-led exit the opposition plays a 
relatively marginal role. Orthodox regimes either collapsed or underwent a regime- 
led transformation. Obviously, negotiation was out of the question in a situation in 
which there was only one substantial, organised political force. In unorthodox 
regimes, the passage to the new regime was negotiated by the communist authorities 
and the opposition.33
East Germany and Czechoslovakia are cases of collapse. When mid-level authorities 
or street-level law enforcers disobeyed the leadership’s orders for the usual brutal 
crackdown on mass protests the hugely illegitimate regimes ceded power to new 
democratic leaderships in a matter of days.34 In the German case, the transition to 
the new regime was completed by the communist state’s incorporation into the
32 Ben Slay, The Polish Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 86
33 Cf, Teny Lynn Karl & Philippe C Schmitter, ‘"Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern 
Europe and Eastern Europe”, International Social Science Journal, 43 (1991), 269-284; G L Munck, 
‘"Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Politics, 26 (1994), 361; Samuel 
Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Boulder.University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991), 113; Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, Gabor 
Toka, Post-Communist Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 29-31; Linz 
and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 57-60
34 David Piyce-Jones, The War That Never Was: The Fall o f the Soviet Empire 1985-1991 (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995), 245, 249, 333, 331; Linz & Stepan, Problems o f Democratic 
Transition, 324; Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse o f Communism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 157
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Federal Republic of Germany. In other orthodox regimes, the transformation was 
regime-led. In Bulgaria, senior members of the old regime committed themselves to 
transforming the communist system into capitalist democracy. The decisions to 
abandon the nomenklatura system and state ownership of the economy were taken 
before non-communists attained powerful executive positions. In Romania, a 
popular uprising and a good deal of violence gave the appearance of a “revolution”. 
Much of the violence seems to have been staged. When the smoke had cleared the 
new leaders were all men who had occupied relatively senior positions under
•  35communism. Such a palace coup is consistent with a regime-led exit from 
communism.
The exit from communism was negotiated in unorthodox regimes. Their very 
unorthodoxy meant that the authorities had some experience of reform and, more 
importantly, there was a significant opposition with which negotiations could be 
conducted. In Hungary, there were important elements of a regime-led 
transformation.36 Radical communist elites, led by Imre Pozsgay, tried to outflank 
their opponents within the regime by sponsoring opposition groups and by 
mobilising the masses.
In Poland the growth of the Solidarity movement had never been intentionally aided 
by the communist regime. Indeed, there had been an impressively efficient 
crackdown under Martial law. However, since 1980 the regime had said it wanted to 
work with “moderates” and not with irresponsible radicals -  the Solidarity leadership
35 Steven Roper, "The Romanian Revolution from a Theoretical Perspective”. Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, 27 (1991), 405
36 Timothy Garton Ash, We the People: The revolution of '89, witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin 
and Prague (Cambridge: Granta, 1990), 14; Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 99-100
36
The ‘Soft State’: Business-Govemment Relations in Poland -  Chapter 2
being irresponsibly radical. In 1988, widespread strikes bred economic chaos. These 
strikes were generally not Solidarity strikes but were organised by younger and more 
radical workers. The government’s desideratum of the co-option of non-communist 
representatives to the cause of economic reform had finally come to pass -  not 
because the government had managed to create a moderate constituency closer to the 
regime than Solidarity but because Solidarity had been outflanked by the 
spontaneous strikes of workers who were less inclined to compromise than Solidarity 
itself.
The downfall of Polish communism was precipitated by a reform plan that went 
wrong. The regime’s decision to negotiate was symbolised by the Round Table 
negotiations held outside Warsaw. The outcome of the talks was decided in advance. 
Solidarity would be legalised but would have to profess its support of “socialism”. 
There would be elections but these would be organised so that all the real power 
stayed with the communist regime. A new Senate with little power would be one 
hundred per cent freely elected. Most power was to remain with the lower house of 
parliament, the Sejm, 35 per cent of the seats of which were to be freely elected. A 
new presidency with control over defence and foreign affairs was designed for 
Jaruzelski and was supposed to reassure the Soviet Union. To the surprise of both 
sides, Solidarity representatives were elected to virtually all the contested seats. A 
shaken Jaruzelski offered Solidarity a junior coalition role. The Solidarity leadership 
refused. Even more surprising than the election result was the defection of the 
satellite parties, the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party. These parties 
had previously been so docile that they merited little more than a footnote in the most 
detailed treatises on Polish politics. However, some of their representatives were
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* 2 7Solidarity sympathisers and members, as were some of the communist deputies. 
They refused to support Jaruzelski and so the Sejm’s composition allowed Solidarity 
to offer the communists a role in a Solidarity-led government.
The institution of the Round Table also played a role in the exit from communism in 
other countries. However, this is no reason to claim that the exit from communism 
was negotiated in these other cases. In Czechoslovakia, the communist authorities 
were in no position to negotiate: the Round Table made their capitulation a little
more dignified and aided the smooth hand-over of power. In Bulgaria, the regime
had great difficulty finding opposition interlocutors for its Round Table
“negotiations”. Many of Bulgaria’s most famous dissidents rejoined the communist 
party when they were released from jail. In Poland itself, actual negotiations were 
conducted behind the scenes and the Round Table existed primarily to legitimate 
rather than to negotiate.38 This symbolic function was imported by other countries.
5. The Economic Transformation
The new Solidarity-led government found itself in an alarming situation. For a 
decade Poland had been struggling to return to the living standards of the late 70s. 
The state had lost control of the economy. Hyperinflation was developing. Poles 
increasingly held their savings in dollars. The black and grey economies rivalled the 
formal sector. Poland had no prospect of meeting payments on her massive foreign 
debt. Wages spiralled and “spontaneous privatization” reached epidemic 
proportions. These conditions set Poland apart from Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
37 Millard, Anatomy of a New Poland, 67
38 Staniszkis, The Dynamics o f the Breakthrough, 196-198
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In those countries, there was no urgent macroeconomic crisis and, therefore, 
politicians could consider a more gradual transformation of the communist economy.
The economic plan of the new regime was designed by professional economists from 
Poland and the US, with little direct input from the political leadership. However, 
Solidarity’s political leadership frilly backed the economic reforms, partly because 
their drastic neo-liberal content also performed an important political function. 
Taking the state out of the economy meant taking the party-state out of the economy. 
This was an important objective for the Solidarity elite who felt they had little 
control over a huge obstructionist bureaucracy.39 The reforms were spearheaded by a 
young professor of economics, Leszek Balcerowicz, who had spent many years 
studying Poland’s attempted reforms and analogous situations in other countries. 
The main lesson he drew from Poland’s reforms was that tinkering with the system 
would not work. Crucially, a decentralization of economic decisions would not work 
without genuine competition in the economy. Therefore, the plan to had to limit the 
opportunities for monopolistic and oligopolistic domestic enterprises to simply raise 
prices and wages. The plan implemented not just a freeing of prices and barriers to 
new firms but also a radical opening to international trade.40 However, on top of 
these measures, the state imposed a controversial special tax on wage increases, 
known as the “popiwek?'. From other countries, Balcerowicz had learnt that only the 
most radical fiscal and monetary reforms were capable of defeating hyperinflation.41 
Therefore, subsidies to consumers and enterprises were slashed and money creation 
by the National Bank o f Poland was halted. A comprehensive plan drawn up by 
academics was rigorously implemented. However, since much of the plan, was not
39 Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy, 43
40 Slay, The Polish Economy, 92
41 Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy, 45
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so much theoretical, but based on an interpretation of past Polish and Latin American 
experience, the common term “designer capitalism” is somewhat misleading.
The result was wrenching economic change. Balcerowicz and his team fully 
expected a recession but it was much deeper and more prolonged than they had 
expected. One reason for this was surely that all of Poland’s post-communist trading 
partners were experiencing similar recessions. In 1991, the Soviet market collapsed. 
However, the plan achieved virtually all of its short-term aims. Inflation was 
reduced very quickly; the currency and budgetary situation stabilised; international 
trade took off; there was an immediate shift from industry to services; and hundreds 
of thousands of new businesses were created. Crucially, long-term structural change 
in the economy was started. However, the plan did not address the most fundamental 
issue of structural change. Its temporary solution to the issues posed by state 
ownership, the “popiwelc” was regarded as inadequate by all, including those who 
dreamt it up in the first place. Privatization was a complex microeconomic process, 
which could not be implemented by administrative fiat like macroeconomic 
stabilisation. A discussion of privatization belongs in the following treatment of 
Poland’s post-communist economy.
The enduring controversy and passion surrounding the Balcerowicz plan should not 
be interpreted as an indication that Poland’s political elite was divided over the basic 
aims of the post-communist transformation. There was a wide and firm consensus 
that difficult economic change was necessary and that its only aim could be a market 
economy, integrated with global capitalism. Indeed, this had been the basis of the 
deal between the communist regime and Solidarity. It was most explicitly reflected
40
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in the technocratic wing of the communist party and the intellectual wing of 
Solidarity. Undoubtedly, most of the 
participants in the negotiations foresaw 
reform, that would be uncomfortable, 
but would be much less radical and 
much more gradual than the 
Balcerowicz plan. They were of course 
working under an assumption that the 
economy would not be as chronically 
imbalanced as it was when the Mazowiecki government took power. In addition, the 
pact was based on a gradualist vision of political change. It was not expected that the 
government would be controlled by Solidarity. Once the Balcerowicz plan was 
implemented it was virtually impossible to undo. The reform consensus can be 
summed up by the phrase “Return to Europe”. In general terms this meant the 
adoption of a capitalist democratic regime as in Western Europe. More specifically, 
this meant membership of the European Community. The acquis communautaire 
spelled out in great detail exactly what a Return to Europe would mean and there was 
very little room for negotiation on the Polish side. Of course, there was considerable 
diversity of socio-economic models in the European Community, and a debate raged 
about how exactly to reach the desired socio-economic model. These options were 
reflected in the party system, albeit usually with little clarity. Nonetheless, the basic 
consensus on market reform was much more important.
Biography: Leszek Balcerowicz
Bom in 1948. A professor of economics he 
left the United Workers’ Part)' in 1981 and 
became an economic adviser to Solidarity. 
From 1989 to 1991 he was finance minister 
under two premiers. In this time he designed 
and implemented the "Balcerowicz plan” of 
shock therapy for the Polish economy. This 
made him the most hated man in Polish 
politics but also won him many admirers. 
After returning to academia and advising on 
reform in other post-communist countries he 
re-entered politics as the leader of the 
Freedom Union in 1995. He became finance 
minister again in 1997 and governor of the 
Central Bank in 2001.
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6. Polish Democracy
Poland’s new democracy has been less stable than the polities of many of its post­
communist neighbours. One of the reasons for this was the nature of the Polish exit 
from communism. Since it was a negotiated transformation, an unelected 
communist presence was maintained at the highest levels, even though the leadership 
of the country came from the opposition. Therefore, many key actors refused to 
recognize the legitimacy of certain institutions, and indeed the system as a whole. 
Moreover, the system had not been designed for democracy, nor had it been 
designed for a situation in which competing groups would simultaneously control 
different key institutions.
6.1 The party system
The forces which contested the election of 1989 underwent a rapid process of 
transformation and fragmentation. In early 1990 the United Workers’ Party voted 
itself out of existence. Its property was transferred to a new party, Social 
Democracy of the Third Republic. Most, but by no means all, of the communist 
deputies also transferred their allegiance. The party’s new beginning was 
exemplified by its leader: a slick young moderate called Aleksander Kwasniewski. 
After a complicated set of splits and relaunches the United Peasant Party merged 
with other new or revived peasant parties. The Democratic Party virtually 
disappeared. Solidarity was an extremely heterogeneous organisation and its 
fragmentation was virtually inevitable:
It was a trade union, a diffuse political movement organized in the citizens’ committees, a 
parliamentary body and the leading force in the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Linked
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tenuously to the industrial trade union was Rural Solidarity, organizing individual peasant 
farmers.42
Nevertheless, these organizations managed to stay more or less united until 1990. 
The break-up of Solidarity was precipitated by increasing hostility between Lech 
Walesa, the head of the trade union, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the prime minister. 
They ran against each other in the 1990 presidential election, which Walesa won 
easily. In the aftermath of his election, Solidarity’s deputies split into a number of 
parties that supported the government and its drastic economic reforms and another 
group of parties that advocated greater economic intervention.43
Poland’s first fully free parliamentary election was held in 1991 and produced a 
record-breaking 10.8 parliamentary parties. Even these parties were often heavily 
factionalised and some split up before the next election. One reason for this extreme 
fragmentation was the very proportional party-list system, which had no thresholds. 
In 1993 the electoral system was changed with the intention of reducing the number 
of parties elected to parliament. The 1993, 1997 and 2001 elections have produced 
moderately multi-party results. The 1993 election was highly disproportional and 
ironically resulted in the elimination of the authors of the new electoral system from 
parliament. By 1997, parties seemed to have adapted to the electoral system by 
forming alliances of parties large enough to pass the relevant thresholds.
In terms of its ideological space, Poland has a “two-and-a-half dimensional” party 
system. The first two of these dimensions are represented in Figure 2.1. It plots the
42 Millard, Anatomy of a New Poland, 119
43 Millard, Anatomy of a New Poland, 133
The ‘Soft State’: Business-Govemment Relations in Poland -  Chapter 2
positions of the main parties in the third Sejm (1997-2001), since this period is the 
main focus of this thesis.
The third dimension is a genealogical dimension that divides parties, which have 
succeeded the official parties of the previous regime from those parties which have 
their roots in the opposition to communism. This genealogical dimension tends to be 
correlated with the social issues dimension. The secular liberals tend to have 
considerable continuity with the previous regime, or have a pragmatic attitude 
towards those who have such continuity, while the traditionalists tend to be bitterly 
anti-communist and anti-post-communist.
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Figure 2.1: Ideological Space of the Third Sejm
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Democratic 
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Union
Peasant
Party
Market
Liberalism
“Centre”
Social
Protectionisi
Solidarity 
Electoral Action
Religious
Authoritarians
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Note: This figure is based on a diagram representing an elite survey of parties in 1993 in Kitschelt, 
Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Toka Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and 
Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 233. The 1997 parties are 
direct descendants of the 1993 parties. The) are located in the spaces occupied by their organisational 
predecessors in 1993.
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The Polish meaning of the left-right continuum can seem eccentric to those 
socialised in Western European political vocabulary. Positions on secularism and 
liberalism versus religion and traditionalism are more strongly associated with the 
classification of parties as left, right and centre than economic policy. In Figure 2.1, 
the economic dimension, which most often forms the basis of a left-right divide in 
other countries is ranged along the X-axis from left to right. However, left, right and 
centre are largely not defined by economics in Poland. In order for the Polish 
meaning of left and right to be represented on Figure 2.1, it would have to be rotated 
ninety degrees anti-clockwise. In other words: the left-wing Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) claims a social-democratic identity but is more clearly defined by its 
secular, liberal attitude and its genesis in the United Workers’ (communist) party. 
The right-wing Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) was a loose alliance of groups that 
had little in common other than a vague traditionalism and a hatred of communism. 
Most notably, it had virtually no coherence on economic issues, traversing almost the 
entire economic ideological spectrum. Both AWS and SLD were strongly connected 
to rival union confederations. Solidarity was linked to AWS and the All-Polish 
Trade Union Federation (OPZZ) was linked to the SLD. The centrist Freedom 
Union is a liberal party in the sense that it is pro-market and secular. It has its roots 
in the opposition to communism. The last vital political player at this time was the 
Peasant Party. It is firmly linked to its farmer constituency, espouses moderately 
nationalist economics and has a background in both the communist regime and the 
anti-communist movement. It is perceived as moderately left of centre. Polish 
politicians, especially those concerned with economic policy, are acutely aware that 
the main political divide does not relate to economics. Obviously, the lack of party 
political definition on economic issues is an important part of the context of
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business-government relations in Poland. Whenever the terms left, right and centre 
are used in this thesis, they are meant in the Polish sense.44
The other notable element of Polish party politics is the extraordinary instability of 
the right, the great instability of the centre and the, until very recently, substantial 
stability of the left. The Polish right lost virtually all of its parliamentary 
representation in 1993. In 1997, it returned to power in the guise o f Solidarity 
Electoral Action. In 2001, the party which formed a single party minority 
government failed to return a single deputy to parliament. Two new parties 
represented some of the right-wing electorate. Related to these ups and downs, the 
right wing has always been bitterly fractious. The centre has had a substantial 
presence in all Polish parliaments but has had limited continuity in the form of 
political parties. In 1997 the centre was represented by the Freedom Union. In 2001 
this party also failed to get back into parliament. Its personnel were substantially 
represented in a new party, Civic Platform, which also included some of the more 
centrist elements of Solidarity Electoral Action. In contrast, in spite of some minor 
name and organisational changes, the left has constituted a continuous, united, and 
relatively disciplined party. However, in 2004 the Social Democratic Union split and 
it is very possible that neither the mother party, nor the newly separate party will
44 Tadeusz Szawiel, "Zroznicowanie w lewicowo-prawicowe i jego korelaty" in Radoslaw 
Markowski, (ed.), Wybory Parlamentarne 1997: System Partyjny, postawy polityczne, zachowanie 
wyborcze (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, 1999); Aleks Szczerbiak, "Interests and Values: 
Polish Parties and their Electorates”, Europe-Asia Studies, 51 (1999), esp. 1420-21. Some authors 
tend to stress the similarities of Polish parties to their Western counterparts and, the importance of the 
socio-economic left-right dimension However, even these scholars admit that its importance is lesser 
than that of the socio-cultural dimension and attitudes to the previous regime. See Kitschelt, Post- 
Communist Party Systems, esp. 387 and Paul G Lewis, Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern 
Europe (London: Routledge, 2001), esp. 50-59,80-81
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return to parliament after elections. In contrast to all other parties, except the 
Peasants, the left has also has a solid organisational base.43
6.2 The government
The principal locus of political power in Poland is the cabinet, which is responsible 
to the Sejm, the lower house of parliament. The Sejm is far more powerful than the 
Senate. If the Senate rejects or amends a bill passed by the Sejm, the Sejm can 
override its decision by means of an absolute majority vote, as opposed to the simple 
majority required for the Sejm to pass a bill in the first place.46 The constitutional 
power of the premier was increased by the 1997 constitution, which removed the 
president’s right to a role in the appointment of foreign, interior and defence 
ministers. The “Little Constitution” of 1992 introduced a German-style constructive 
vote of no-confidence. Like most of their continental European counterparts, Polish 
ministers have a cabinet of political appointees to assist them, who perform many of 
the functions traditionally carried out by career civil servants in Westminster 
systems. The Prime Minister’s office has been relatively weak in terms of 
institutional resources, and it has not been able to dominate or frequently even co­
ordinate the work of the line ministries.47
The positions of the cabinet and premier have been substantially determined by the 
position of the presidency and the party system. For all of Walesa’s tenure and, for 
four years of Kwasniewski’s, the president has had to deal with a cabinet from a 
different party. Although cross-nationally cohabitation or its absence is the main
45 Szczabiak, Aleks, 'Testing Part) Models in East-Central Europe: Local Part) Organization in Post­
communist Poland”, Party Politics, 5 (4), 1999
46 KonstytucjaR.P., Art 121.3
47 Radek Zubek, "A Core in Check: the transformation of the Polish core executives”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 8 (6), 2001
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factor influencing presidential-cabinet relations, this has, so far, not been the case in 
Poland. The pragmatic Kwasniewski has managed much smoother relations with all 
cabinets, than did Walesa.
The cabinet’s nature has largely been a function of the party system, and here Poland 
is no different to elsewhere. All Polish cabinets, until 2000, have been coalition 
governments. Some coalition governments have lacked majorities in parliament, as 
did two one-party governments. The Polish premier has not, until recently, been the 
leader of the largest party in parliament. The difficulties of forming coalitions, 
satisfying the existing president and the presidential ambitions of party leaders have 
all been reasons why lesser political figures have held the premiership. Furthermore, 
cabinets and premiers have had to deal with putative coalition parties, which 
displayed a conditional loyalty to the government, and weak party loyalty amongst 
the deputies belonging to coalition members.
Poland’s first non-communist prime minister and cabinet for over forty years had a 
relatively free hand when they came to power. They had huge popular support, were 
protected by the “reform umbrella” of Solidarity, and generally received polite co­
operation from the remaining communist appointees. However, the fragmentation 
exemplified and exacerbated by the presidential election, made the situation much 
more difficult for Mazowiecki’s successors. They had to spend a huge amount of 
time in political management of their cabinet and political parties in the Sejm. In any 
case, most of them spent relatively short periods in office. From 1993 to 1997 there 
was a relatively stable coalition o f the left and the Peasant party. However, prime 
ministers were the creatures of their parties, and the pre-eminent leftist,
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Kwasniewski was, of course, running for, or occupying, the presidency. From 1997 
to 2000, the liberal and Solidarity coalition exhibited some stability in senior 
personnel, but was chronically weak due to its incoherent party base. The return of 
the leftists and peasant coalition, has not brought a return to stability: the junior 
partner has left and the left-wing minority government is managing to surpass even 
the unpopularity of its right-wing predecessor. It has now become so unpopular that 
after Poland’s accession to the European Union in May 2004, the prime minister will 
resign and will probably be replaced by a technocratic caretaker government and 
premature parliamentary elections.
6.3 The presidency
The relationship between parliament and the president has been the major 
constitutional instability in Poland. In 1989 and well into 1990, these problems were 
not acute, as Jaruzelski apd^tjid^left the Solidarity leadership to take the real 
decisions.48 The real chaos began with the election of the leader of Solidarity’s trade 
union wing to the presidency. Lech Walesa increasingly saw the presidency as the 
only legitimate political institution and, instead of working with, or in parallel to, 
parliament, he sought to undermine it. A fully democratic election to the Sejm in 
1991 did not help matters since the highly proportional electoral system elected what 
some calculated was the most fragmented parliament in the history of any country. 
During this period there was intense struggle over both legislative and executive 
authority between Walesa and a succession of weak post-Solidarity and liberal 
governments. This was aptly known as “the war at the top”. In 1992, the Sejm 
managed to muster the two-thirds majority to pass a “little constitution” which
"7
48 Millard, Anatomy of a New Poland, 150
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clarified the relationship between the presidency, government and Sejm, largely by 
codifying the early post-communist relationship. Central to this was a recognition of 
the president’s level of control over the defence, interior ministry and foreign affairs 
ministries. The Little Constitution also attempted to bolster government stability by 
introducing a German-style “constructive vote of no-confidence” and a detailed 
procedure, which encouraged the president and Sejm to agree on a prime minister.49
In 1995 Aleksander Kwasniewski narrowly defeated Walesa in the presidential 
election.50 His relationship with his post-communist colleagues in government since 
1993 was relatively harmonious in spite of occasional tensions.31 In 1997 a new 
constitution was finally passed. Until 1997, the president had the right to nominate 
the prime minister, a legislative veto which could only be overridden by a two- 
third’s majority in the lower house of parliament, the right to submit bills to the 
constitutional tribunal and a right to appoint the ministers of foreign affairs, defence, 
and internal affairs. The new constitution removed the president’s right to appoint 
ministers and made it possible for a slightly lower majority in the lower house of 
parliament to override the veto.32 Of course, even at this level, the government alone 
would not have enough votes to bypass the president.
In spite of these new limitations, the president remained a powerful political actor. 
During the third Sejm (1997-2001), the period on which this thesis concentrates) he 
had to “co-habit” with his political opponents rooted in the opposition to
49 Millard, Anatomy of a New Poland, 161
50 Frances Millard, ’‘The 1995 Presidential Election in Poland ", Journal o f Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics, 12(1996)
51 Ania Krok-Paskowska, "Divided Government in Poland” in Robert Elgie (ed.), Divided 
Government in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
5“ Konstytucja R.P., Art. 122.5; Frances Millard, Polprif Polish Politics and Society (London: 
Routledge, 2000), 31
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communism. His personal popularity and visibility as head of state gave him ample 
opportunity to criticise the government. He managed to successfully veto several 
important bills such as those changing sex education in schools, lowering personal 
income tax, and prohibiting any but the smallest businesses from opening on a 
Sunday. The Polish political system fits quite clearly into the category of semi- 
presidential regimes in that it has a popularly elected president and a prime minister 
and cabinet who are responsible to parliament. Polish semi-presidentialism tilts 
towards parliament, and the presidency is significantly weaker than in the 
archetypical semi-presidential regime, France.
6.4 Other institutions
There are significant political institutions in Poland beyond the national legislature 
and executive. There are three levels of elected sub-national government 
culminating in the sixteen provinces (there were forty-nine until 1999). These 
institutions are not very powerful and do not substantially qualify Poland’s status as 
a unitary state. Another set of devolved institutions were the health funds which 
were guaranteed a proportion of income tax revenues with which to buy healthcare 
from public and private institutions for all Poles.33 The current government has re- 
centralized health funding in one quasi-autonomous agency. Poland’s constitutional 
tribunal is powerful and has struck down several important bills, including some of 
those aimed at penalizing those who held high positions under the previous regime54 
and the most recent reform o f the health system. Poland’s central bank has been a 
source of political controversy since the mid-1990s. Its power to set interest rates
53 Iain McMenamin and Virpi Timonen, "Poland's Health Reform: Politics, Markets and Informal 
Payments", Journal o f Social Policy, 31 (2002)
54 Herman Schwartz, ’"Eastern Europe’s Constitutional Courts", Journal of Democracy, 9 (1998), 100- 
114
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and its insulation from political pressure make it one of the most powerful central 
banks in the world.53
6.5 Policy-making and implementation
The policy-making environment for Polish business is one in which it is difficult to 
avoid direct individualised involvement with the state, regardless of state or private 
ownership. This can be described as a situation in which private goods, decisions or 
policies applying to a particular firm or list of firms, are very important in 
comparison to public goods, decisions or policies applying indiscriminately to an 
abstract class of firms. For example, the importance of licences has not been a 
quickly diminishing legacy o f the communist period. According to Kloc, between 
1989 and 1996 the number of areas of business for which special licences was 
required increased from 11 to 2 1.56 In 2001, over 50 per cent of the Ministry of 
Economy’s decrees related to individual firms.57 That is to say over half of them 
related to the distribution of import quotas, subsidies, places in special-export zones, 
restricted licences for the production or trade of certain goods etc. The remainder 
consisted of regulations, which applied automatically to objectively defined groups, 
like health and safety regulations for particular industries.
All of this state activity, is reflected by the importance of the state to the fate of 
individual firms. In the ISP survey, one quarter of the firms had received a 
subvention, an allowance, a derogation or some other financial assistance in the last
55 Robert Haterski, Niezaleinosc Banfcu Centralnego (Toruri, Poland: Dom Organizatora, 2000)
56 Kamila Kloc, Szara Strefa w Polsce w okresie transformacji (Warsaw: Centre for Social and 
Economic Research, 1998), 35
5/ Author’s calculation from "Wykaz Rozporzadzen Mmisterstwa GospodarkT, 8 December 2001, 
www.mg.gov.pl/prawo/Prawo.htm,
53
The ‘Soft State’: Business-Govemment Relations in Poland -  Chapter 2
year.38 Almost one quarter held a special licence in that period.39 Over half had sold 
goods or services to the state. Over 11 per cent received the majority of their income 
from sales to the state.60 62 per cent of the firms benefited from at least one of the 
above private goods (sales to the state, financial assistance, licences).61 These 
categories of goods are likely to apply disproportionately to the biggest firms. 
However, others, such as the controversial allocation o f shares of the import quotas 
for many goods and public procurement at the local level, can be vital for much 
smaller firms.
The implementation of the law can produce private goods from laws or regulations 
that are formally public goods. The head of Poland’s Supreme Audit Chamber 
(NIK) writes:
T can but I don’t have to’ -  unfortunately, this principle operates in many fields of public 
administration. Investigation after investigation by the Audit Chamber points to the lack of 
clear and transparent rules for taking decisions on matters such as the distribution of import 
quotas, licensing, tax breaks, and even qualification for flood aid. Unequivocal conditions for 
entitlement to a quota or a benefit have not been specified. Bureaucrats distribute subsidies to 
hospitals or coalmines, arbitrarily deciding which mine, or which hospital, should benefit, 
according to their own personal taste.6"
Business representatives are acutely aware o f the importance of private goods, and
explain this situation by reference to both the distinctive post-communist legal chaos
and the limitations of the bureaucracy: “[The importance of private goods is
explained by the] low standard of the civil service, their poor pay, low qualifications,
58 Excluding missing cases of 4.2% of sample.
59 Excluding missing cases of 4.2% of sample.
60 Excluding missing cases of 12% of sample.
61 Excluding missing cases of 17% of sample.
62 Rzeczpospolita, Opinie, 9-10 December 2000
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•  • 63  •low morality and the fact that laws have been changing so frequently”. One issue, 
which exemplifies this phenomenon, is the constant stream of complaints from 
businesses about the caprice and inconsistency of the taxation authorities.64
No direct measure of the relationship between implementation and public and private 
goods exists. However, the tendency of a bureaucracy to transmute public goods into 
private goods probably increases as the bureaucracy becomes less efficient and less 
professional. The World Bank’s Aggregate Governance Indicators dataset combines 
three hundred measures o f the quality of bureaucracies worldwide, including both 
expert assessments and elite and popular surveys relating to 1998.63 The indicators 
are based on an unobserved components model, which reduces the huge range of 
measures to six basic indicators for samples of between 155 and 173 countries. In 
particular, three of these indicators are likely to be highly correlated with the balance 
of public and private goods produced by the system. The indicators are Government 
Effectiveness, the Rule of Law and Perceptions o f Corruption. Government 
Effectiveness combines the “quality of public service provision, the quality o f the 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service 
from political pressures and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
policies”. The Rule of Law combines “the incidence o f crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts”. The Corruption 
indicator includes a range of measures from “additional payments to get things done 
to the effect of corruption on the business environment”.66 Most of the elements of
63 Interview: Mordasewicz, 9 August 2000
64 "Czarna lista urzedow skarbowych”, Rankingi, www.businessman.onet.jrf
65 www.worldbank.org/wbi/g0 vernance
66 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, "Governance Matters", Policy Research 
Working Paper 2196 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999), 8
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the three indicators seem close to the idea that good governance consists of public 
goods rather than private goods.
The data suggests that Poland has relatively good governance. Its governmental 
effectiveness is better than 80 per cent of cases, its rule of law is better than 70 per 
cent and its prevention of corruption better than 72 per cent. The scores have a large 
margin of error but they probably provide the most objective overall assessment of 
Polish governance in comparative context. The scores can also be calculated for a 
narrower, and more meaningful, sample, which excludes all states classed as unffee 
by Freedom House in 1998.67 Narrowing the sample moves virtually all scores 
downwards. At 73 for governmental effectiveness, 63 for rule of law and 63 for 
corruption Poland is not too far away from a typical quality of governance. That 
Poland’s quality of governance is approximately in the best third of “free” countries 
would suggest that its bureaucracy is a long way from perfect and that, therefore, 
many private goods are created in the course of the implementation of formally 
public goods. However, it also suggests that Poland is not a country where there are 
no public goods worth pursuing. Staniszkis and the World Bank team present the 
useful concept of the privatization of public goods. This is when something, which
is nominally a public good, is transmuted into a private good, which benefits an 
individual enterprise or network of enterprises. Again, Poland’s intermediate status 
suggests that is not a place where all public goods can be “privatised” by the 
powerful. Political insiders in Poland seem to be aware of this intermediate status,
61 http://www.freedomhouse.org
68 Jadwiga Staniszkis, Post-Communism: the emerging enigma (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 1998); Heilman, Joel S, Geraint Jones, Daniel Kaufmann, Seize the 
State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Influence and Corruption in Transition, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 2444, September 2000
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where many goods are public, many private, some privatisable and others not. One 
lobbyist says:
In Poland it’s not so straightforward ... You can’t arrange everything on a personal level. In a 
democratic state you cannot do what you want, in contrast to Russia or the Ukraine where 
everything can be arranged. It’s different here in Poland.69 
For business lobbying this means that public goods cannot be ignored. It is not
possible for one of Poland’s most powerful firms to solve every issue on a one-to-
one basis. In many instances, if an enterprise wants a policy changed, then it has
little option but to lobby for what is a public good.
7. Polish Capitalism
7.1 Ownership structure
Privatization in Poland has taken place in several different ways. The first 
privatisations were alegal or illegal “nomenklatura privatizations”, in which 
members of the nomenklatura used their position to transfer state assets to 
themselves, by a variety of, more or less subtle, methods. These instruments were 
usually alegal, as opposed to illegal.70 Some of the state enterprise’s functions could 
be spun-off to a company owned by managers or employees. More blatant were 
expensive purchases from private companies owned by managers. Sometimes no 
goods or services were actually provided.71 The converse was also common: private 
companies would buy assets from state enterprises for a very low price.72 Within a 
few months of its formation the Mazowiecki government had moved to prevent
69 Interview: Dziedzic. 1 July 2002
,0 Staniszkis, The Dynamics o f the Breakthrough, 8
n Staniszkis, The Dynamics of the Breakthrough, 44
Tittenbrun, The Collapse of ‘Real S oc ia lism esp. 177-182; Poznaftski, Poland's Protracted 
Transition, 212
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further blatant nomenklatura privatisations.73 However, managers, politicians and 
bureaucrats still managed to do well out of later privatizations by allying themselves 
with workers or by obtaining more or less corrupt side-payments from investors.
The method of privatisation for a given enterprise under the new regime was heavily 
influenced by the size of the enterprise. For small and medium-sized enterprises, 
privatisation carried out by co-operatives and municipalities privatization via lease 
and liquidation were the most common methods. Another vital factor was worker 
self-management. Although introduced in 1956, this had only begun to become a 
reality in the 1980s. Obviously, the Solidarity episode put great pressure on 
management to respond to workers’ demands. The atrophy of the party-state meant 
that it was less able to dominate workers’ councils. By the time communism 
collapsed, workers’ councils were beginning to assert their full legal powers. 
Elements of both the communist and new regimes, saw privatization as a vital means 
of reducing or eliminating the workers’ control over enterprises.74
Under the previous regime, there was little practical difference between state and co­
operative ownership.75 However, the new regime decentralised and democratized the 
“co-operative movement” in a way, which transferred much of this property into 
genuine co-operatives. Many of these co-operatives have since been transformed 
into joint-stock companies. Municipal authorities were responsible for transferring
/3 Stanislaw Gomulka & Piotr Jasinski, '"Privatization in Poland 1989-1993: policies, methods and 
results” in Saul Estrin (ed.), Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe (London: Longman, 1994), 
221
4 Poznariski, Poland’s Protracted Transition, 221-222
'5 Gomulka & Jasinski, '"Privatization in Poland 1989-1993”, 227; Komai, The Socialist System, 77- 
80; Raphael Shen, Economic Reform in Poland and Czechoslovakia: Lessons in Systemic Reform 
(London: Praeger, 1993), 182
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large numbers of retail outlets to the private sector. Often this was done by means of 
a lease, rather than outright sale.76
•  * 77Medium-sized firms have largely been privatised by the process of “liquidation”. 
This refers to legal rather than literal liquidation. A state-owned enterprise was shut 
down and then most or all of its assets were leased or sold to new owners. This type 
of privatization was straightforward and therefore could be, and was, implemented 
quite quickly. It was dominated by the interests of workers and management, who 
usually managed to take over the enterprise in which they worked for relatively small 
sums of money. Although many of these can still be described as worker-owned 
firms, they are increasingly owned by their management and by external investors. 
One of the principal reasons privatization of co-operatives, by municipalities and by 
liquidation were often able to proceed reasonably quickly was because they were 
lightly regulated. In fact many of the techniques of nomenklatura privatisation were 
adapted to these situations.78 However, they were less flagrant and under a more 
definite legal cover than those carried out in the dying days of the communist regime.
The privatization of large firms has been bitterly contested, has taken a long time, 
and is far from complete. Workers and management have not generally been able to 
emerge as the owners of the large number of large firms, which typified the 
communist economy. Instead, they have been able to prevent privatization in the 
first place or receive a generous allocation of free shares and guarantees of 
employment. Large firms have been “commercialised” in preparation for
Gomulka & Jasinski, "Privatization in Poland", 226
7/ Piotr Kozarzewski, Elity Kierownicze Spolek Pracawniczych (Warsaw: Instytut Studiow 
Politycznych, 1999), esp. 24
Jacek Slonina, "Irregularities in the Privatization process" in Maria Jarosz (ed.), Direct 
Privatization: Investors, Managers, Employees (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, 1999), 151-168
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privatization. Commercialisation means that the enterprise is no longer a state 
enterprise but is basically a joint-stock company owned by the state treasury and 
subject to the same commercial code as private sector companies. This, o f course, 
eliminates worker self-management. However, workers were usually given a 
substantial minority of seats on the supervisory board of the company.79 
Commercialised enterprises have been privatised in two principal ways: on an 
individual basis and as part of the mass privatization programme.80
The individual route was sometimes described as the “British method”, since it had 
much in common with the thoroughly prepared privatisations carried out in Britain in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The great disadvantage of this was that Poland wanted to 
privatise thousands of enterprises, rather than a handful.81 An individual approach 
would be just too slow. However, there were important political and strategic 
reasons why the state should try to get the highest price and the most appropriate 
investor for key enterprises. There were three ways of actually selling the 
enterprises: a public offer on the stock exchange, a public auction, and negotiations 
with invited bidders. From 1997 to 2001, there were 12 public offers, 59 public 
auctions and 57 invited negotiations regarding commercialised state enterprises.82
The other route to the privatisation of large firms was mass privatization. All Poles 
over eighteen were entitled to one share in a National Investment Fund (NDF) on
19 Poland operates a two-board system on the German model. There is a supervisory* board and an 
executive board, which actually runs the company on a day-to-day basis.
80 Other methods, which have not been used so often, are described by Gomulka & Jasinski, 
’‘Privatization in Poland”, 232-235
81 Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy, 84; Gomulka & Jasinski, ’‘Privatization in Poland*’, 
221-224
82 Ministerstwo Skaibu Panstwa, Sprawozdanie o Stanie Mienia Skarbu Pahstwa: Majqtek Skarbu 
Panstwa i Panstwowych Osob Prawnych (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Skarbu Pahstwa, 2002), 82
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payment of a small fee. 25.7m of the 27m who were eligible did so. Polish-Western 
consortiums submitted bids to win the right to manage the 15 NIFs which each hold 
shares in groups of 33 or 34 enterprises. The ownership structure of a firm 
participating in the NIF scheme is such that:
• 33% of its shares belong to a single NIF;
• 27% belong to other NIFs;
• 25% are held by the state; and
• 15% are given to the employees of the enterprise.83
The shares of the NIFs are traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and shares in the 
firms themselves were eventually to become tradable.
While privatization may accurately describe the above processes, it is far too specific 
a word to describe the outcome of these processes: many of firms that have 
undergone, or are undergoing, privatization are a complex mix of public and private 
ownership. The NIFs are an example of mixed ownership, which is not clearly either 
public or private. Other examples of mixed ownership are privatizations in which 
the state treasury divests itself but other state agencies, state-owned enterprises or 
mixed-ownership enterprises buy some or all o f the shares. It is also important to 
remember that many firms with a majority state ownership have significant private- 
sector shares, while others with majority private ownership have significant state 
minority holdings. In 2001 there were almost three times as many firms in which the 
state had partial ownership as there were wholly state-owned commercialised firms.84
83 Jacek Klich, lecture, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, August 1998
84 Ministerstwo Skarbu Panstwa, Sprawozdanie o Stanie Mienia, 78. This excludes inactive firms or 
those in the process of bankruptcy or liquidation.
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Almost 93 per cent of the state holdings were minority shares.8:> These minorities are 
always enough to ensure board representation and frequently enough to constitute a 
veto. Diffuse and mixed forms of ownership do seem to be important in the Polish 
economy86 but are probably not as important as they are in other post-communist 
economies.87
It is important to note that the political importance of privatization may be greater 
than its economic importance. Most of the structural change in the Polish economy 
was the result of the formation of new private businesses,88 the expansion of pre­
existing private businesses, and foreign direct investment rather than the process of 
ownership transformation. Policy-makers were consumed with battles over 
privatization, but played little or no attention to small businesses until the second half 
of the nineties.
7.2 Sectoral structure
The early nineties brought massive structural change in the Polish economy. 
Between 1990 and 1995 the share of services in output soared from 35 to 53 per cent, 
while industry declined from 44 to 33 per cent and agriculture from 13 to 8 per cent. 
From 1995, this trend continued. In 1999 services accounted for 59.6 per cent of 
GDP, industry for 36.6 per cent and agriculture for only 3.8 per cent. While Poland 
has a lot of farmers their productivity is very low partly because many have other
85 Ministerstwo Skarbu Panstwa, Sprawozdanie o Stanie Mienia, 83. This excludes inactive firms or 
those in the process of bankruptcy or liquidation.
86 Zbigniew Drqg, "Elita biznesu: Autonomiczny segment elity polity cznej?" in Jacek Wasilewski 
(ed.), Elita Polityczna 1998 (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences,
1999), 58-61
87 Bernard Chavance & Eric Magnin, "Emergence of path-dependent mixed economies in Central 
Europe” in Ash Amin & Jerzy Hausner (eds.), Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Interactive Governance 
and Social Complexity (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1997), 213-215
88 Herman Hoen, The Transformation of Economic Systems in Central Europe, (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1998), 123
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jobs and many others are subsistence farmers. Within industry the share of various 
sectors changed enormously. For example the share of mining and quarrying 
declined from 13 to 5 per cent and output of furniture rose by 48 per cent between 
1990 and 1995. This reflected a re-balancing towards light industry away from the 
behemoths, which had been privileged during the communist era. The share of the 
private sector jumped from 28 per cent in 1989 to 55 per cent in 1995 and reached 75 
per cent by 2001.89 In spite of these changes, Poland, along with other “advanced” 
post-communist economies is still characterised by an economy, which has a large 
industrial and agricultural sectors and small services sector.90
Consumption
The changes in supply have reflected the changes in demand. A much higher 
proportion of Polish GDP is now constituted by consumption. Also, consumption 
patterns have changed a lot. For example, the assortment of foods purchased has 
shifted enormously. More fundamentally, the share of housing, commuting and 
healthcare have increased reflecting the, official and unofficial, commercialisation of 
services that were previously heavily subsidised or purely public.
Trade
Foreign trade also increased significantly. Exports of goods and services have risen 
from 19 to 25 per cent of GDP between 1989 and 1995 while imports have risen 
from 15 to 23 per cent. The lifting of restrictions by the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (the Soviet bloc’s supposed equivalent of the European
89 OECD Economic Surveys 1997; US Central Intelligence Agency, http://www.cia.gov
90 Iain McMenamin, "Is there an East-Central European Variety of Democratic Capitalism: A twenty- 
two country cluster analysis", paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Philadelphia PA, August 28-September 1,2003
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Community) and the recessions in post-communist countries prompted a massive and 
permanent switch in trade from East to West. The share of trade with OECD 
countries rose from a half to three quarters while the share of Central and Eastern 
Europe, which was about a third in 1989, had halved by 1995. The share of natural 
resource intensive exports declined to 45 per cent in 1995, as did exports with a high 
proportion of skilled labour, capital and technology, to 30 per cent. The export share 
of low-skill labour rose by ten percentage points. Roughly speaking, this reveals 
that, in spite of the changes in the structure of its trade, Poland still has a comparative 
advantage in low-skilled labour and natural resources.91
7.3 Growth and unemployment
The share of employment in different sectors did not change nearly so much as the 
share of output. Between 1989 and 1995 the proportion of total employment in 
services increased from 37 to 43 per cent, while industry and construction declined 
from thirty five to thirty per cent, with agriculture remaining at about twenty seven 
per cent. One of the few ways in which state socialism fulfilled its promises was in 
the elimination of unemployment. However, in 1989 one quarter of Polish 
employment was estimated to be non-productive.92 Unemployment rocketed during 
the transition to capitalism, reaching 17 per cent by 1994. It then declined, dipping 
below ten per cent in 1998. Unemployment has been increasing ever since, partly 
because of a slowdown in growth but also because of a demographic bulge. By early 
2002 it stood at nearly 18 per cent.
91 OECD Economic Surveys 1998
92 Tomasz Mickiewicz, '"Polish Labour Maikets", paper delivered at the School of Slavonic and East 
European Studies, London, 1998
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Figure 2.2: U nem ploym ent in Poland
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Poland was the first country to emerge from the post-communist recession, growing 
by 2.6 per cent in 1992. It was also the first country to exceed its pre-transitional 
GDP. Between 1994 and 2000 Poland, with Korea, had the second highest, after 
Ireland, overall growth rate in the OECD. This was the first period of sustained 
growth in Poland since the early seventies. However, by the late nineties growth was 
clearly slowing down and unemployment rising. By 2002, Poland was experiencing 
an economic crisis, with unemployment approaching twenty per cent and the 
economy barely growing. In 2000 its GDP per capita was approximately one third of 
the European average, and considerably lower than that of Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia.
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Figure 2.3: Economic Growth in Poland
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8. Conclusions
This chapter has provided a background to the Polish political and economic system, 
which is necessary for understanding the detailed analysis of business-government 
relations offered later in the thesis. As the introduction indicated, this chapter has 
considered features that Poland has in common with other capitalist democracies and 
other post-communist countries, as well as features that are uniquely Polish. In the 
next chapter I introduce the theoretical framework, which I will use to analyse the 
Polish case.
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Chapter Three:
The Four Modes of Business-Govemment Relations
1. Business in Post-Communist Business-Government Relations
A business can usually be defined as a profit-seeking organisation, which produces 
goods or services. One of the problems that face the researcher of post-communist 
business-government relations is that, under communism, there were relatively few 
such businesses. There were state-owned enterprises, which produced goods or 
services, but did not seek profit. Instead of providing a profit for shareholders, they 
performed a variety of other social, political and economic functions. It is important 
to remember that the multi-functionality of state-owned enterprises has decreased but 
has not been eliminated. Nevertheless, all commercialised firms are now officially 
profit-seeking. It is also worth noting that, while this multi-functionality is vastly 
more important in post-communist economies, it is also to be found in established 
capitalist democracies.
The emphasis given to profit making in post-communist state-owned enterprises 
varies, but it is virtually never considered irrelevant as it was under the previous 
regime. There are many state-owned providers and sellers of goods and services, 
which have not been commercialised, and cannot reasonably be construed as profit 
seeking. These organisations include, for example, educational and healthcare 
institutions. Collectively, many of them are part of what is known as the “budget 
sector”. This thesis, and the discussion in this chapter, should be construed as 
generally applying to private and state-owned enterprises in the commercial (or 
commercialising sector) rather than the budget sector.
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Of course, this poses a particular problem in trying to assess the importance of the 
communist legacy. Here, I try not to be overly restrained by definitional problems. 
There were clear antecedents of businesses in the state-owned communist economy, 
usually direct organizational antecedents. There were also antecedents of business- 
government relations, in that state-owned enterprises were influenced by, and tried to 
influence, the central authorities. However, I always keep in mind that these 
antecedents were, at most, antecedents and did not constitute business-government 
relations, in a strict sense.
This chapter presents four modes of business-government relations in capitalist 
democracies. It also provides explanations for the strength of the four modes. This 
chapter is distinctive amongst studies of business-government relations in a number 
of ways. Firstly, the number of modes of business-government relations is four. 
Most work concentrates on only one mode. Secondly, the relative strength of the 
different modes is seen as the key to understanding any one of the modes. Other 
authors usually study one mode in isolation. Thirdly, the chapter analyses the likely 
effect of post-communism on the relative importance of the modes.
2. The Modes of Business-Government Relations
Business-government relations consist of two major elements: the indirect (or 
structural) and the direct (or political).1 The indirect element focuses on the mutual 
dependence of business and government. Business cannot be conducted without the 
basic defence of private property provided by the state, as well as a plethora of more
1 Claus Qffe. ’‘Two Logics of Collective Action” in his Disorganized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity, 
1985), 170-220
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advanced services and institutions, which underpin contemporary capitalism. For 
example, the joint-stock company and the telecommunications system are vital to 
enterprises. Neither can exist except in a framework of government regulation.2 
Even more familiar is the government's dependence on business. The government’s 
resources are provided by the taxation of businesses, their employees and their 
customers. Most of a government’s time and most of a government’s popularity 
relate to economic management. Yet, the government does not directly control the 
economy. It has to coax or incentivise the private sector, which controls the 
economic resources upon which government depends.
This very special indirect relationship is the focus of most writing which highlights 
the difference between business and other interests in capitalist democracies. The 
state is not as dependent on other interests, such as unions, consumers, public interest 
groups and professionals, as it is on business.3 The structural element to their 
relationship is missing, so these groups must concentrate on the direct political 
element. They must lobby and pressure government in order to influence it, whereas 
business can influence government without ever going near it. In fact, it can 
influence government by fleeing from it and moving to another jurisdiction along 
with vital jobs and taxes. The indirect power of business is so great that it gives 
business greater direct access. Politicians are keen to engage with business directly 
for fear of what might happen if they relied on their structural interdependence with 
business. However, the increased access that structural dependence gives business is 
not the only difference between its direct relationship with government and that of
2 Mancur Olson. Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (New 
York: Basic Books, 2000); Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: 
Monthly Review Press, 1968), 5-13
3 Charles E Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), esp. 175
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other interests. It is much more seldom emphasised that business has a variety of 
channels of direct access to government, which are not available to other interests.
Government is very rarely interested in the representations of one single worker, 
consumer, environmentalist, or professional. Therefore, those who wish to have 
these interests represented must gather together in interest associations. Government 
is much more likely to take account of an association which represents a large 
number of individuals who share an interest. The same option is available to 
businesses. Indeed, business associations exist in all capitalist democracies and are 
often a very important feature of business-government relations. However, it is also 
possible for a firm to directly represent its interests to the government. Individual 
firms often have sufficient resources to be able to put their own view directly to 
policy-makers. Business also has a special relationship with political parties. Parties 
desperately need money for electoral campaigns and business has huge amounts of 
money. Finally, individual businesspeople are also able to gain access to policy­
makers, because the economic and political elite often come from similar 
backgrounds and occupy a single social space, or overlapping social spaces. In other 
words, a personalist option is regularly available to business and is much more rarely 
available to other interests. These four channels of access to government distinguish 
the direct element of business-government relations from other interest group 
politics. The representation of business interests involves a decision about which 
mode of access to use, or, more frequently, how to combine different modes of 
access. Businesses will need to weigh up the availability and effectiveness of these 
different ways of relating to government, before embarking on a political campaign. 
In contrast, for other groups in society, lobbying is overwhelmingly dominated by
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the activities of interest associations. Thus, the dependent variable of this study is 
the mode of access to government taken by Polish business.
The variety of channels of business access to government is not acknowledged by 
much of the literature on business-government relations. Most writers focus on just 
one of the channels, usually interest associations. While a focus on one of the 
channels is, of course, a valid and interesting exercise, some consideration of the 
other channels cannot be excluded. This is because the use of one channel involves a 
judgement that the other channels are unavailable or ineffective. A decision to use a 
business association to further a firm’s interests is also a decision not to use the other 
channels. There is a fair amount of writing, which investigates decisions to take one 
channel rather than another. Most of this work is limited to the two options o f the 
association or company routes. Others seem to include the other channels, but do not 
clearly distinguish them from each other.4 The closest approach, to the one taken in 
this thesis, is that of Grant. He explicitly identifies the “association”, “company” and 
“party states” of business-government relations. He implicitly contrasts the company 
state in contemporary Britain with an earlier period in which the personalist channel 
was available and frequently used. In this thesis, I call business-government 
relations conducted on this basis, a “soft state”, since the state is permeated by 
personal connections and networks.
The following four sections look at each of the channels of influence (associations, 
companies, parties, personal connections) in more detail. The first aim of each 
section is to clarify each mode of representation so that it can be employed
4 Joel S Heilman. Geraint Jones, Daniel Kaufmann, Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, 
Influence and Corruption in Transition (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000) 2
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consistently in the empirical analyses that follow. The second aim is to identify 
independent variables, which explain the strength of each mode of access. It should 
be remembered that, according to the approach taken in this thesis, these specialised 
independent variables are always combined with the general independent variable o f 
the relative availability of the different channels of representation.
3. The Association State
3.1 The dependent variable
In an association state, business associations dominate the interface of government 
and business. A business association is an organization, which represents the 
interests and opinions of non-agricultural businesses to the state. This thesis assesses 
the importance of associations in Polish business-government relations, relative to 
other channels of business influence on government. The literature on interest 
associations is enormous, usually ignores the possibility of alternative modes of 
business-government relations, and is dominated by some of the most chameleon­
like concepts in social science. The most prominent of these are civil society, 
pluralism, and corporatism. This section argues that civil society is a very similar 
concept to pluralism. It then adopts single definitions for pluralism and corporatism, 
respectively, and suggests that corporatist interest association politics exclude other 
channels of business representation in a way that pluralist interest association politics 
do not. Therefore, in this thesis, pluralism signifies relatively weak business 
associations and corporatism relatively strong business associations.
Most authors seem to assume that there is little controversy or ambiguity about the 
term civil society. However, there is, in fact, an enormous number of definitions,
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which vary according to intellectual status (a normative ideal5, a strategy of
6  7 8resistance to authoritarian rule , a description of Western society , an ideal-type ), 
scope (the state9, political parties, interest groups10, non-profit non-political 
organisations11, the economy12, culture13, family relationships14) and the importance 
of voluntariness.15
For a social science thesis the status of ideal-type is the most appropriate one for the 
concept of civil society. This provides a clear logical framework through which 
empirical data can be selected and assessed. Since this thesis is concerned with the 
interface of business and government the scope of civil society is best restricted to 
interest associations. Here, it is vital to understand interest associations as separate
5 Jean L Cohen & Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1992), xii
6 Adam Michnik, "A New Evolutionism", Letters From Prison and Other Essays, trans. Maya 
Latynski (London: University of California Press, 1987), 135-149. Also presented as a distinction 
between '"politics" and "anti-politics". John Keane, Civil Society and the State: New European 
Perspectives (London: Verso, 1988), 396-397
' John A Hall, Civil Society: History, Theory, Comparison (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 2; Hall, 
Civil Society, 81
8 Wolfgang J Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology o f Max 
Weber (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 74
9 John Gray, "From Post-Communism to Civil Society" The Re-Emergence of History and the Decline 
of the Western Model", Social Philosophy and Policy, 10 (1993), 29-30; Ernest Gellner, The 
Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Enemies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 193
10 Philippe Schmitter, "What’s all this nonsense about Civil Society?", paper delivered at Nuffield 
College, Oxford, 1996
11 Hall, Civil Society, 250-268
12 G W F Hegel, Elements o f the Philosophy o f Right, trans. H B Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), § 188
13 Krishan Kumar, "Civil Society: an inquiry into the usefulness of a historical term", British Journal 
of Sociology, 44 (1993), 382-3
14 Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1992), ix
15 Keith Tester, Civil Society (London: Routledge, 1996); Perez-Diaz, "The Possibility of Civil 
Society", 84-85; Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, 103. Michael W Foley & Bob Edwards, "The Paradox 
of Civil Society ", Journal of Democracy, 7 (1996), 38-52. This stress on voluntariness is largely 
under the influence of de Tocqueville who writes about "civil associations" but never uses the term 
civil society” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence (London: 
Fontana, 1994), 697, 513-517, 520-524. Civil society’s modem career was begun by Adam Ferguson 
for whom it means quite the opposite of assodability: Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of 
Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University7 Press, 1995), 24, 196. For many others civil society7 
is not necessarily voluntary. See, Hegel, Philosophy o f Right, § 255; Schmitter, "What’s all this 
nonsense about Civil Society-?"; Richard Rose, William Mishler & Christian Haerpfer, Getting Real: 
Social Capital in Post-Communist Societies (Strathclyde: Centre for the Study of Public Polic>?, 
University7 of Strathclyde, 1997), 4
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from individual private interests in the economy and the interests of the state. So, 
civil society refers to a vibrant, pluralistic and influential population of interest 
associations. Since many business associations (notably chambers of commerce) in 
democratic societies are compulsory, civil society will not be restricted to purely 
voluntary groups. The restriction of the scope to interest associations means that 
compulsoriness does not mean that the state can be treated as part of civil society in 
this definition. Finally, the exclusion of the state means the separation of the state 
from interest associations. Associations may be deeply involved with the state but to 
be part of civil society it must be possible to extricate the state from interest 
associations and interest associations from the state. Thus, civil society is defined as:
An ideal-typical relationship between private interests, interest associations, and the state in 
which a wide range of interest associations are able to obtain substantial goods for their 
members without "capturing" the state or any of its individual institutions or being "captured" 
by any of them.
This definition is not open to the charge that it is not the definition of civil society. It 
is open to the charge that it is not a definition of civil society at all, or that it is not 
the best definition o f civil society for assessing the importance o f business 
associations relative to other modes of business-govemment relations in Poland.
Like civil society, pluralism has a wide variety of meanings in social science. These 
conceptualisations vary according to status (a normative ideal, a description of 
Western societies, an ideal-type16), scope (all social interests17 versus interest
16 Wolfgang Streeck, "Between Pluralism and Corporatism: German Business Associations and the 
Stater, Journal o f Public Policy, 3 (1983), 265-84
17 Robert A Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961), 86
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associations18) and level of analysis (macro-political regime type19 versus system of
• 9ftinterest group politics in capitalist democracies ).
This thesis adopts a definition of pluralism as an ideal-typical classification of the 
role of interest associations in capitalist democracies. Pluralism consists of the 
following elements:
(1) Membership of associations is voluntary.
(2) Associations compete for members.
(3) Associations are typically organisationally weak.
(4) Associations pressure the political system from the outside, rather than participate from 
the inside.
(5) The pluralist system leaves space for business to frequently and successfully access 
government by channels other than interest associations.21
Corporatism is simply the opposite of pluralism for each of the five elements. 
Capitalist democracies can be identified somewhere along a continuum from the 
pluralist to the corporatist ideal-type. For example, Austria is highly corporatist, 
Canada highly pluralist and Ireland lies in the middle between the two ideal types. 
The fifth element of this definition is implicit in the literature, and has been explicitly 
included here to remedy the literature’s failure to consider business associations as 
competitors to other channels of business representation. Theoretically, there are two 
principal reasons why corporatist associations tend to crowd out other channels o f 
influence in a way that pluralist associations do not. Firstly, corporatist associations
18 Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?'', T , Review of Politics, 36 (1), 1974, 93-96; 
Alan Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 11-12
19 Grant Jordan, "The Pluralism of Pluralism: An Anti-Theory‘r  in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), Pressure 
Groups (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 60-61
20 John Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984); 
Bemd Marin, "Organizing Interests by Interest Organizations: Associational Prerequisites of 
Cooperation in Austria”, International Political Science Review, 4 (1983), 197-216
21 C.f Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 172; Schmitter, "Still the Century o f 
Corporatism?”
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mobilise much greater resources than do pluralist associations, and therefore make 
other channels relatively unattractive 22 Secondly, their monopolistic relationship 
with the state directly blocks and invalidates other modes of business-government 
relations. Empirically, the other channels o f influence are usually associated with 
pluralist systems of business association. For example, the company state has been 
most frequently discussed in the context of the highly pluralist systems o f Britain, the 
US and the European Union. Agh sees corporatism as a system that can crowd out 
the dominance of political parties over business-govemment relations.23
Similarly to the definition of civil society, this definition is not open to the charge 
that it is not the definition of pluralism. It is open to the charges that it is not a 
definition of pluralism at all or that it is not the best definition of pluralism for 
assessing the importance of business associations relative to other modes of business- 
govemment relations in Poland. Since the definition of pluralism and the definition 
of civil society are so similar,24 the term civil society will be dispensed with and 
interest associations in Poland will be evaluated according to whether they are 
pluralist or corporatist.23 From now on, pluralist and corporatist should be
22 Philippe Schmitter & Wolfgang Streeck, The Organization of Business Interests: A Research 
Design to Study the Associative Action o f Business in the Advanced Industrial Societies of Western 
Europe (Berlin: International Institute of Management, 1981), 124-132
33 Attila Agh, Politics in Central Europe (London: Sage, 1998), 112
34 Stephen Padgett, Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany: Interest groups in post-communist 
society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 6, 50
35 Some other popular concepts deal with essentially the same dependent variables as civil society- and 
pluralism. The concept of policy* networks is often presented as an alternative to pluralism and 
corporatism See, David Knoke, Franz Urban Pappi, Jeffrey Broadbent, Yutaka, Tsujinaka, Comparing 
Policy Networks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David Marsh (ed.). Comparing 
Policy Networks (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998). The policy networks literature deals 
with basically the same variables as corporatism and pluralism: the structure of interest representation, 
the issue of the inclusion or exclusion of given interests, and the type of policy-making. Like the 
pluralism and corporatism literature the literature on policy7 networks posits a syndrome in which the 
value of one of these variables is very7 closely associated with the values of the other two. Instead of 
the opposite ideal-types of corporatism and pluralism there is a spectrum of relationships from policy7 
communities to issue networks. See, Wyn Grant, Pressure Groups and British Politics (London: 
Macmillan, 2000), 48-50 The policy7 networks approach is more clearly distinguished from pluralism
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understood only according to the definitions offered above, and not according to any 
of the plethora of other definitions of these terms.
3.2 Independent variables
A massive number of variables have been proposed to explain patterns of interest 
association politics. The following divides these explanations into economic, 
political and social variables. It argues that the economic variables can be gathered 
together by a synthesis based on Olson’s logic of collective action. This explanation 
focuses on the number of enterprises in the constituency of an interest association. 
Political and social variables interact with economic structure. Economic structure 
places such limitations on the effect of political and social variables that economic 
structure can be seen as the key explanation for the strength of interest associations. 
The following outlines the synthesis of economic theories. It then goes onto discuss 
political and social theories and how they interact with economic theories.
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action
The basis of Olson’s argument is the distinction between public and private goods. 
The key feature of a public good is that if one member of a group “consumes it, it 
cannot feasibly be withheld from others in that group”.26 A private good is simply 
the converse: if one person consumes it there is nothing to stop it being withheld 
from other members of a group. Someone can enjoy a public good whether they
and corporatism by its level of analysis (issue domains rather than states) than by its dependent 
variables. Similarly, Olson’s work distinguishes between interest associations on the basis of how 
"encompassing" they7 are. Again, the emphasis is on the size of individual associations, their number, 
and how this relates to their nature, which in turn relates to consequences for policy-making. See, 
Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 48
26 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University7 Press, 1971), 14
77
The ‘Soft State’: Business-Govemment Relations in Poland -  Chapter 3
have contributed to its supply or not. It is not rational for an individual to contribute 
to the provision of a public good unless she thinks that her portion of the increase in 
the supply of the good due to her efforts will be greater than the cost of her 
contribution to its supply. The likelihood that an individual will calculate that their 
contribution will make a sufficiently large difference to the supply of a public good 
is basically a function of group size. This is the first key independent variable 
identified by the logic of collective action.
Olson distinguished three types of groups. A latent group is a group for which “if one 
member does or does not [participate in collective action] no other one member will 
be significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to react”. As such, latent 
groups are very unlikely to form the basis of collective action and the formation of a 
business association. Intermediate groups do not “have so many members that no 
one member will notice whether any other member is or is not helping to provide the 
collective good”. This makes it much more likely that collective action will happen. 
Finally, there are “privileged groups” in which a single member has sufficient 
incentive to set up a business association.27
Since the vast majority o f politically relevant groups are latent groups this theory 
predicts there will be very few interest associations. However, Olson is well aware 
that a large number of latent groups have in fact managed to mobilise interest 
associations. He explains this by reference to private goods, which enable those 
“who [do not] contribute to the attainment of the group’s interest [to] be treated
Olson, Logic of Collective Action, 50
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differently from those who do”.28 Olson sees private goods as exclusively economic 
rather than political and as such they are the basis of the “by-product” theory. 
Members do not join a group because they support its political aims. According to 
Olson’s account they might even violently disagree with them! Members join 
because of the private economic goods. Thus, the political activities of interest 
groups are a by-product of their delivery of private economic goods. The balance of 
public and private goods provided by an association is the second key independent 
variable proposed by the logic of collective action.
The third key independent variable is the size of the enterprises. The basic cost- 
benefit calculation is quite different for small enterprises.29 Firstly, small enterprises 
have limited resources and almost always have to contribute a greater proportion of 
their resources in money, secondments, volunteer work, etc., than do large 
enterprises. However, although their contribution is proportionally larger the 
chances that their contribution will make a difference to the provision of public 
goods is much smaller.
Private goods often present a greater incentive for association membership for small 
enterprises than they do for large enterprises. The services provided by associations 
are frequently functions that large enterprises can afford to provide in-house or 
purchase in the market. In contrast, small enterprises are not able to provide 
themselves with various ancillary functions and perceive a great benefit from having
2H Olson. Logic of Collective Action, 57
"9 Terr}' Moe, The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics o f Political 
Interest Groups (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 255; Franz van Waarden, 'Two Logics 
of Collective Action? Business Associations as Distinct from Trade Unions: The Problems of 
Associations of Organisations" in Dieter Sadowski & Otto Jacobi (eds.), Employers' Associations in 
Europe: Policy and Organisation (Baden-Baden: Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991), 70; Wyn Grant & Davod 
Marsh, The Confederation o f British Industry (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), 36
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them provided by an association. This does not mean that small enterprises flood 
into interest associations. Firstly, service-providers that are not subsidising political 
activities can undercut interest associations and it is from consultancies and such like 
that small enterprises often purchase specialised services.30 Secondly, the 
competitive provision of services necessitates considerable resources, which are not 
likely to be provided if an association is dependent on the very small contributions 
that small enterprises are prepared to make. This is a vicious circle in which many 
associations are trapped: to recruit members they need to provide private goods, to 
provide private goods they need an organisational infrastructure but they cannot 
build an infrastructure until they have recruited members to provide resources.
Size also influences whether a cost-benefit calculation is made in the first place. For 
large enterprises, the decision to join, and more frequently the decision to remain a 
member, may not cross the threshold of rationality.31 The low level of the 
contribution to the association may not be enough to justify the trouble of making 
cost-benefit calculation on whether it should be made or not. However, since 
contributions to associations will be proportionally larger for small enterprises they 
will apply a much more strict cost-benefit analysis to association membership.
Lastly, small enterprises are strongly associated with large groups. Where there are 
few enterprises in an industry those enterprises are also likely to be large. Where 
there are lots of enterprises in an industry the vast majority of those enterprises are
30 Iain McLean, "‘The Divided Legacy of Mancur Olson”, British Journal of Political Science, 30 (4). 
2000,651-668; Padgett, Organizing Democracy, 120
31 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations, 28; Grant & Marsh, The CBI, 49-50; Justin 
Greenwood, “Incentives and Disincentives for Collective Behaviour by Business in the EU: Business 
Collective Action and the Responses of Associations”, paper delivered to the Conference on the 
Effectiveness of EU Business Associations, Brussels, September 2000
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likely to be small. Therefore, small enterprises are more likely to be members of 
latent groups and large enterprises are more likely to be members of intermediate and 
privileged groups.
The three independent variables of the number and size of enterprises and the mix of 
public and private goods are vital factors in explaining the degree to which interest 
associations actually get organised. The size of the enterprises in the economy is a 
straightforward variable to assess. The other two variables are not so 
straightforward. The size of the group is ultimately subjective, and it will vary 
depending on which issues are perceived to be salient. Similarly, the balance of 
public and private goods provided by associations will partly depend on the quality 
of the association’s entrepreneurship in meeting and creating a demand for services. 
However, both of these factors are also subject to the influence of objective features 
of the economic environment. Three such features, which can be applied to the post­
communist context, are trade unions, varieties of capitalism and interest diversity. 
The next sections aim to show how these characteristics of the economy are 
specifications of the variables of group size and the balance of public and private 
goods that are part of the general logic of collective action.
Trade Unions
Business associations are often seen as a reaction to the strength of trade unions. It is 
important to distinguish between the political and economic power of trade unions. 
If unions have labour market power they will be relevant to business at the level of 
sectors and regions and will stimulate the formation of business associations at those 
levels. I f  unions have political power they will be relevant to business at the level of
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a political territory. In most countries the political territory contains many times 
more businesses than are to be found in a particular sector or region. If unions have 
political power alone, the opposing business constituency is likely to be a latent 
group and, therefore, likely to produce weak business associations. Indeed, the 
business constituency will usually comprise the whole business class. If  unions have 
labour market power the opposing business constituencies are likely to be defined by 
sector and region. These will constitute intermediate, or even privileged, groups and 
are much more likely to result in strong business associations. Moreover, if business 
faces the labour market power of trade unions, associations will be able to provide 
important industrial relations services such as legal and mediation consultancy. In 
contrast, if it is only the political power of trade unions that is relevant there will be 
very few opportunities to provide trade-union related services. Labour market power 
means that business associations can offer important private goods while political 
power alone does not increase the potential for private goods. Unions tend to be 
much stronger in large enterprises than in small enterprises. In fact, they are usually 
completely absent from small enterprises. Therefore, the labour market power of 
unions faces a promising constituency for collective action amongst large enterprises. 
Even though small enterprises may not be faced with unions in the workplace the 
political power of unions may be an issue for them in terms of legislation that 
impacts on workplaces whether unions are present are not. Of course, this 
constituency of small enterprises is not a promising one for collective action.
Varieties of capitalism
In recent years, the literature has shifted away from the tendency to view business 
associations as merely a reaction to trade union power. Soskice argues that the type
82
The ‘Soft State’: Business-Govemment Relations in Poland -  Chapter 3
of economic activity in which a business is engaged is likely to affect the potential 
for business association. He sums up the most profound differences between types 
of businesses in the notion of a “production regime”. According to this account, 
business associations do not reflect the structure of labour unions, but rather labour 
unions are part of an overall institutional structure, the nature of which is largely 
determined by the production regime. In other words, business decides on union 
structure, not the other way round.32
Soskice distinguishes between co-ordinated and liberal market economies. In co­
ordinated economies, there is a rich structure of institutional co-operation between 
enterprises, amongst which relatively corporatist business associations play a vital 
part. In this sort of system, business associations have a key role in the economic 
activity of the firm, in regulation, technology transfer, training, etc. By contrast, in 
liberal market economies there is much less inter-firm co-operation. Business 
associations are much less relevant to the firms’ economic activity and tend to be 
restricted to a narrower lobbying function. This narrower lobbying role means that 
there is less incentive for business associations to encompass and monopolise the 
representation of their business constituencies.
In terms of the logic of collective action, in co-ordinated economies the most 
relevant group for business is likely to be a sector or sub-sector. Sectors, in turn, are 
likely to be intermediate groups with good collective action potential. Because o f 
their integration in the production processes of the firms business associations in
32 Soskice, David, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market 
Economies in the 1980s and 90s" in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, John D Stephens, 
(eds.), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, 101-134; Peter A Hall & David Soskice 
(eds.), Varieties o f Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000)
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coordinated economies are likely to provide private goods, which are absolutely 
central to their member firms’ activities. In liberal economies, these small groups are 
less likely to be important and business is more likely to identify with a latent group 
like the business class as a whole. In this case, there is likely to be less potential for 
private goods, which are so vital to the firm’s profits. Furthermore, co-ordinated 
economies tend to have relatively large numbers of medium-sized enterprises. These 
enterprises are large enough to be motivated by public goods but also small enough 
to be motivated by private goods. In liberal economies there is more of a contrast 
between large enterprises, which are interested primarily in public goods and small 
enterprises which are really only interested in private goods.
Interest diversity
Padgett makes an interesting argument about interest diversity amongst post­
communist businesses. He argues that there are so many sources of division in post­
communist business that this hinders collective action, resulting in small weak 
associations:
[C]leavages between state and private sectors, large and small firms, indigenous and foreign 
capital, and the liberal and ‘nomenklatura bourgeoisie’ are replicated in organisational 
activity.33
This suggests that there are no coherent constituencies for business associations. 
Groups of businesses with enough in common to justify the foundation of a business 
association are so small that there is no need for such formal co-ordination: a handful 
of enterprises can easily co-operate on an informal basis. At its most extreme, if an 
enterprise is separated from other enterprises by a variety of cleavages only 
individual action makes sense. Ultimately, the salience of these multiple cleavages
33 Padgett, Organizing Democracy. 10
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means that there is also no overall business class interest or identity.34 This 
argument about interest diversity can also be interpreted in terms of the Olsonian 
focus on the size of the group. Basically, it argues that groups will tend to have one 
member, or that there are no groups and therefore collective action makes no sense.
Figure 3.1: Economic Explanations for the strength of business associations
High
Probability 
that a business 
will join an 
association
Low
Intermediate / Privileged Individual actionLatent
Class Sector / Region No relevant group
Limited Moderate Extreme
Collective Action Category (Size of Group)
Definition of Group
Interest Diversity across Economy
Theoretical synthesis
Figure 3.1 summarises the above arguments about economic influences on business 
association. When there are very large numbers of enterprises that share the same 
interest this constitutes a latent group, which makes collective action problematic.
34 Padgett, Organizing Democracy, 1, 53
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The ultimate latent group for businesspeople is their overall class position. This 
class position is best defined in opposition to labour movements with influence at the 
level of national politics. In liberal market economies business tends to view itself as 
a class seeking maximum freedom from restraint by labour law and labour unions 
and eschewing state support for sectoral systems of business co-ordination. The 
business class is the level, which emphasises maximum interest homogeneity across 
the national economy as a whole. There are very restricted possibilities for the offer 
o f private goods at such a general level. At the class level the vast majority of 
businesses are small.
Intermediate groups are those where the non-cooperation of a single enterprise may 
be noticed and sanctioned by others, thereby making collective action much more 
likely. Sectoral or regional business associations are likely to constitute intermediate 
groups. If unions have strong labour market power they are likely to stimulate 
business association at the sectoral or regional levels. Similarly, co-ordinated market 
economies tend to emphasise the sectoral level at which associations can co-ordinate 
both the political and economic activities of their members. This type of economy 
represents a moderate focus on interest diversity. Sectoral interest is more important 
than class interest. At the level of sectoral interest there is considerable potential for 
offering attractive private goods to members. Medium-sized enterprises are well- 
represented in economies with strong sectoral interests and identities.
Finally, there is the situation in which only individual action is rational: there is no 
relevant group with which an enterprise can contemplate collective action. This is a 
situation of maximum interest diversity and is the logical extreme of Padgett’s
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argument. This section has shown that arguments about unions, production regimes 
and interest diversity can be adequately incorporated into Olson’s trio of group size, 
private goods, and enterprise size.
Political Variables
It is often argued that divided political institutions tend to encourage a pluralist 
system.33 Although this theory is consistent with some cases, in general it is weak. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient between Lijphart’s index of pluralism and 
corporatism and the divided government dimension for his 36 democracies is slightly 
negative (-0.045), which is in the correct direction but is statistically insignificant.36 
However, arguments about divided government and pluralism tend to focus on two 
elements of divided government: federalism/decentralisation and bicameralism. In 
the case of federalism the correlation coefficient is moderately negative (-0.278) and 
is borderline statistically significant (0.05 exactly, on a one-tailed test). This is the 
opposite direction to that predicted by the hypothesis. The bicameralism hypothesis 
is not much more successful: the correlation coefficient is slightly positive (0.049) 
but is statistically insignificant. Overall, the comparative data provides little 
evidence for divided government being a good explanation for interest group 
pluralism.
Lijphart himself does not make any claims about the association between the 
divided-power dimension and interest groups. However, the interest group index is 
part of the joint-power dimension. Therefore, it is hardly surprising to find a strong
35 Graham Wilson. Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1985), 
27, 99; Stephen Bell, '‘Between the Market and the State: The Role of Australian Business 
Associations in Public Policy”, Comparative Politics, 28 (1995), 25-54
36 Arend Lijphart, Patterns o f Democracy: Governmentforms and performance in thirty-six countries 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999)
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correlation between the average of Lij part’s 36 cases on the first four measures of the 
executives-parties dimension and their interest group index scores. The Pearson 
coefficient is 0.694 and the one-tailed test is significant at the one per cent level for 
Lijphart’s 36 cases. According to Lijphart and Crepaz, inclusive coalition 
governments are conducive to the long-term policy relationships between interest 
associations and the state, which are important for corporatist policy-making.37 
However, this is clearly an argument about an elective affinity, which only has a 
significant impact over a long period of time such as that studied by Lijphart. 
Clearly, this logic is unlikely to have made itself felt in the relatively short period 
since the collapse of communism.
More relevant are direct interventions by the political system in the structure of 
business associations. However, it is extremely difficult for a government to recast a 
system of business associations. It is especially difficult for a government to create 
corporatism from pluralism. While the government can grant legal monopolies, hold 
regular consultations and sign agreements it is very difficult for it to restructure an 
economy so completely that the corporatist methods of policy-making are backed up 
by corporatist structures in the economy. Simply put, a democratic government has 
very limited power to create small constituencies of large enterprises, which view 
monopolistic business associations as an integral part o f their firms’ business 
strategy. A frequently cited illustration of this point is the failed tripartite project in 
1970s Britain.38 However problematic it may be to break out of a historical pattern 
of pluralism, this has, of course, happened. Decisive shifts towards corporatism are
37 Markus M L Crepaz & Arend Lijphart, '"Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus 
Democracy: Theoiy, Concepts and Evidence”, British Journal o f Political Science, 25 (1995), 282- 
288
38 Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver, Peter Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 2nd 
ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), 369-372
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associated with periods of economic and political crisis.39 There are two reasons for 
this. Firstly, a period of crisis may be one in which the government has greater 
power than usual to impose substantial and enduring changes on economic structure. 
However, crisis merely weakens the barrier posed by economic structure; it does not 
eliminate it. Secondly, a crisis often produces a political imperative for unity and 
consensus, characteristics that are features of corporatism rather than pluralism. The 
drastic recession that accompanied the collapse of communism definitely constituted 
a crisis that was serious enough to allow governments much more scope than usual to
40institute corporatism.
Social variables
It is widely accepted that there are features of society, separate from economic 
structure and political interventions, which encourage or discourage people from 
participating in groups. Frequently, this tendency has been described as cultural. 
Some nations, regions, functional categories, or other groups are perceived to have a 
predilection to join organisations while others are not. For example, a key element 
of the so-called “civic culture” has been a predilection to join organisations.41 
Arguments similar to those about the civic culture are frequently framed in terms of 
“social capital” . The term social capital has two advantages over the traditional 
emphasis on “civic culture”. Firstly, it is more concrete and less general. Secondly, 
it is easier to synthesise with other sorts of arguments, including, crucially, those
39 Niamh Hardiman, ‘Social partnership, wage bargaining and growth” in Brian Nolan, Philip J 
O’Connell and Christopher T Whelan (eds.), Bust to Boom? The Irish Experience o f Growth and 
Inequality (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2000)
40 Bela Greskovits, The political economy of protest and patience: economic and political reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America (Budapest: Central European Press, 1998); Adam Przeworski 
(ed.), Sustainable democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
41 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963); Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Boulder: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)
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about economic structure.42 Social capital is used in two different forms.43 The first, 
narrower, meaning refers to personal connections,44 while the second, wider, 
meaning also includes norms and trust.43 This thesis will employ social capital in its 
narrower form. Again, the emphasis is on a concrete definition, which can be used 
consistently in qualitative and quantitative analyses. Moreover, “personal 
connections” retain much of the explanatory power of the wider definition without 
the associated vagueness and measurement problems. Finally, adopting the narrower 
definition of social capital does not undermine the synthesis with economic 
variables.
The synthesis is simply stated. The logic of collective action demonstrates that the 
larger the group, the more difficult it is to achieve collective action. Groups of 
enterprises defined by economic characteristics tend to be large latent groups. 
However, groups defined by personal connections may be smaller intermediate 
groups. If social capital is high amongst businesspeople, they will be able to commit 
their enterprise to an association in the confidence that their friends will not free ride 
on their contribution. Conversely, if a businessperson, who is personally connected 
to the members of the association, does not join, they are likely to be noticed and 
sanctioned. This is in contrast to the free rider in a large group who can benefit from
42 Robert D Putnam. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 165-180; Elinor Ostrom, '‘A Behavioral Approach to the Rational 
Choice Theory of Collective Action”, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998); James S 
Coleman, Foundations o f Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1990); Padgett, Organizing 
Democracy, esp. 14-16; George Kolankiewicz, “Social capital and social change”, British Journal of 
Sociology, 41 (1996); Akos Rona-Tas, “Path-Dependence and Capital Theory: Sociolog) of post­
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Poland", International Sociology, 11 (1), 1996,37-62
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public goods provided by others, with little fear of detection or sanction. This does 
not mean that the availability of social capital transforms latent groups into 
intermediate groups and, therefore, dissolves the collective action problem. The 
potential members of the association still need to be motivated public or private 
goods. The public goods will still apply to large latent groups, and the provision of 
the private goods will, in great measure, be dependent on a relatively developed 
organisation, which already has a substantial membership. Moreover, the network of 
personal connections is highly unlikely to be structured so that it can encompass all 
o f those enterprises with the relevant economic characteristics.
Paradoxically, the absence of social capital can also help business associations. The 
absence of social capital presents associations with an opportunity to provide an 
attractive private good and thereby recruit members. This opportunity seems to be 
particularly relevant to post-communism. Post-communist societies lack the dense 
regulatory and customary structure of long-established capitalisms. This means that 
transaction costs are much higher for post-communist businesses. They cannot rely 
on a clear legal context and a reliable system of contract enforcemeny^o facilitate 
transactions. In this situation, social capital becomes an attractive alternative. If 
business is transacted between individuals who already know each other, there is less 
need to rely on the law to provide predictability in the execution of agreements. 
However, social capital is also lacking in post-communist societies, because there are 
relatively few individuals who have been in business for long periods, never mind 
families who have been in business for generations. There are, of course, those who 
were involved in the production and service-provision under the previous regime. 
These people are frequently able to adopt communist-era personal connections to the
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new regime. On the other hand, the radically new economic context means that old 
connections are inapplicable or less effective. In the absence of both state regulation 
and relevant personal connections business associations can fill the gap by creating 
social capital amongst business. Enterprises can be matched with each other, and 
their common membership of a business association means that dishonest behaviour 
will have an immediate and substantial effect on the reputation of a business. As 
well as being another private good, which can be added to a portfolio of services, the 
creation of social capital is useful in that, unlike the offer of many other services, it 
makes very light demands on the organization. At the minimum, all that is needed is 
an opportunity for businesspeople to get to know each other and discuss mutually 
profitable opportunities. Contrast this with the expense of providing legal advice or 
export promotion. However, this private good is subject to the same logical problem 
as other private goods: it does not necessarily need to be provided by a business 
association. It is, indeed, a role, which is often played by social, cultural or sports 
clubs in countries both within and outside the post-communist region. Social capital 
can ease the collective action problem: it cannot resolve it. In this respect, its 
relationship to economic structure is similar to that of political intervention.
This thesis concentrates on economic variables to explain the strength of interest 
associations. Political and social variables make a smaller contribution that can be 
coherently synthesised with the economic explanation. This approach is summed up 
by Figure 3.2 below.
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Figure 3.2: Overall Explanations for the strength of interest associations
Political
Decisions
Economic
Structure
Social
Capital
4. The Company State
In a company state, individual companies dominate the interface of government and 
business. Grant uses the idea of the company state to sum up business-government 
relations in contemporary Britain. For Grant, the company state is concerned with 
the highly professionalised world of the government and public relations divisions of 
large corporations.46 There is a similar emphasis in the many studies of big business 
in the US47 and the EU.48 The most fundamental reason that multinationals are able 
to manage their relations with government on a company basis is sheer size.49 There 
are also other reasons why the company channel is particularly fruitful and attractive 
for multinationals. Multinationals are mobile. It is much easier for them to shift 
jurisdiction if public policy, or the general economic climate, affect their profits. 
This special structural power potentially gives them a particular influence over 
governments. This specificity also makes it less likely that a business association 
will adequately represent their interests. Since much of politics is about context, the 
expatriate management of a multinational prefer to have government relations
46 Wyn Grant, Business and Politics in Britain, 2uJ ed. (London: Macmillan, 1993), 18
4/ Cathie-Jo Martin, Stuck in Neutral: Business and the Politics o f  Human Capital Investment Policy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000)
48 Bennett, Robert J, "Business Routes of Influence in Brussels: Exploring the Choice of Direct 
Representation ', Political Studies, 47 (1999), 240-257
49 Grant, Business and Politics, 89
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managed by experts with local knowledge. Moreover, expatriates will also lack the 
accumulated personal connections that make the personalist route so attractive for 
indigenous business leaders.
In addition to multinationals, large state-owned enterprises are also likely to directly 
manage their relations with government. With multinationals they share sheer size 
and a specificity, which is sometimes hard for general business associations to 
encompass. However, their special relevance for government tends to relate to 
political rather than economic structure. As the owner of a firm, the government is 
seen as especially responsible for employment, wages, prices, profits, etc. All o f the 
key economic indices of the firm become indices of the political performance of the 
government. State-owned enterprises, because o f size, sector, and state-ownership 
itself, tend to be highly unionised. This hugely increases their level of politicisation, 
particularly in an era when unions are rapidly losing members in the private sector. 
Unusually intense politics are associated with the process of privatization, which has 
swept across the world in the last couple of decades.
State-owned enterprises are particularly important in the post-communist context. 
This importance is largely explained by the factors mentioned above. Some post­
communist enterprises are enormous, even by the standards of state-owned 
enterprises elsewhere. Really large enterprises are often usually even more 
important than their huge size suggests. When a region or locality becomes 
dependent on a large employer, the issue is not merely a rise in unemployment and 
the loss of the votes of the newly unemployed, it is the social and economic 
devastation of a region, and the political consequences that follow. This is a classic
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scenario of post-industrialism and is perhaps most evident in industries like coal and 
steel in many countries. Like their counterparts in the West, post-communist unions 
are concentrated in the state sector. However, in post-communist countries, their 
decline has been particularly precipitous and their defence of the state sector has in 
some cases been remarkably fierce. The issue of privatization has been even bigger 
in the post-communist context than elsewhere, given the size of the state sector and 
the pressure to move quickly to a privately owned market economy. Some of the 
features of post-communist ownership structures, notably worker ownership, have 
made privatization more hotly contested than elsewhere. There is one feature of 
post-communist state-owned enterprises, which further increases their political 
salience and has no real analogue in the West. Large communist enterprises were 
not solely economic organisations. They also served as agents of political control, 
provided health and social services as well as social insurance, and even were major 
providers of leisure, travel and cultural opportunities. In other words, much of what 
is the state’s responsibility in capitalist democracies was provided through 
enterprises. State-owned enterprises have had to be commercialised in a very 
fundamental sense. They have had to be transformed from multi-functional, to 
purely economic, institutions. For all o f these reasons, it is plausible that state 
ownership is a major explanation for the importance of the company mode of 
business-govemment relations in post-communist countries. It is important to 
realise that state-owned enterprises present great difficulties in extricating the 
company state from the party and personalist states. Obviously, state enterprises are 
particularly susceptible to party political involvement and the development of
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personal connections between managers and politicians.50 These empirical problems 
are not so prominent in the case of multinationals.
5. The Party State
In the party state, business needs the intermediary services of a political party. 
Businesses must ally themselves with a political party in order to gain access to the 
political system. Wilson writes, “In most political systems there is one party which 
is closely associated with business”.51 This is true of many political systems, 
perhaps especially two-party Anglo-Saxon systems. However, it is not generally 
true of post-communist countries, although there are obvious variations across the 
region. Ex-communist parties are closely associated with business because the 
business elite is dominated by ex-communists. Non-communist parties also tend to 
be broadly pro-business since they opposed the anti-capitalist communist system. 
High levels of politicisation of the economy are associated with the party state by 
many authors,52 and this seems like a more promising explanation for the party state 
in the post-communist context. Here, politicisation is defined as the ability of the 
state to directly influence the behaviour of individual enterprises. This refers to 
much more than state ownership. Politicisation also includes export quotas, 
subsidies, licences, public procurement, individual enquiries or inspections of tax or
50 John Scott Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),
268
51 Wilson, Business and Politics, 14
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environmental compliance and a host of other instruments. These instruments and 
others constitute a well-known feature of post-communist economies and affect both 
public and private sectors. This politicisation is a different, and more intense, type 
o f state intervention than that which affects only general classes of enterprises, such 
as heavy taxation or high levels of regulation. There is little doubt that post­
communist economies are much more politicised than their counterparts elsewhere. 
Many accounts of business-govemment relations, in post-communist countries and 
elsewhere, assume that high politicisation is a sufficient explanation for the party 
state. Their logic is as follows: given that parties control the executive and the 
executive controls a politicised economy, business-political networks should be 
structured by political parties. That is to say, businesspeople and politicians are 
loyal to, or dependent on, political parties and the networks of businesspeople do not 
cut across networks structured by political parties.
These accounts of the party state tend to assume that politicians and businesspeople 
have congruent interests. A high level of politicisation means that there are very 
strong incentives for firms to develop political connections and there are great 
opportunities for well-placed politicians to develop connections to the business class. 
Furthermore, the expense of electoral competition and the financial resources of 
business mean that there are very strong incentives for political parties to develop 
connections to the business class. However, the existence of strong incentives for 
politicians and businesspeople to get to know each other and exchange resources 
does not necessarily mean that businesses will ally themselves with particular 
political parties.
97
The ‘Soft State’: Business-Goverament Relations in Poland -  Chapter 3
Businesses and parties have conflicting interests. Unless one party seems likely to 
stay in power for the foreseeable future, loyalty to one particular party is not a 
sensible long- or medium-term option for any business. Of course, political parties 
have an interest in ensuring that businesses support only their party and do not, 
instead, or in addition, support their competitors. When parties are out of 
government, they have little to offer business and are unlikely to be able to stop 
business seeking favours from their political opponents. Even in government, it is 
questionable whether any party in a competitive environment would be in a position 
to turn down the support of a business, which had previously supported one of their 
political opponents. Given high levels of politicisation, the extent to which there is a 
turnover of parties in government is the best explanation for the relative strength of 
the party state.
However, the force of this argument does vary according to different instruments of 
politicisation. State ownership presents the opportunity for parties to encapsulate 
firms. Boards which have been loyal to other parties can immediately be exchanged 
for the placemen of the new governing parties. It should be noted that it is not 
always clear to what extent parties as opposed to politicians control board 
appointments. Appointees may be the clients of party factions or the Minister of the 
State Treasury, rather than an actual political party.
Other instruments of politicisation are subject to the fundamental point that a party 
has little to offer business once it is out of government. Only the parties in power 
have control over these instruments. The privatization process gives firms and 
businesspeople a great incentive to be loyal to the parties in government. Strategic,
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discounted or well-timed purchases of state assets can make or break businesses. In 
many cases, they have created businesses out of nothing. Once the purchase has 
been made it is virtually impossible for a party returning to power to punish a firm 
for its subsequent disloyalty by renationalising its assets. Of course, the influence of 
parties depends on the structures of corporate governance. Frequently, the state sells 
only minority shares to investors who are then at the mercy of governments. 
Sometimes the state maintains a blocking minority of shares. Often the state rigs the 
voting rules of the firm so that it can continue to exercise a veto with only a 
relatively small number of shares. Many of the deals in which minority shares are 
sold to investors involve contracts by which a majority will be sold under specified 
conditions at a specified date. These features of corporate governance may or may 
not give a government the power to punish a firm, which it thinks has been disloyal. 
Nonetheless, there is still no incentive for the firm to be loyal unless it expects the 
same government to return to power.
The irreversibility of major decisions applies even more strongly to other policies 
where there is no equivalent of the minority “golden shares” of corporate 
governance. For example, there is widespread, and often very substantial bribery, for 
legislation in post-communist countries. For example, the most prominent scandal 
under the Miller government in Poland involves the alleged sale of a legislative 
clause, which would have allowed the owners of print media to buy into broadcast 
media, something that was banned under previous legislation on media 
“concentration”. This type of law would have been very difficult to undo, if the 
beneficiary firm had subsequently been disloyal to Miller’s party. Indeed, if  there 
was a strong likelihood that the law could later be revoked it would not have made
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sense to demand such a large bribe. Again, even if Miller and his party could later 
change the law, it would make no sense for the firm to stay loyal to them, unless it 
foresaw that they would stay in power for a long period. A similar logic would seem 
to apply to the award of the plethora of licences required in post-communist 
economies. Public procurement is another area in which there seems to have been a 
lot of corruption and a huge potential for the party funding. Again, contractual and 
practical considerations make it difficult for a government to change firm mid­
project in order to enforce loyalty. Even the promise of further work in the future is 
not particularly attractive, unless the party is likely to continue in government in the 
future.
There are some benefits, which can perhaps be calibrated to increase party political 
control over firms. Subsidies can change, be eliminated, or be transferred from year 
to year. However, subsidies are usually given to state-owned enterprises, so they do 
not add much to an explanation centred on ownership. Moreover, they tend to be 
given to communist-era giants in which very strong trade unions place a significant 
constraint on government policy. Lucrative import quotas (kontyngenty)53 also seem 
to offer a potential for party political manipulation. The amounts in question, the 
conditions under which they are received and the recipients can be changed from 
year to year. All this means is that loyalty can be maintained for the tenure of the 
political parties in government. Once they leave government, as is virtually 
inevitable at every election in post-communist countries, businesses have an 
overwhelming incentive to transfer their loyalties to the new governing parties.
53 George Kolankiewicz, "Social capital and social change". 437
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There is nothing the previous government can do in the future that the present 
government cannot do in the present!
6. The Soft State
In a soft state, business gains access to the government by means of the personal 
connections of its representatives. It is widely agreed that business representatives 
need to make direct personal contact with the government and maintain good 
relationships with decision-makers.54 However, this is a rather banal observation, 
which is taken for granted by most authors. The vast majority of the literature on 
business-government relations sees personal connections as epiphenomenal.^ It is 
the characteristics of a business association, company or political party affiliation 
which allow a business representative to gain access to government and which enable 
her to develop personal relationships with politicians. Ultimately, these connections 
are a resource of the association, company or political party, not of individuals. 
These connections are not truly personal. This view of personal connections as 
epiphenomena of institutional affiliations is shared with the literature on political and 
business elites. Merely epiphenomenal personal connections are regarded as a 
fundamental characteristic of “advanced” or “complex” societies.56 It is 
acknowledged that, in the past, purely personal connections have been more 
important. Grant and Scott recognise an earlier era o f British business-government
54 Clive Thomas (ed.), First World Interest Groups: A Comparative Perspective (London: 
Greenwood, 1993), 220
55 John P Heinz, Edward O Laumann, Robert L Nelson, Robert H Salisbury, The Hollow Core: 
Private Interests in National Policy Making (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 11-12
56 Robert D Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1976), 18; Michael G Burton & John Higley, '‘Invitation to Elite Theory7: The Basic Contentions 
Reconsidered” in G William Domhoff & Thomas R Dye (eds.), Power Elites and Organizations 
(London: Sage, 1987), 224; John Higley , Jan Pakulski, Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, '‘Introduction: Elite 
Change and Democratic Regimes in Eastern Europe” in Higley, Pakulski, Wesolowski (eds.), 
Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan, 1998), 2; C Wright 
Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), passim., esp. 3, 9
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relations when personal connections were influential,37 and Mizruchi makes a similar 
observation with regard to the USA.38 Moreover, there seems to be a consensus that 
personal connections are a vital element of contemporary Russian business- 
government relations.39 Mills mentions some examples of businesses hiring 
personnel because of their personal connections with politicians 60 In this case, the 
business’s contacts are a result of the characteristics o f the individuals who work for 
it, not the other way round, as is generally assumed.
The disagreement about whether or not personal connections are epiphenomenal is 
effectively one about the sources of social capital (see figure 3.3 below). In the 
epiphenomenal view, social capital is the result o f affiliation with institutions, 
associations, companies and political parties. In the non-epiphenomenal view, or the 
view that sees such connections as purely personal, the source of social capital is an 
individual’s biography. Therefore, in the context of business-government relations, 
we can identify three main sources of social capital: organizational (association or 
company), political (affiliation to a party)61 and personal. The soft state is not an 
epiphenomenon. It is based on purely personal connections, independent from 
contacts deriving from organizational or political affiliation. The epiphenomenal
57 Scott, Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes, 268; Grant, Business and Politics in Britain, 92, 
130
58 Mark S Mizruchi, '"Why do Corporations Stick Together? An Interorganizational Theory of Class 
Cohesion” in G William Domhoff & Thomas R Dye (eds.), Power Elites and Organizations (London: 
Sage, 1987), 206-207
59 Peter Rutland, Business and the State in Contemporary Russia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 
2001), 17-18. Also, David Lane, "What kind of capitalism for Ru§sia2_Acomparative analysis”, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 33 (2000), 499; Alena(LedevnaR u ss ia ’s Economy of 
Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange (Cambridge: Cambndge University Press, 1998), 
passim, esp. 199-200; Peter Rutland, Review of Sergei Peregudov et al, Grupy lnteresov i Rossiiskoe 
gosudarstvo, Europe-Asia Studies, 52 (2000), 1549-1550
0 Mills, The Power Elite, 136
61 This might be called political capital. However, there are many different usages of political capital, 
none of which should be read into the present analysis. For example, see John A Booth & Patricia 
Bayer Richard, "Civil Society’, Political Capital and Democratization in Central America”, Journal o f
Politics, 60 (3), 1998, 780-800
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view is that personal connections are indicators, not of the soft state, but of the 
association, company or party state.
Figure 3.3: Sources of Social Capital
Social
Capital
Personal
(attached to an individual person)
Political
(attached to a history o f partisan 
political ircvolvement 
and affiliation)
Organisational s
(attached to characteristics o f an association or firm)
So, the level of personal connections needs to be tested against business association 
membership, the characteristics of the firm and political affiliation. The association 
variable is perhaps the easiest. We can simply look for membership of a business 
association. Next easiest is political affiliation. Political party membership is the 
place to begin, but in many, perhaps most, cases this will be an inadequate indicator. 
Many businesspeople are clearly associated with a party without being a member. 
We also need to look at past membership, membership of non-party partisan 
organisations and maybe also look for evidence that individuals have benefited from 
partisan affiliation. Since all businesspeople are employees or owners of firms we 
need to look at the characteristics of the firms. Here we can follow the earlier
103
The ‘Soft State’: Business-Govemment Relations in Poland -  Chapter 3
analysis of the company state and look at size, state ownership, politicisation and 
foreign ownership. Larger enterprises and higher levels of state ownership and 
politicisation are likely to produce employees with more personal connections to the 
political elite. Foreign ownership could go both ways. The government may be 
particularly keen to develop relationships of foreign firms because of their structural 
power. On the other hand, nationalist sensitivities may make politicians reluctant to 
spend too much time with the leaders of foreign-owned business. We can also add 
directorships, as some businesspeople represent more than one firm and for that 
reason are likely to have better access to politicians. Indeed, multiple directorships, 
and their patterns, have long been regarded as a useful indicator of elite status.62 The 
existence of purely personal connections can be demonstrated by showing that the 
association, company and party relationships do not explain the relative prevalence 
of connections between the economic and political elites. However, this still leaves 
us with the vital question of what features of the biographies of senior 
businesspeople are important for the development of personal connections with 
business.
Past institutional affiliations have been transformed into personal connections if they 
still mean that individuals have personal access to politicians, irrespective of the 
institution they currently represent. So we can begin by looking at past institutional 
affiliations to see whether they, rather than present institutional affiliation, explain 
the levels of personal connections to the political elite amongst businesspeople. The 
past plays a very different role in the analysis o f political and organisational sources 
of social capital. A political past is harder to shake off than a commercial past. A
62 Mills. The Power Elite, 122-123
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former Coke employee is unlikely to be greeted with suspicion in Pepsi Cola in the 
way that a political turncoat is suspected by his former political enemies. Past 
political involvement is a good indicator of present political affiliation and past 
commercial involvement is not a good indicator of present commercial loyalty. 
Thus, it is problematic to use past political involvement as an explanation for purely 
personal connections independent of the party state. In contrast, no such problems 
are presented by looking at the employment history of individuals. Similarly, there 
should be no particular problems in using past involvement in business associations 
to explain current levels of personal connections.
While past associational, company and party affiliations may be interpreted as 
personal, if contrasted with current affiliations, evidence for the personal nature of 
connections is much stronger if the connections were developed outside of the 
process of business and political elite interaction. An obvious indicator, and one that 
has been popular in many elite studies, is membership of voluntary organisations and 
clubs. The role of the London gentlemen’s clubs is a staple of the analysis of 
Britain’s traditional elite. Golf clubs are frequently seen as places where business 
and political elites develop connections independent of, but functional for, their 
professional positions. Religious, cultural and charity groups can perform a similar 
role.
The farther back in time the personal connections were developed, the more purely 
personal they currently are. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, although 
acquaintances may have originally been formed because of an institutional context, 
the longer they have been maintained outside that context, the more personal their
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basis is. Secondly, earlier institutional experiences are likely to be at a lower level. 
Thus, with these earlier experiences the individuals are much less likely to have been 
seen as representatives of powerful institutions. Furthermore, connections developed 
earlier in life can be particularly powerful. This is because the development of one 
personal connection is not just the development of one important personal 
relationship: it is an entry point to a network. Personal connections create personal 
connections.63 Developing good personal connections earlier in life means that, year 
after year, more and more personal connections can be accumulated. In this regard, 
education is vital. In most societies, it is difficult to attain elite status without a 
relatively high level of education, and most of the future elite will begin their career 
in elite schools, universities or other educational institutions. This point is reflected 
in discussions of Oxbridge, the Ivy League and the Ecole Nationale d\Administration 
and Sciences-Po”.64
Personal connections are less likely to be epiphenomenal in a situation of rapid 
systemic change like that experienced by post-communist countries. Rapid changes 
in the characteristics of associations, companies and parties along with the sudden 
birth and death of other associations, companies and parties means that personal 
connections become a relatively more reliable guarantee o f elite status than 
institutional affiliation. Moreover, personal connections that bridged the economic 
and political spheres were likely to be especially important in the unique post­
communist context in which a new political system sought to rapidly destroy a 
communist economy and introduce capitalism. This meant that the rules of the 
economic game were in flux and were open to negotiation and manipulation to an
63 Mills, The Power Elite, UK-9, 283
64 Ezra N Suleiman. Les Elites en France: Grands Corps et Grandes Ecoles (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1979), 13
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extent much greater than they have ever been in countries where capitalism has long 
been established and evolved relatively slowly. The fact that government underpins 
and sets the context for business has perhaps never, and nowhere, been so obvious 
for capitalists (and aspiring capitalists) than in post-communist countries. Therefore, 
the phenomenon of politicisation described in the section on the party state, also 
makes personalism an attractive option for both businesses and politicians.
As in many systems where there has been rapid change, in spite of the preferences 
and efforts of many post-communist leaders and their supporters, it was always likely 
that many of those who had been powerful under the previous regime would preserve 
their elite status. In spite of rapid change, much of the previous system remained, 
and had to remain. The only people who knew how to operate it, were, of course, 
those who had previously operated it. There is a strong tendency for these same 
people, operating some of the same structures, to behave in a way similar to the way 
in which they conducted business under the previous regime.63
Some of the essential features of the communist regime increased the importance of 
personal connections. Firstly, throughout much of the system, personal loyalty 
mattered more than professional performance. The communist parties and the 
nomenklatura were organised as hierarchical networks of personal loyalty.66 It was 
not just party membership and ideological conformity but this direct personal loyalty, 
which served to exercise political control across the polity and society and within the 
economy itself. The relative importance of loyalty versus performance changed over 
time. In the early Stalinist phase performance and qualifications were of minor
65 Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists: Class 
Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe (London: Verso, 1988), 38-39
66 Eyal, Szelenyi, Townsley, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists, 7
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importance. By the last years of the regime, some measure of both competence and 
loyalty were generally required of those in responsible positions. The combination 
of competence and loyalty also varied significantly from country to country and 
within countries. From at least the 1960s there was a significant cleavage of “Reds” 
versus “Experts” within the regimes.67 Much of the factional conflict, which 
preceded and accompanied the fall of communism, related to this cleavage. 
Nonetheless, in all communist regimes, it was taken for granted that personal 
connections to the political elite were much more important for those in senior 
economic positions, than in the vast majority of established capitalist democracies. 
Although the more technocratic faction was more successful in the post-communist 
era,68 it is still likely that they retained and exploited significant networks of personal 
connections.
Under communism, politics dominated the economy. The political system tried to 
eliminate an independent economic sphere with an independent economic logic, and 
was largely successful in doing so. Instead, the logic of production units, or firms, 
was largely political. It followed that there was no sharp distinction between 
businessmen, or economic managers, and politicians.69 Even to the extent that there 
was, the two groups had to work together to a degree that was unimaginable for 
capitalist managers. The necessity of working together applied to both the official 
and unofficial economic systems. Such were the inefficiencies and irrationalities of
67 Judy Batt, Economic Reform and Political Change in Eastern Europe: A Comparison of the 
Czechoslovak and Hungarian Experiences (London: Macmillan 1988), passim., esp. 88, 105, 111, 115 
120; J F Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (London: Duke University Press, 1988), 25; 
Ivan Berend, The Hungarian Economic Reforms, 1953-88 (Cambridge: Cambridge University7 Press, 
1990), 202; Neal Ascherson, The Polish August: the self-limiting revolution (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1982), 77; George Sanford, Democratization in Poland 1988-90: Polish Voices (London, 
Macmillan, 1992), 11; Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, 60
68 Eyal, Szelenyi, Townsley, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists, passim., esp. 6,13-14
69 Janos Komai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1992),passim., esp. 74, 75, 97, 124-126
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the official system, that, to get anything done, managers often had to use personal 
connections to break the rules. Overall, not only were personal connections 
important in the communist system, but intense personal connections, between those 
who would later divide into businessmen and politicians, were unavoidable.
A soft state, permeated by personal connections, which are independent of 
institutions, constitutes a mode of business-government relations, which is 
fundamentally different from the other channels of business influence reviewed 
above. The personalist channel is the one least studied in the literature, and it is 
virtually ignored in comparison with the voluminous literature on interest 
associations. Personal connections are explained by an individual’s biography. They 
can be developed during, before and outside an individual’s professional career. 
There is good reason to believe that personal connections might be especially 
important in post-communist regimes.
7. Conclusions
This chapter has argued that there are four principal modes of business-government 
relations: the association, company, party and soft states. Of the four modes the 
association state is by far the most commonly studied, with the soft state very rarely 
being addressed. Any treatment of business-government relations, which ignores the 
existence of multiple modes of business-government relations, is likely to be 
inadequate. The relative prevalence of one channel is largely a function of the 
unavailability or ineffectiveness of other channels. Moreover, any serious lobbying 
strategy will try to combine elements of as many of the modes as possible. The 
different channels will have different comparative advantages in different political
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situations within the one national system of business-government relations. Of 
course, there are important explanations for the strength of the different modes, 
which are independent of the strength of the alternative routes to government. In the 
preceding discussion, I have considered independent variables, which affect capitalist 
democracies in general, and the specific conditions of post-communist capitalist 
democracies. I argued that the number of enterprises in the constituency of a 
business association is the most powerful explanation for the strength of the 
association state. The company state seems to best understood as a result of the 
importance of multinational and state enterprises. The rate of turnover of parties in 
government fundamentally affects the rationality of the party state. Finally, the 
personalist state is explained by the common biographies, especially early 
biographies, of the political and economic elites. In the empirical chapters, I find 
evidence for the existence of all four modes of business-government relations in 
Poland, but the soft state is by far the most important. It is unsurprising that 
elements of all four are present.70 However, given the scarcity of work on the soft 
state, and the categorical dismissal of its importance by many authors, the finding on 
personalism in Poland is very significant. The terms introduced in this chapter can 
be presented diagrammatically to sum up the argument o f the thesis. See Figure 3.4
/0 Grant, Martinelli, Patterson, “Large Firms as Political Actors: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Chemical Industiy in Britain, Italy and West Germany”, 75; Grant, Business and Politics, 17
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Figure 3.4: Explanatory Framework for Business-Government Relations
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Chapter Four: 
Business Associations in Poland
1. Introduction
This chapter follows the dominant literature on business-government relations by 
focusing on Polish business associations. It shows that Polish business associations 
are clearly very pluralist and very weak. The most successful explanation for this 
situation is the logic of collective action. The evidence in this chapter combines a 
general perspective with detailed case studies. This combination is not applied 
uniformly across the different elements of the dependent and independent variables. 
This is due both to the availability of suitable data and to the nature of the variables: 
some of them are only meaningfully evaluated according to general or case study 
data. When general and specific information concur this increases confidence in the 
conclusions. Nonetheless, the wide range of the data, in terms of both its nature and 
quality, is taken into account when drawing conclusions. The case study data is 
largely drawn from what academics, journalists, businesspeople and politicians agree 
to be Poland’s five most influential business associations.1 All of these associations 
are very encompassing and claim to represent Polish business as a whole. This 
sample has different implications for the generalisability of conclusions according to 
the particular variable under examination. Such implications are discussed wherever 
they are important.
1 Krzysztof Jasiecki, “Organizacje Przedsi^ biorcow i Pracodawcow w Polsce" in Jacek Wasilewski 
(ed.), Zbiorowi Aktorzy Polsfdej Polityki (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of 
Sciences), 177; Businessman, June 1998, 69; Wieslawa Kozek (ed.), Spoleczne Organizacje Biznesu 
w Polsce a Stosunki Pracy (Warsaw: Centrum Partnerstwa Spdecznego DIALOG, 1999), 86
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2. Dependent Variable
This section assesses the pluralism and strength of Polish business associations. It 
proceeds according to the different elements of the pluralism-corporatism continuum 
introduced in Chapter Three. Firstly, however, I introduce the legal context and the 
types of business associations that exist in Poland. The vast majority of Polish 
business associations are registered under four statutes. The laws on employers’ 
organisations,2 chambers of commerce3 and artisans’ organisations or guilds4 all 
grant business associations the right to offer their opinions on laws relevant to their 
sphere of activity in return for a minimum number of members and democratic 
procedures. In spite of this minor privilege and quasi-official status, many Polish 
business associations are registered according to the law on associations, which 
confers no legal political privileges, but sets no minimum membership and has less 
to say about internal procedures.3 This specific legal category of “association” will 
hereafter be placed in inverted commas to distinguish it from the more general use of 
the word.
There is, to some extent, a theoretical division of labour between the different types 
of organisations. Chambers of commerce are supposed to lobby for a very wide 
range of public goods and also offer many specific private goods to their members. 
Artisans’ organisations are designed to represent the interests of small-scale craft 
businesses. Employer organisations are intended to be especially interested in 
industrial relations issues. “Associations” are sometimes perceived to be more
2 '"0 organizacjach pracodawcow'’, Dziennik Ustaw, 23 May 1991
3 "O izbach gospodarczych"", Dziennik Ustaw, 5 May 1991
4 "O rzemiosle", Dziennik Ustaw, 22 March 1989. To qualify as artisanal a business must be based on 
some craft qualification and employ a maximum of fifteen people.
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concerned with providing social goods to their members and private or very narrow 
political goods.
2.1 Voluntariness
There are estimated to be about three and a half thousand business associations in 
Poland.6 Membership is purely voluntary. There have been various attempts to 
make membership of chambers of commerce compulsory.7 These attempts have 
been sponsored by chamber officials who were also Sejm deputies. The only real 
support for the proposals came from the elites of the organizations who would 
benefit. Large majorities of Polish enterprises and even chamber of commerce 
members opposed compulsory membership.8 The proposal was vehemently resisted 
by other types of business associations.
2.2 Structure and Competition
The legal structure suggests a number of functionally differentiated types of 
associations. In practice, the different types of organizations compete with each 
other. For example, in the mining industry, chambers and employer organizations 
battle over the right to represent their industry in areas other than industrial relations. 
Artisans are also strongly represented in chambers and have their own “associations” 
and employer organisations. In the building industry a powerful “association” and an 
employers’ organisation are bitter rivals. This phenomenon of competition between
5 'Prawo o stowarzyszeniach", Dziennik Ustaw, 7 April 1989
6 Interviews: Szejnfeld, 6 December 2000; B^k, 24 July 2000 [All interviews Warsaw unless 
otherwise indicated.]
7 Businessman, August 1996, 28; Rzeczpospolita, Kraj, 22 May 1996, Prawo, 29 November 1995, 28 
December 1994
8 Mieczyslaw Bqk, Przemyslaw Kulawczuk, Anna Szczesniak, Wzmocnienie potencjahi organizacji 
przedsiqbiorcow w Polsce (Warsaw, Instytut Badan nad Demokracja i Przedsi^ biorstwem Prywalnym, 
2000), 57
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different types of business association is widely acknowledged to be a general 
characteristic of the structure of Polish business association.
The pattern of competition between and within the types of organization is reflected 
at the peak level. There are two actively hostile employers’ confederations, a 
chamber of commerce, a peak artisans’ guild, an artisans’ association and a number 
o f “associations” which aspire to represent Polish business as a whole. However, the 
associations are not all bitter rivals and sometimes cooperate and coordinate on 
specific issues, such as the coalitions on tax and the labour code formed during the 
third Sejm. There is also a fair degree of overlap in membership of the associations. 
One particular individual, Witold Zaraska, was for a long time a key figure in the 
Chamber of Commerce, the two most influential “associations” and, for a period, 
also the chairman of an employers’ confederation. However, there is no immediate 
prospect of unity or a coherent division of labour, and there never has been.
2.3 Membership
Business associations have a weak presence amongst businesspeople. One survey 
found that over 35 per cent of heads of firms claimed never to have heard of any 
organisation representing employers.9 Both membership figures and estimates of the 
number of enterprises in Poland tend to be very unreliable. However, it seems highly 
unlikely that more than ten per cent of Polish enterprises are members of a business
9 Institute of Public Affairs. Raport z  badania opinii na temat potrzeb istnienia i roli organizacji 
zrzeszajqcych pracodawcow, unpublished (Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 2000), 7. Telephone 
interviews with owners/president/vice-presidents of firms. 60% were private enterprises; 33% from 
Warsaw; 33% from towns of over 100,000 inhabitants; 33% from towns of between 20,000 -  100,000 
inhabitants. The sample represents the 8 main categories of the European Classification of Economic 
Activity. No response rate given.
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association.10 The Big Five, that is the most influential associations, including those 
which aspire to be peak associations, encompass only a small proportion of this 
limited overall constituency. In 1999, the Confederation of Polish Employers 
(hereafter Confederation) claimed seventy thousand members.11 If true this would 
represent only a couple of per cent of Poland’s enterprises but a substantial 
proportion of its large enterprises. Its members supposedly employ eight hundred 
thousand people. Five of Poland’s eleven registered employer federations and 
confederations were members of the Confederation in 1999.12 14 out of 95 employer 
associations registered at the Warsaw provincial (wojewodzki) court were members 
of the Confederation.13 The proportion of active, as opposed to merely registered, 
associations the Confederation organises is likely to be higher but it is impossible to 
estimate how much higher.14 The Polish Chamber of Commerce (Chamber) had 150 
member organisations in 1990. Even its most realistic claim for member businesses, 
350,000, seems too optimistic.13 Its members include territorial, bilateral and 
sectoral chambers and a plethora of other organisations. 30 per cent plus of chambers
10 The Institute of Public Affairs survey described above found that 8% of enterprises with 20 
employees or less were members of business associations. Since approximately 95% of Polish 
enterprises are about this size or smaller ten per cent seems to be a safe upper limit.
11 Konfederacja Pracodawcow Polskich, Folder of miscellaneous documents (Warsaw: Konfederacja 
Pracodawcow Polskich, August 1999)
12 Konfederacja Pracodawcow Polskich, Wykaz Czionkow KPP (Warsaw: Konfederacja 
Pracodawcow Polskich, 1999)Rejestr Zwiqzkow Pracodawcow “B ”, Unpublished (Warsaw: Sqd 
Wojewodzki w Warszawie, VII Wydzial Cywilny i Rejestrowy, 10 August 1999)
13 Rejestr Zwiqzkdw Pracodawcow "A ”, Unpublished (Warsaw: Sqd Wojewodzki w Warszawie, VII 
Wydzial Cywilny i Rejestrowy, 10 August 1999). This refers to the smaller old provinces dating from 
Gierek’s reforms of the 1970s, not to the larger new provinces, which were introduced by the Buzek 
Government in the late 1990s.
14 This is because inactive organizations almost always remain on the register. Many associations, 
like most enterprises, and other types of organizations, M l after a short period. This is evident from 
research on Polish associations in general and employers organizations in particular. See, Ewa Les, 
Slawomir Nal?cz, Jakub Wygnanski, '‘Defining the Non-Profit Sector: Poland”, Working Papers of 
the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, no. 36 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Centre for Civil Society Studies, 2000)
15 Krajowa Izba Gospodarza, Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza, (Warsaw: Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza, 
1999); Interview: Bqk, 24 July 2000. The leadership of the Chamber sometimes claims 400,000 or 
even 0.5m members. If the Institute of Public Affairs survey quoted above is in any way accurate, 
even the figure of 350,000 is an implausibly high proportion of Poland’s approximately 1.6m 
registered enterprises.
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in the city of Warsaw were members of the Polish Chamber of Commerce in 1999.16 
It is likely that the proportion of active, as opposed to merely registered, chambers, 
which are members is much higher but again it is impossible to tell how much 
higher. This is almost twice the membership density of the Confederation of Polish 
Employers in the Warsaw province. In 2000, The Business Centre Club (Club) had 
1900 individual members from over 1000 companies, employing a 0.8m people.17 In 
2000, the Polish Business Roundtable (Roundtable) consisted of sixty-eight
1 o
individual members who can only join by invitation. The membership of the Polish 
Confederation of Private Employers (Private Confederation) was a politically 
sensitive issue as it has been vital to the organisation’s contest with the official 
Confederation. As of December 1999 the Private Confederation had seventeen 
member organisations, employing over three hundred thousand.
2.4 Organisational Development
Polish business associations are generally organizationally weak. The only general 
data relates to employer organisations and is presented in Table 4.1. The data 
suggest that Polish employer organisations have, on average, just one employee and 
are heavily dependent on membership fees, and the contributions of volunteers, to 
survive. However, the sale of services does make a significant contribution to their 
income.
16 Krajowa Izba Gospodarza, Wykaz Czionkow KIG (Warsaw: Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza, 1999); 
Rejestr Izb Gospodarczych, Unpublished (Warsaw: S^d Gospodarczy S^du Rejonowego dla miasta 
stolecznego Warszawy, 7 September 1999)
17 Club, http://www.bccnet.com.pl. 23 November 2000
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Table 4.1: Data on Employer Organisations
Active Polish employer organisations 89
Engaged in profit-making activity 19
Directly employed (equivalent of full-time employees) 110
Outsourcing (equivalent of full-time employees) 37
Volunteers 432
Revenue 9.5m PLN (€2m)
Sources o f revenue: Commercial activity 15.9%
Bank interest 2.4%
Membership dues 58.6%
Public grants 4.2%
Donations 1.3%
Other* 17.7%
* Probably fees for services provided on a non-commercial basis.
Source: Analysis by Slawomir Nal^cz of the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of 
Sciences on the SOF census of the Polish Central Statistical Office in 1998. The questionnaire 
was sent to all 109 employers organisations with bank accounts. 67 replied, 22 refused, 6 were 
inactive and nothing is known about 14. It was assumed that the 22 refusals were similar to the 
67 respondents on die basis of similar research on Polish non-profit organisations.
This pattern of organizational weakness is also evident amongst the Big Five 
associations. The Confederation of Polish Employers has a very low level of 
organizational development with most of its work being done by volunteers from the 
membership. Many of the Confederation’s member associations do not pay fees but 
are kept on the books in order to maintain some vestige of prestige and credibility for 
the organization. In 1997 it charged eight grosze per employee for each member 
association and claimed to have a total income of 1.125m PLN.19 The Business 
Centre Club has a core of well-paid professional staff with expertise in marketing, 
economics and lobbying.20 It charges quite high fees. In 1997, they were 8500 PLN 
per enterprise and the total income was 7.5m PLN. The Polish Chamber of 
Commerce charged 1000 PLN per association in 1997 and received a total income of
18 Businessman, July 2000, 20
19 Businessman, June 1998, 69
20 BCC Yearbook 1998 (Warsaw: Business Centre Club, 1998)
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almost 25m PLN. It has a substantial organization. However, much of this is 
dedicated to commercial rather than political activity. Its lobbying organization is 
regularly overwhelmed by the number and complexity of policy issues. The high 
income of the group is largely derived from commercial activity rather than 
membership fees. The Polish Business 
Roundtable has a handful of professional 
staff. The Roundtable charged 18,000 PLN 
per member making for a total of 0.76m 
PLN. The Polish Confederation of Private 
Employers was initially bankrolled by the 
Roundtable and by its founding members and this may still be the case. In terms of 
staff resources it is comparable to the Club. For example, it has full-time industrial 
relations, legal and international officers.
One indication of the low level o f 
organisational development of these business 
associations is their close identification with 
their leaders. The Business Centre Club is 
commonly known as ’’Goliszewski’s club”. It 
has had only one President since its 
foundation and much of its effectiveness in the political system is due to his personal 
connections. Similarly, the Polish Confederation of Private Employers is known as 
"Mrs. Bochniarz’s confederation” and is reliant on her personal connections for most 
of its influence. It has also only had one President, although it was founded
21 Businessman, July 2000, 21; Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza, The Polish Chamber of Commerce 
(Warsaw: Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza, undated)
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Biography: Marek Goliszewski
Joined the United Workers’ Part} in 1983 
when most people were leaving it. He 
dabbled in journalism before setting up the 
Business Centre Club in 1991, which has 
made him a rich man. He has held board 
positions on the boards of some large 
member firms. Involved in setting up the 
Civic Platform in 2001, via the supposedly 
non-political Dialogue Forum, which is 
linked to the Club. 22
Biography: Andrzej Arendarski
Bom 1949. He studied at the University of 
Warsaw and was a doctoral student at the 
Polish Academy of Sciences. He served as a 
Deputy of the Liberal Democratic Congress 
from 1989-93 and as Minister of Foreign 
Trade from 1992 to 1993. He was elected 
president of the Chamber in 199 and has 
more recently been associated with the 
political left A board member of several 
large privatised conglomerates.21__________
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relatively recently, in 1999. Even the Polish Chamber of Commerce, with its 
inheritance from the previous regime and its three hundred and fifty thousand 
members, is nonetheless sometimes identified as ’’Arendarski’s group”. Andrzej 
Arendarski also has been its only President since its foundation in 1989, and his 
formidable political connections are usually regarded as more effective than the 
Chamber’s involvement in a wide range of institutional fora. The Polish Business 
Roundtable is clearly not dependent on one individual and never has been. However, 
it prides itself on the personal connections of its membership as a whole being its 
main political resource. The Confederation of Polish Employers has not been 
associated with one person and has not based its political strategy upon the personal 
connections of its members. However, the vicissitudes of its history are largely the 
vicissitudes of its leadership. It had had little in terms of organizational resources to 
sustain it.
The case studies confirm the data on
employer organisations and fragmentary
evidence from elsewhere which also
suggests a situation of extreme pluralism 
and organizational weakness.
Concentrating on the Big Five business 
associations probably gives a fairly accurate 
view o f the overall state o f Polish business associations. If five associations, which 
are reputedly so influential, are organizationally weak then the conclusion of 
weakness can confidently be extended to the vast number of associations, which do
22 Businessman, July 2000, 21
23 Informacja Prasowa (Warsaw: Polish Business Roundtable, 1999)
Biography: Henryka Bochniarz
President of the Private Confederation, 
President of the Polish Business Roundtable 
(1996-99), member of the Business Centre 
Club, member of the Bureaucracy Task Force 
of Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, 
Minister of Industry in Jan Krzy sztof Bielicki’s 
government of 1991-92. President of NICOM 
consulting, a small firm which was involved in 
preparing the mass privatization programme 
and is part of the management consortium of a 
National Investment Fund. PhD from and later 
researcher in the Academy of Planning & 
Statistics (now Warsaw School of Economics). 
Former lecturer, University of Minnesota."13
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not have their reputation for influence. If anything, a focus on the most influential 
associations would be expected to exaggerate the strength of business associations in 
general. However, the case studies do underestimate the variation amongst business 
associations. Three members of the Polish Confederation of Employers illustrate this 
range well.
The Federation of Polish Energy Employers represents a sector that is still largely 
state-owned and has only recently begun the process of privatization and de­
regulation. However, the fact that Poland already has an energy market puts it ahead 
of many West European countries. This Federation consists of four functionally 
differentiated employer organizations with virtually 100 per cent membership 
density. Unsurprisingly, the Federation is a highly developed organization with 
professional staff.24 The Association of Warsaw Industrial Employers is an 
association of large private enterprises and it contains a large minority of Warsaw’s 
largest industrial employers. It has a moderate level of organizational development 
with a small professional staff.23 The Mazowsze and Warsaw Employers’ 
Association is one of Poland’s largest and most dynamic associations of small 
enterprises. It has only a rudimentary secretariat. Virtually all o f its business is 
carried out by a highly committed core of activist-members.26 Thus, overall, even 
though the Confederation itself is extremely weak, some of its member associations 
have more powerful organizations.
24 Interview: Luczkiewicz. 17 November 2000
25 Interview: Jesionek, 25 July 2000
26 Interview: St^pniewski 27 July 2000; Zwiqzek Pracodawcow Warszawy I  Mazowsza: Historia i 
Podstawowe Dokumenty Zwiqzku (Warsaw: Zwiqzek Pracodawcow Warszawy I Mazowsza, 2000)
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2.4 Policy-Making
Just as the associations have a weak presence amongst businesspeople they are rarely 
central actors in politics.27 Only 3.1 per cent of deputies in the Second Sejm (1993- 
97) felt that employer organizations had a great influence on their work.28 The 
principal peak associations, and many sectoral associations, are frequently consulted 
by the government on new bills, but they have no right to be consulted and often do 
not hear about a bill until it is published. Also, complex bills are often submitted to 
the associations too late for them to make any contribution, never mind a considered 
and effective one. This is especially a problem for the Confederation and the 
Chamber, both of which are highly constrained by the very limited organizational 
resources they can commit to public policy issues. The Chamber has perhaps had 
more elected politicians in its upper ranks than any other business association and 
this facilitates personal access to policy-makers. Indeed, personal networking seems 
to be a vital part of the Chamber’s political activity.29
Although the Club finds it difficult to influence the state, it is generally regarded as 
the most powerful business association in Poland and is far and away the best known. 
It has no legal right to consultation but is nonetheless regularly consulted by policy­
makers on a non-statutory basis.30 In contrast to the Confederation and the 
Chamber, it also has excellent media connections and is frequently covered in
2/ Preston KeaL "Penalizing the reformers: Polish steel and European integration", Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies, 33 (2000), 212 fii 7
28 Wiodzimierz Wesolowski and Barbara Post (eds.), Polityka i Sejm: formowanie si% elitypolitycznej 
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1998), 188
29 Interview: Kloczko, Chamber, 6 June 2000
30 Interview: Uchman, Warsaw, 24 August 2000
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Poland’s quality and business press.31 Rather than being bypassed by the 
personalism of Polish politics, the Club tends to work with it. It co-ordinates the 
personalist lobbying of its members and activists, when its employees cannot directly 
access policy-makers.
The Roundtable is taken seriously at all levels of politics. Again this seems to be due 
to the personal reputations of its members rather than its organizational identity. 
Many interviewees agreed that most of its members could ask for and would receive 
an audience with the President.32 Indeed, most of its lobbying is done by members 
rather than employees. It relies on government contacts to catch bad policies before 
they happen. Roundtable representatives then talk to policy-makers “behind closed 
doors”. The Private Confederation follows the Club’s example in a successful use 
of the print media. It has also undoubtedly inherited a formidable bank of personal 
connections from the Roundtable. However, it has also succeeded in a tough 
campaign for the admission to the Tripartite Commission, previously monopolised 
by the Polish Confederation of Employers.
In spite of the inadequacy of the general system of legislative consultation, there are 
two potentially corporatist institutions of relevance to business interests: the 
Tripartite Commission and the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Committee of 
the Sejm. Until its abolition during the fourth Sejm (2001-present), the SME 
Committee had a very close relationship with associations. Its vice-chair said:
We co-operate intensively with business associations ... Our committee is the most open to 
cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations ... We invite representatives o f the most
31 Interviews: B^k, 24 July 2000; Uchman, 24 August 2000
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important business associations to all our sittings and if a sitting relates to a particular sector we 
invite the relevant organization.33 
Moreover, the committee members freely acknowledged that much of their activity 
could be described as pro-business rather than rigorously restricted to small 
enterprises.34 Associations also appear fairly often at the Economy, Social Policy and 
other legislative committees. However, the SME committee was the only committee 
with which they had a regular and privileged relationship. Unfortunately for the 
associations, this committee has now been abolished. At any rate, it never contained 
any real political heavyweights and was generally very weak compared to other 
legislative committees, never mind the parties and the government.
Poland is officially a corporatist state. Its 1997 Constitution declares the country a 
“social market economy” dedicated to “solidarity, dialogue and the co-operation of 
the social partners”.33 The right of association is explicitly guaranteed to labour 
unions and employer organizations, as is the right to conduct collective bargaining.36 
The one institution that aspires to fulfil this corporatist aspiration is the Tripartite 
Commission. From its inception in 1993 until recently, the composition of the 
Commission was the Confederation of Polish Employers, the Solidarity Trade Union 
Confederation, the All-Polish Trade Union Federation (OPZZ), and the government, 
usually represented by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy.37 The 
Commission’s statute has now been amended to include formal measures of
32 Interviews: Wejchert, 10 September 1999; Konwicki, 13 December 2000; Matraszek, 13 July 2000; 
Dankowski, 6 December 2000
33 Interview: Szejnfeld, 6 December 2000
34 Interview: Jagieliriksi, 7 December 2000
35 Konstytucja Rzeczpospoltej Polskiej, Art. 20
36 Konstytucja Rzeczpospoltej Polskiej, Art. 59
3/ Jerzy Hausner, ‘The State Enterprise Pact and the Potential for Tripartism in Poland" in Robert 
Kyloh (ed.), Tripartism on Trial (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1995), esp. 114-5; Jerzy 
Wratny, Pakt o Przedsiqbiorstwie Panstwowym w Trakcie Przeksztalcania (Bydgoszcz: Oficyjna 
Wydawnicza Osrodka Post?pu Organizaczjnego, 1993)
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representativeness, which have allowed other business associations to become 
members. The Commission has a wide range of informal powers, within its general 
remit of the maintenance of “social peace”. For example, it has a committee, which 
looks out for threats to national social peace and may refer them to the Tripartite 
Commission proper. However, it does not seem that this power has been used very 
often, nor does it seem that it has been effective. It also has the statutory right to give 
its opinion on virtually all of government policy. Here it is treated similarly to the 
business associations themselves. Whether the Commission’s opinion is taken at all 
seriously, and whether it is informed of policies early enough to have an influence on 
them, usually depends on the whim of the government.
The single significant power of the Commission is the annual setting of wages in the 
’’budget sector”. Basically, this includes all of the non-profit-seeking state sector. It 
therefore excludes most traditional state enterprises as well as legally private 
companies, which are owned by the state. There is a disagreement as to the nature of 
the Confederation of Polish Employers’ role in these negotiations. It is alleged that 
there are no ’’employers” in the budget sector, except for the state itself, and that, 
therefore, the negotiations are in fact bipartite negotiations between the state and 
unions. There are two variations to this. In the first, the Confederation’s opinion is 
simply irrelevant. In the second, the Confederation is a junior partner of the unions in 
squeezing higher pay and subsidies from the state. One of the enemies of the 
Confederation from the Private Confederation says:
Employers and trade unions pressurise the government together in the Tripartite Commission.
They do not represent private business. They’re supposed to be on opposing sides.38 
Another from the Roundtable says:
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We look down on the Confederation of Polish Employers ... They go hand in hand with the 
trade unions. They can take on obligations because they do not have to fulfil them. For 
example, coalmines do not have to pay tax, social security. They’re exempted from 
everything every year because of the unions... The employers actually paid for the buses that 
brought the striking coalminers to Warsaw to protest against the government.39 
There is undoubtedly a commonality of interest between employers and workers in 
some state enterprises that does not exist in the private sector, and some collusion 
does exist. However, it is not accurate to portray the Confederation of Polish 
Employers as simply a subsidy-guzzling state sector lobby. The real issue is the 
second issue of whether the employers are sufficiently autonomous to make a real 
contribution to budget sector negotiations. A member o f the Confederation’s 
presidium protests:
She [the President of the Private Confederation] says that there is no such thing as an 
employer in a State Treasury company but we say that in Germany, the UK, the USA in a big 
company with hundreds of branches ... [The managers] don’t have to be owners of shares.
He is an employer because he signs the contract of employment and he who signs the contract 
of employment is the employer, not the owner, and that’s the difference. Bakers and 
hairdressers are employers but he who has five thousand workers is not an employer, 
according to Mrs Bochniarz, because he’s not the owner. She is wrong.40 
However, the consensus seems to be that these pay negotiations are effectively 
between the state and unions. A senior trade unionist and Solidarity politician says:
In the public communal sector, which my section represents, employer organisations do not 
exist. This is a bad phenomenon because then trade unions do not have a direct partner, their 
own employers. We have to deal with the government41 
The chefde cabinet o f the leftist Minister of Labour and Social Policy says:
38 Interview: Janicki, 19 August 1999
39 Interview: Barikowicz, 9 August 1999
40 Interview: Luczkiewicz, 17 November 2000
41 Interview: Gielgus, 13 December 2000
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In the budget sector, there is only administration, or quasi-administration, quangos. There are 
no employers because the state is the employer. These negotiations are in fact directly between 
the government and the trade unions. Employer organizations are indirectly involved, if pay 
goes up in the budget sphere that affects their situation in the labour market... There are also 
more general arguments about the budget, tax, etc., redistribution. This affects all in the 
entrepreneurial or productive sphere whether state or privately owned.42 
So, the one real power of the Tripartite Commission is one in which business 
associations have only a marginal, indirect say.
Overall, the associational structure of Polish business is clearly pluralist. 
Membership is voluntary; associations compete with each other; they have weak 
organizations and they are largely ineffective outsiders in the policy-making process. 
The next section goes on to evaluate theories, which may explain this state of affairs.
3. Independent Variables
This section is divided in three. The main explanation is the logic of collective 
action, which emphasises economic structure. However, political and social 
variables are also considered.
3.1 Economic structure
Chapter Two argued that the logic of collective action was the compelling theory 
for explaining the structure and strength of business associations. Three key 
independent variables were derived from this approach: the number of enterprises 
in a group, the size of enterprises, and the balance of public and private goods 
provided by associations. One o f the advantages of this approach is that it is able
42 Interview: Dhigosz, 2 July 2002
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to subsume other economic approaches, as well as political and social approaches. 
Three economic approaches will be interpreted in terms of the logic of collective 
action. The first emphasises the influence of trade unions on business 
associations. The second is the varieties-of-capitalism approach, which stresses 
how the mode of production fits into a wider institutional structure including 
labour unions and business associations. The third focuses on interest diversity 
amongst the business class, and is exemplified by Padgett’s work on post­
communist interest groups. This section proceeds by first providing a general 
perspective and then moving on to case studies of Poland’s five most influential 
associations. For some of the variables, both general and case study data are 
available. For others only one type of evidence is available.
At the level of a class, 1.6m Polish businesses constitute a latent group. Of course, 
business associations also try to organise on the basis of specific constituencies 
rather than the economy as a whole. Most sectors are also latent groups. There are 
large contrasts in the number of enterprises between the basic sectors of the 
economy. The fragmentation of a basic sector into many smaller sub-sectors can be 
an aid to collective action. For example, a direct-member manufacturing business 
association is unlikely but more narrowly focused business associations representing 
specialised sectors of the manufacturing industry are much more likely to form. 
Once they have formed they constitute a small group, which can relatively easily 
federate to form a representative for the whole of the manufacturing sector. The 
Polish pattern seems fairly typical of an industrial economy.43 For example, the 
mining sector contains few enterprises while construction contains many;
43 downy Urzqd Statystyczny, Podmioty Gospodarcze Wedhig Rodzajaw i Miejsc Prowadzenia 
Dzialalnosci w 1998 r. (Warsaw: downy Urzqd Statystyczny, 1999), 32-35
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manufacturing is divided into many sub-sectors while commerce cannot be easily 
divided.
One source does cross-tabulate sector and association membership, but the sample 
size is far too small for meaningful comparison between sectors.44 However, there is 
strong unsystematic evidence. For example, virtually all enterprises in the highly 
concentrated energy-production and mining sectors are members of the relevant 
business associations.45
More striking than the numbers of Polish enterprises is that all but a tiny minority 
of these are small enterprises. Poland has an unusually high proportion of small 
enterprises.46 Within the category of small enterprises, ninety-five per cent are 
sole traders.47 One survey, although small, clearly shows that Poland conforms to 
the logic of collective action in that the smaller the firm the less likely it is to be a 
member of an association.48
There is no general information on the incentives provided by Polish business 
associations. However, case studies of the Big Five and their member associations 
give a good idea of the range of strategies which Polish business associations employ 
to recruit and maintain members. The case studies of the Big Five themselves are 
unrepresentative of Polish business associations for a number of reasons. The
44 Institute of Public Affairs. Raport z  badania opinii na temat potrzeb istnienia i roJi organizacji 
zrzeszajqcych pracodawcow, Tabela (v20_22)
45 Interviews: Luczkiewicz, 17 November 2000, Krysak, Katowice, 22 August 2000
46 Mieczyslaw B^k (ed.), Raport o stanie sektor mafych i srednich przedsiqbiorstw w Polsce w latach 
1997-98 (Warsaw: Polska fundacja promocji i rozwoju malych i srednich przedsicbiorstw, 1999). 
Based on national register of enterprises (REGON) adjusted to take account of registered but non­
existent enterprises.
47 Rzeczpospolita, Ekonomia, 12 July 2002
^ Institute of Public Affairs, Raport z  badania opinii na temat potrzeb istnienia i roli organizacji 
zrzeszajqcych pracodawcow, unpublished (Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 2000), 1-2,23
129
The ‘Soft’ State: Busmess-Govemment Relations in Poland -  Chapter 4
Confederation, Chamber and Private Confederation have no enterprises or 
individuals as members. All their members are other associations. This structure 
means that the peak associations concentrate on public goods, leaving private goods 
to be provided to enterprises by their member associations. As Poland’s most 
influential associations all o f the Big Five are obviously specialists in public goods in 
a way that the vast majority of Polish business associations are not. It is vital to 
keep in mind that peak associations provide incentives to three separate types of 
actors: member associations, enterprises and individual businesspeople. Primary 
associations provide incentives to individual businesspeople as well as enterprises. 
However, in the relevant cases, the following studies also look at the incentives 
offered by the member associations of the Big Five.
The Confederation of Polish Employers is emasculated by collective action 
problems. Its member associations are new and underdeveloped and they themselves 
largely depend on huge constituencies of very small cash-strapped firms. The 
weakness of Poland’s labour unions undermines a central incentive to join employer 
associations. Many of the Confederation’s member associations do not pay fees but 
are kept on the books in order to maintain some vestige of prestige and credibility for 
the organization. Therefore, even for the smallest associations decisions about 
membership o f the Confederation do not cross the threshold of rationality. The 
Confederation has a very low level of organizational development with most of its 
work being done by volunteers from the membership. Much of this volunteer work 
is not motivated by public goods but instead by the individual political careers of 
businesspeople and the opportunity for individual firms to obtain private goods from
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the political system.49 This pattern is also to be found in many of the first and 
second-order member associations. However, some of the member associations are 
dynamic and have found imaginative solutions to collective problems.
Obviously, there are huge differences between the member-associations. The three 
very different members of the Confederation, which were introduced earlier in the 
chapter, will be examined again here. The Federation of Polish Energy Employers 
operates in a sector that is still dominated by a small number of large enterprises. It 
is definitely an intermediate group, that is, one in which the non-participation o f an 
enterprise will be noticed. It may even be a privileged group, that is, one in which 
the incentives to form an association are so strong that an individual enterprise might 
shoulder the whole burden itself if others did not want to contribute. Energy is one 
of the handful of sectors in which wages and conditions are negotiated at the sectoral 
level. This gives a vital role to the Federation in providing a public good, which is a 
private good for most enterprises and one that they can provide themselves. The 
importance of unions also means that industrial relations issues also constitute a 
range of private goods, which can be provided by the Federation. Not just state 
ownership, but also ownership and regulatory transformation mean there are vital 
public goods to be provided by the Federation beyond the narrow industrial relations 
sphere. The Federation has no real collective action problems and this explains why 
it has a highly developed organization and plays an influential role in public policy.
The Association of Warsaw Industrial Employers is an association of large private 
enterprises and it contains a large minority of Warsaw’s largest industrial employers.
49 Rzeczpospolita, 3 September 1999, Magazine, 30 and 31 July, 1 August 2000, Kraj
131
The ‘Soft’ State: Business-Goverament Relations in Poland -  Chapter 4
It is probably an intermediate group. Its main activity is industrial relations. It 
provides a public good in the negotiation and maintenance of agreements with 
Solidarity and another local union. It provides little in the way of services for its 
members and also participates in lobbying at the national level, notably on the issue 
of the labour code. It has a moderate level of organizational development with a 
small professional staff.50
The Mazowsze and Warsaw Employers’ Association organises small enterprises 
which form a clearly latent group. It is heavily involved in lobbying at the 
municipal, regional, and national levels. Notably, it campaigns on right-wing issues, 
which are ignored by the more hard headed business associations and representatives 
of big business: for example, the restriction of the expansion of hypermarkets in 
Poland and a pro-family economic policy. It also provides private political goods in 
the form of interventions to try and reverse bad decisions at the municipal level in 
individual cases. The association has also co-ordinated economic co-operation 
amongst its members in the form of the foundation of a new shopping and business 
centre bringing together small indigenous enterprises and the organisation of trade 
shows in Germany. In this way the association has become directly involved in the 
economic strategies of its members and this obviously constitutes a substantial 
private economic good. The association stresses the importance of the creation and 
development of social capital amongst small employers as a vital element of political 
and entrepreneurial success. It has only a rudimentary secretariat. Virtually all o f its 
business is carried out by a highly committed core of activist-members. In other 
words, it is the pursuit of public goods that really keeps the association going.51
*° Interview: Jesionek, 25 July 2000
51 Interview: Stepniewski 27 July 2000
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The Confederation is a weak organisation largely comprised of weak associations 
trapped in a collective-action vicious circle. The members’ constituencies largely 
consist of latent groups of small enterprises: this suggests that private goods are 
needed to recruit enterprises. However, a substantial organisation is needed to 
provide substantial private political goods and a sizeable membership paying 
significant fees is necessary to build up the requisite organization. The 
Confederation itself seems to be trapped in the same vicious circle. It has so far not 
had the luck or good leadership to break out of this collective action trap and neither 
have most of its members.
The Business Centre Club is a direct member organisation open to all Polish business 
and therefore is operating in the context of the most latent group possible. However, 
the relatively high membership fees exclude the very small businesses, which are 
members of the Confederation. In contrast to the Confederation, and most of the 
Confederation’s members, the Club provides a wide range of private goods via a 
relatively well-developed organization. These include business matching, seminars, 
and product promotion. A perhaps distinctively post-communist good is the 
guarantee of trustworthy business partners in a situation where the networks of many 
businesspeople were initially undeveloped and in which the state’s legal system is 
too weak to provide effective enforcement of contracts.52 This could be interpreted 
as either a substitute for social capital or a way of creating social capital. Social 
goods are also important to some members. While the Club is a hard-nosed special
52 Iwona Krzesak. "Etnografia Business Centre Club" in Jacek Kurczewski & Iwona Jakubowska- 
Branicka Biznes i kJasy srednie: Studia nad etosem (Warsaw: Zaklad Socjologii Obczyajow i Prawa 
Stosowanych Nauk Spolecznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1994), 52; Dlatego Mowiq WlaSnie 
Sympatycyi Cztonkowie BCC (Warsaw: Business Centre Club, 1999), 18-34
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interest group it often presents itself as a rather glitzy and publicity-seeking version 
of an English gentlemen’s club. For this reason many members see it as prestigious. 
An important service is provided by the Club’s “Intervention Office”, which helps 
members in individual disputes with the state. An important example of the type of 
private political good provided by the Club is intervention to adjust the tax 
assessment of members.
Table 4.2 provides some data on motivations for membership of the Club.
Table 4.2: Motivations for Membership of Business Centre Club
Public Policy 52
Promoting a positive image o f business 9
Prestige 7
Private political goods 3
Private economic goods (excluding trust) 35
Trust 10
N 72
Source: Dlatego Mowiq Wlasnie Czlonkowie i Sympatycy Business Centre Club 
(Warsaw: Business Centre Club, 1999), 18-36. The data consists of statements of 
about 100 words on motivations for Club membership collected by the Club itself in 
1995,1998 & 1999. The categories of the analysis are not mutually exclusive.
The sample is biased because it contains a disproportionate number of Club office­
holders. It is also reasonable to assume that the non-officeholders in the sample are 
more active and enthusiastic than the average member. This should mean that the 
data overestimates the importance of those goods, which are stressed by the 
leadership of the Club. This, in turn, should mean an exaggeration of the importance 
of public goods and prestige. Nonetheless, it provides fairly strong evidence that 
both public and private goods are important to Club members. This figure may 
underestimate the importance of private political goods to Club members. A further 
ten members stress the opportunities afforded by Club membership to meet top
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politicians and bureaucrats. These meetings may result in connections, which 
members hope will deliver private political goods without the formal involvement of 
the Club office.
The Club has had considerable success in mobilising a latent group. The reasons for 
its success are those stressed by classic collective action theory: a concentration on 
large members and the provision of a wide range of private goods. However, it is 
also interesting to note that the Club has advanced by innovative leadership which 
has tailored its strategy to the conditions of post-communist Poland, rather than 
trying to copy Western European business associations as is the case with the 
Confederation and most Polish business associations.
Like the Confederation, the Polish Chamber of Commerce itself provides little in the 
way of private goods to members and charges very low fees. Unlike the 
Confederation, it is not dependent on membership fees, having inherited valuable 
assets from its communist predecessor and engaging as it does in a wide range of 
successful commercial endeavours. The low membership fees mean that 
membership does not pass the threshold of rationality for many chambers. When 
asked why his organization was a member of the Polish Chamber of Commerce, the 
deputy director of the Katowice Chamber of Importers and Exporters said:
Now that you ask me that question, I must say that there is little benefit to our membership of 
that organisation. We have never really considered the question and have little contact with 
their offices in Warsaw. I am not sure if the} really represent our interests.33
53 Interview: Moczynksi, Katowice, 22 August 2000
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In contrast to the Confederation, members are expelled for non-payment of fees and 
there is a regular turnover of four or five members a year with overall membership 
holding steady since the mid-1990s.34
Sectoral chambers are more likely to involve smaller numbers of enterprises which 
will be known to each other and therefore constitute an intermediate group. Sectoral 
chambers are unusual to Poland and their competition with employer associations 
undermines the inherent advantages of intermediate groups. As is the case with 
employer organisations, in some cases, the sectoral chambers have great collective 
action advantages and are reputedly quite powerful. Overall, however, it is the 
regional chambers which account for the vast majority of the enterprises affiliated to 
the Chamber. Table 4.3 shows some data on membership incentives for the regional 
chambers of commerce, which are likely to be dealing with latent groups.
54 Interview: Kloczko. 30 June 2000
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Table 4.3: Membership Incentives for Regional Chambers of Commerce
Members Formermembers
Desire to make contacts which can aid the realisation o f the firm’s 
interests
65 per 
cent 60
Desire to belong to an organisation defending the common interests 
of the business community 54 40
Desire to have up-to-date information on legislative changes and 
other important issues 23 18
Access to aid programmes and services offered by the Chamber 22 28
Use o f the Chamber to defend the interests o f the firm against state 
and substate authorities 21 28
Exchange o f views with other members 20 22
Other reasons 8 6
Hard to say 5 6
Competitors joined so we had to 4 8
Notes: Respondents could choose a maximum of 3 reasons. Stratified Random Samples. No response 
rates given. Members: N=100. 8% state enterprises; 49% less than 5 employees; 28% 50 to 250 
employees; 23% 250 employees and over. Non-members: N=50.
Source: Mieczyslaw B^k, Pizemyslaw Kulawczuk, Anna Szczesniak, Wzmocnienie potencjatu 
organizacji przedsiebiorcow n* Polsce (Warsaw: Instytut Badari nad Demokracja i Przedsiebiorstwem 
Prywatnym, 2000), 2-4
In interpreting the table it is important to remember that respondents were asked to 
name up to three reasons for joining the chambers and were not asked to rank these 
reasons. The most striking feature of the table is the relative importance of political 
goods, both public and private. However, the membership motivation chosen most 
often was that of making contacts, which would be good for the firm. This is far 
more important than private economic goods provided as services by the Chamber. 
This seems to be another example of a business association creating social capital for 
its members. Often, small enterprise associations are judged to be heavily dependent
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on private economic goods.55 The small size and tight budgets of the members 
means they are unlikely to make a vital contribution to the provision o f a public 
good. Their small size also means that membership fees are a relatively greater 
burden. In small enterprises, especially those that are owner-managed, it is relatively 
easy to evaluate and cease contributions. However, a relatively high level of 
organizational development is needed to deliver economic private goods that 
compete with the commercial sector in combination with a quite separate lobbying 
function. Polish chambers are probably, in many cases, too underdeveloped to do 
this and instead have a much purer concentration on politics, which, pace Olson, also 
has great potential for the delivery of private goods. The chambers movement does 
seem to be more firmly embedded in local politics than employer associations, and 
local chambers have a reputation for having formidable personal links with 
politicians.2)6
The Chamber and its members present a different aspect of the logic o f collective 
action to the Confederation and the Club. The Confederation has largely failed to 
solve the collective action problem and the Club has done so by combining large 
members and private economic goods, as Olson would predict. The Chamber of 
Commerce movement has had some success by pursuing a different strategy, which 
focuses on private political goods and on encouraging the development of social 
capital amongst its members. This means that Chambers can provide important 
private goods with which to recruit members without having to build up a 
, considerable organisational capacity separate from its pursuit of public goods in the 
political system.
55 Padgett, Organizing Democracy, 108-109
56 Interview: Matraszek, 13 July 2000
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Members of the Polish Business Roundtable are prominent on the list of richest 
Poles. Although the Roundtable has an encompassing interest in the Polish 
economy, it is in fact a fairly well integrated network of businesspeople rather than a 
classic latent group. Not only are the members well known to each other but they are 
all highly politically motivated and do not usually subject their participation in the 
Roundtable to an analysis of its costs and benefits for their firm. The other way in 
which the Roundtable has overcome the collective action problem is that it comprises 
a small number of very large businesses. All can make a substantial difference to the 
organisation. The Roundtable provides very little in the way of private goods, apart 
from some social opportunities and occasional private lobbying for members. 
However, the members tend to be so powerful that they do not need any 
organization’s aid in the pursuit of private political goods. The Roundtable has 
collective-action advantages that allow it to concentrate on public goods. Firstly, 
there is the size of the members but more important seems to be the fact that they are 
strongly motivated by political goods and have a very high opinion of their own 
political efficacy. The Roundtable’s members are openly elitist. They see 
themselves as the most successful and most brilliant entrepreneurs in Poland who can 
and should pressurise government into improving the environment, not just for their 
own businesses, but for Polish business in general.
The majority of the founding members of the Polish Confederation o f Private 
Employers seem to have been new associations created more or less directly by the 
Roundtable, while a smaller number were previously unaffiliated associations and
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defectors from the official Confederation.37 Most of these associations were trying to 
mobilise latent groups, as they related to territorial units or sectors with large 
numbers of private enterprises. A striking exception was the Polish Copper 
Employers’ Association. This is a classic privileged group of enterprises dependent 
on the Polish Copper conglomerate, which also has interests in mobile telephony and 
other sectors. The Private Confederation has sought to attract members partly 
through an emphasis on its private-sector credentials, partly through its superior 
political ability but also through the offer of the real and professionally delivered
58private goods that are completely lacking from the official Confederation.
In terms of collective action, the same analysis as was applied to the Roundtable is 
pertinent to the Private Confederation’s leadership: an emphasis on political goods 
and a high perception of personal political efficacy. However, the leadership knows 
that this is not enough to recruit a mass membership and is therefore trying to 
provide substantial private goods which potential member associations are too weak 
to provide for themselves.
The case studies show that the small size and large numbers of Polish enterprises are 
formidable obstacles for Polish business associations. This is clearest in the cases of 
the Confederation and the Chamber. One way around the collective action problems 
posed by these structural characteristics is to minimise the level of organizational 
development of associations as has been done with some success by regional
57 Andrzej Rudka, Personal Communications, 26 January and 29 August 2000; Press Release 
(Warsaw: Polska Konfederacja Pracodawcow Piywatnych, 9 July 1999); S^d Wojewodzki w 
Warszawie, VII Wydzial Cywilny i Rejestrowy, Rejestr Zwi^ zkow Pracodawcow "B", 10 August 
1999; Interviews: Malinowski, 8 September 1999; Barikowicz, 9 August 1999
58 Untitled Pamphlet in English (Warsaw: Polska Konfederacja Pracodawcow Piywatnych, 2000); 
Untitled Pamphlet in Polish (Warsaw: Polska Konfederacja Pracodawcow Piywatnych, 2000)
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chambers of commerce and the Roundtable. Also, a leadership motivated by 
political goods and with a high opinion of its own political efficacy can start and 
maintain some level of collective action. This is shown by the Roundtable, Private 
Confederation and some members of the Confederation. These advantages might be 
described as cultural resources or social capital. The fact that they are the exception 
rather than the rule shows how debilitating their absence has been for Polish business 
association in general. Another route is the well-designed business model of the 
Club, which manages to be Poland’s most successful business association without 
relying too heavily on non-economic motivations. The importance of these two 
routes to business association helps to explain not just the weakness but also the 
fragmentation of Polish business in politics. It is not in the interest of Club President 
Goliszewski to share his profits with anyone else via merger. Similarly, those who 
are motivated by political goods, bolstered by a high opinion of their personal 
contribution, are likely to be reluctant to cede the pleasure of leadership to others 
whose skills and influence may not match up to their own. Finally, the collective 
action analysis helps explain the personalism of Polish business associations. 
Obviously, a major reason for this is organizational weakness, which is in turn 
explained by the logic of collective action. However, if the political commitment or 
entrepreneurial flair of a small elite is the main type of collective action then the 
personal connections of this elite are the main resources of the so-called 
“organizations”. In conclusion, it seems very clear that the case studies back up the 
general statistics of a weak and divided structure of business association in Poland. 
This section continues by showing how the logic of collective action can subsume 
other economic approaches to business associations.
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Next, the specific effect of trade unions on the logic of collective action for Polish 
business will be examined. The representation of Polish trade unions is weak in the 
labour market. Union membership has been in free fall since the collapse of 
communism, as Table 4.4 shows.
Table 4.4: Trade Union Membership in Poland
Federation 1990-91 1993 1995
Solidarity 2.2m 1.5m 1.3m
OPZZ 6m 4.8m 2.5m
Source: Paul Kubicek, "Organized Labor in Postcommunist States: Will the Western Sun Set on
It Too?", Comparative Politics, vol. 32, no. 
author, ILO or state committees.
1, 1999, 86. Self-reported data, collected by
In 1995 the overall union density was estimated to be about 35 per cent. 
Membership has continued to fall fast. By 1997 it was estimated to be 23per cent39 
and by 2000 20 per cent60 The fall in the membership of OPZZ has been 
particularly precipitous in recent years.61 None of these figures is likely to be exact 
but the overall picture is clear. The research of Gardawski has shown that 
membership of Polish unions is high and stable in the state sector, is being eroded in 
privatised firms, and is virtually non-existent in new private and small firms.62 The 
central federations, OPZZ and Solidarity, are fiercely antagonistic at the level of 
national politics. Relationships at the local level tend to be more pragmatic, but co­
operation is limited. Both federations have very loose structures. Unions in the 
workplace have very little contact with, and regard for, the national leadership and
59 Padgett, Stephen, Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany: Interest groups in post-communist 
society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 78
60 Rzeczpospolita, PlusMinus, 19 August 2000
61 Rzeczpospolita, Kraj, 27 May 2002
62 Juliusz Gardawski, Barbara Gqciarz, Andrzej Mokrzyszewski, Wlodzimierz Pankow, Rozpad 
Bastionu? Zwiqzki Zawodowe w gospodarce prywatyzowanej (Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 
1999), 14-15. The information is based on a sample of 202 workplaces from 1998, drawn from the 
food, wood and paper, chemical, car, building, education, healthcare and social assistance sectors. 
202 directors or another members of the management was interviewed, as were 148 union activists, 
and 1225 other workers, whether union members or not The number of workers surveyed was 
proportionate to the size of the enterprise. Almost half of the places of work had less than 50 
employees. 41.5% had between 50 and 250 employees and 8.5% had over 250 employees. Almost
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the regional and sectoral divisions of the federations.63 There are also many 
independent unions. The most significant of these are radical offshoots o f Solidarity 
-  Solidarity ’80 and Solidarity August ’80. The majority of unionised enterprises 
have only one union.64 Where this is not the case, the law tends to calcify the 
fragmentation of unions by insisting that unions work together. In practice, they 
frequently do not manage to do so and unions are marginalized. The leader of 
Solidarity’s public services branch says:
At the plant level many trade unions are registered. When there’s a real gamut of trade unions it 
is hard for them to come to agreement among themselves. There is just too much pluralism and 
this does not help the representation of workers.65
Overall, Polish unions are relatively passive. Workers and unionists have great 
respect for managers and rarely seem to think they can or should take part in the 
running of the firm.66 Unions play little or no role in decision-making in firms. 
Their role is greatest in safety and hygiene, layoffs and bonuses. Collective 
bargaining agreements were in place in one third of the workplaces in Gardawski’s 
sample.67 Collective bargaining beyond the level of the individual workplace is 
extremely rare in Poland and formal agreements are confined to a handful of state 
sectors. Relationships between unions and employers are rarely conflictual in 
Poland. In one-third of the workplaces in Gardawski’s sample strike notice had been 
served in the last decade and in one-fifth strikes had actually taken place. The 
number of working days lost to strikes in 1990 was 141,304. This fell to 25,894 in
half of the workplaces were private or privatized. No response rate given. (Gardawski, Rozpad 
Bastionu, 13)
63 Gardawski, Rozpad Bastionu, 17,20, 168
64 Gardawski, Rozpad Bastionu, 234
65 Interview: Wielgus, 13 December 2000
66 Gardawski, Rozpad Bastionu, 172; David Ost and Marc Weinstein, "Unionists Against Unions:
Toward Hierarchical Management in Post-Communist Poland”, East European Politics and Societies, 
13 (1999)
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1997 but rose again to 36,824 in 1998.68 The vast majority of conflict takes place in 
a limited number of state sectors.
Workers do not consider their unions very useful. When they have a problem, 
workers tend to go straight to the management rather than through their union.69 
Workers perceive membership of unions as correlated with worse-paid jobs in worse- 
performing firms, even though it seems union membership has no particular 
relationship with members’ pay and their firm’s performance.70 When given a list of 
statements describing the role of unions workers most frequently chose, “They try 
but they do not achieve much”.71
However, unions do have considerable influence at the level of national politics. In 
the third Sejm 106 out of the 460 members of the Sejm were directly connected to
77unions. Many Poles, and especially business leaders, think that Poland is a country 
run by unions. They have even coined the term “Zwiqzokracjd” (Rule of the 
Unions). The following discussion argues that this view is an exaggeration.
Solidarity cannot be straightforwardly treated as a union. It has always had a much 
wider political agenda.73 At both the grassroots and elite levels the political and 
trade union Solidarities were difficult to extricate. Local party organisations were
61 Gardawski, Rozpad Bastionu, 21
6,5 Rocznik StatystycznyRzeczpospolitej Polskiej 1999 (Warsaw: Glowny Urzqd Statystyczny, 2000), 
141
69 Gardawski, Rozpad Bastionu, 244
’° Gardawski, Rozpad Bastionu, 19,184, 186 
;1 Gardawski, Rozpad Bastionu, 20
12 George Kolankiewicz, '‘Social Package to Social Consequences: Restructuring of Coal Mining in
Poland ,^ paper delivered at the London School of Economics, 1998
13 Irena Jackiewicz, '‘Solidarity in a Double Role: Political Representative and Pressure Groups in 
Agh, Attila & Honszki, Gabriella (eds.), Parliaments and Organised Interests: The Second Steps 
(Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies, 1996), 122-140
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largely based on existing union facilities. The top officials of Solidarity sat in the 
Sejm, some entered government, and the Solidarity Electoral Action bloc was 
dominated by Solidarity president Marian Krzaklewski. Perhaps the most obvious 
example of union influence in the third Sejm was legislation on shortening the 
working week. Previous governments had passed various laws, which gave some 
privileges to unions, such as enhanced job 
security for union officials.74 However, 
the overall thrust of Solidarity government 
policy had nothing to do with the rights of 
unionists and workers. The bloc also 
contained other parties, like the People’s 
Conservative Party, who wanted to restrict
Biography: Marian Krzaklewski
Bom 1950. Doctorate on the
computerisation of industrial processes 
from the Silesian Institute of 
Technology. Initiated Solidarity
organisation in the Polish Academy of 
Sciences. Arrested under martial law. 
Took over from Lech Walesa as 
Solidarity’s head in 1991. Founder of 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) in 
1996. His unsuccessful presidential 
campaign 2000 led to a struggle over his 
role in the party7 and the implosion of 
AWS.
union influence on policy. Many o f the Solidarity representatives had a much 
stronger commitment to the acceleration o f socio-economic reform than they had to 
the promotion of workers or union interests. One common explanation for the 
decline of Polish unions is the “umbrella” provided by Solidarity to radical reforms 
after the transition of 1989 and again during the third Sejm. The chaotic record of the 
government, Krzaklewski’s pathetic campaign for the Polish presidency and the 
electoral wipeout suffered by Solidarity Electoral Action in 2001 may mean the end 
of direct involvement in politics for the Solidarity union.
The relationship between the OPZZ and the Democratic Left (SLD) is more 
straightforward. Again, senior officials sit in the Sejm and enter government. They 
tend towards a more direct representation o f union interests than Solidarity.
'4 Teresa Majtas, Prawo Pracy: Zarys Wykladu (Poznan: Wyzsza Szkda Zarz^dzania i Bankowosci w 
Poznaniu, 1999X 27-28
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Although the Democratic Left calls itself social-democratic and advocates many 
social-democratic policies it is also a party of business, especially big business. 
Many of the senior members of the party come from the pro-business wing of the 
party. Perhaps the most salient characteristic of the party and its leadership is its 
pragmatism. It is as much a party of power as a left-wing union-based party. In both 
the SLD and AWS large swathes of the parties were unhappy with their close 
relationship with the unions and were working to undermine it or reconstruct it on a 
more distant basis.7;>
The constituencies of businesses with an interest in the presence of trade unions in 
the labour market may be quite small, territorially and/or sectorally, and thus provide 
good incentives for collective action. The constituency for trade union political 
power is the most latent of latent groups since it relates to virtually every business 
under the jurisdiction of the Polish State. Thus, Polish trade unions are weak where 
they are most likely to encourage strong business association and strong where they 
are least likely to encourage business association. Polish business leaders are 
tortured by “frustrated functionalism”. They see trade union power as deeply 
damaging to the business class and think that the common interest of business this 
represents would lead to strong business associations if  only Polish businesspeople 
understood their interest properly.76 However, looked at from the rational choice 
perspective, the weakness of the business associations makes perfect sense and 
seems unlikely to be overcome because of trade union power in national politics.
5 Irena Pankow. "Trade Unions and Politics" in Janina Frentzel-Zagorska and Jacek Wasilewski 
(eds.), The Second Generation o f Democratic Elites in Central and Eastern Europe (Warsaw: Institute 
of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000); Irena Pankow, "Zwi^ zki zawodowe a 
polityka" in Jacek Wasilewski (ed.), Elita polityczna 1998 (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 1999)
76 Interview: Mordasewicz, 9 August 2000
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The weakness of trade unions in the labour market also means that few business 
associations can recruit members by offering industrial relations services. Finally, 
unions are to be found in the most concentrated sectors with the largest enterprises, 
that is, in the state sector. In fact, much of their presence is in the budget sector 
where there is only one giant employer, the central state itself. In the case of groups, 
which are already intermediate or privileged, the presence of trade unions may not be 
an especially large extra incentive to collective action.
The above argument is that trade unions are not a major stimulus to business 
association in Poland. The foundation of the Private Confederation is a good 
example of the exception that proves the rule. Its origins relate quite directly to the 
distinction between the labour market and political power of trade unions. In most 
countries, unions provoked business association because business wanted to take on 
locally or sectorally based unions at the same level, that is to say that the labour 
market power of unions stimulated the formation of business associations. These 
locally based unions then federated, eventually forming national peak associations, 
which dealt with wider political issues. In the case of the Private Confederation, it 
was the other way round. The power of the trade unions is in the political system so 
a confederation, which could be influential at that level was needed. However, a 
confederation cannot legally be set up unless it has the required number of 
associations as members. Since these were lacking, the Confederation’s founders set 
up several associations in order to overcome this hurdle. Since it was the political 
and not the labour market power of unions, which was the target, the peak 
association came first and was then followed by the primary associations. This is in 
contrast to most West European countries in which local and sectoral associations
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were set up to counter the labour market power of unions, only considerably later 
forming into national confederations.77 While the Private Confederation has been 
fairly successful in partially supplanting the official Confederation, it has not 
managed to mobilise the latent group of the Polish national business class against 
trade union political power.
Another popular economic approach to business associations plays down the role of 
trade unions and argues that the mode or production is the key independent variable. 
The vital distinction here is between coordinated and liberal economies. Coordinated 
economies are exemplified by highly skilled and specialised sectors, which 
encourage business association. Liberal economies stress the flexibility necessary 
for industries where radical innovation and/or low wages are necessary and business 
associations are relatively superfluous. It is easy to demonstrate that Poland is a 
liberal economy rather than a coordinated economy. Poland’s comparative 
advantage is to be found in low-skill, low value-added sectors, which are the very 
antithesis of the “coordinated” production regime. In these sectors, there is little 
need for technical and training cooperation and therefore a low potential for business 
associations to offer private goods, which are so essential that they form part of the 
production process itself. It has been noted by the Polish Foundation for the 
Development of Small and Medium Enterprises that Polish business associations are 
virtually never involved in “carrying out work connected with the certification of 
products or the conduct of research and innovation activity”.78
'' John P Windmuller and Alan Gladstone, Employer Associations and Industrial Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1984), 3
'8 Businessman, November 2000,16
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The final economic approach focuses on interest diversity, a variable for which there 
is no worthwhile general data. If there is a very high level of interest diversity 
amongst post-communist business classes, as Padgett supposes, then divisions 
between and within business associations should be based on objective factors, like 
the sectors of the businesses, their ownership structure, and the background of their 
management. Little of the competition between the Big Five seems to be based on 
fundamental differences in their membership. The big exception here is the 
competition between the Confederation of Polish Employers and the Private 
Confederation. The Private Confederation claims that this is a straightforward 
opposition between the state and private sectors. As has already been pointed out 
this is a great exaggeration but there is also a substantial amount of truth in this view. 
Furthermore, the clash between private and state sectors is an important source of 
division within the Confederation of Polish Employers. It is, however, important to 
remember that by far the biggest employer in the Private Confederation, the Polish 
Copper Association, is largely state-owned. Also, the vast majority of members of 
the official Confederation are from the private sector and are by no means excluded 
from its decision-making. One obvious indicator is that all its presidents have been 
private-sector representatives. As regards the other associations, while they have 
fairly different membership profiles, most of their competition relates to personality 
and valence issues. Their attacks on each other consist of accusations of 
incompetence, careerism and corruption. Very rarely do they describe their 
competitors as representatives of big business, the state sector, foreign firms, or the 
former nomenklatura. Similarly, there is little sign of competition within 
associations based on objective factors. In the Chamber, which has the largest and 
most diverse membership, internal politics does often relate to differences between
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large and small business and occasionally foreign and domestic business. However, 
these conflicts do not seem especially intense and are only to be expected from any 
interest association. Internal politics in the Chamber seems to be much more focused 
on the competition of various personal cliques for power and position. The Club, 
Roundtable and Private Confederation appear to enjoy very minimal internal conflict. 
In the case of the Club, this is partly because it is effectively a firm controlled by one 
man. The Roundtable and the Confederation are based on a tightly knit core of 
business leaders with similar views and interests. This relative lack of conflict on the 
basis of objective factors suggests that Polish business associations consider 
themselves as fundamentally one large latent group. Their problems do not seem to 
be conflicts between mobilised groups with fundamentally different interests. Their 
fundamental problem is the mobilisation of latent groups with common interests.
3.2 Political variables
Under the communist regime, there were clear antecedents of business-government 
relations in both the state and private sectors. There is no doubt that many sectors of 
state enterprise constituted formidable economic lobbies in the Poland o f the 1980s. 
The economic reforms of the early eighties tried to introduce more competition, and 
reduce the power of economic lobbies, by breaking up huge sectoral 
“agglomerations” into several units. However, the old economic agglomerations 
were resurrected as slightly more informal “associations”. In some respects, these 
organisations acted very like business associations.79 They lobbied for exceptions to 
the rules and bargained over their government contracts. The interests of the 
enterprise associations usually coincided with those of ministry bureaucrats. The
79 George Kolankiewicz and Paul G Lewis, Poland: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Pinter. 
1988), 104, 109, 111, 112, 114
150
The ‘Soft’ State: Business-Govemment Relations in Poland -  Chapter 4
huge smoke-stack industries were among the most inefficient and inflexible in 
Poland and would have been seriously threatened had the reforms been implemented
o s v
consistently. It was not in the interest of bureaucrats to implement reforms that 
would reduce their power by taking economic decisions out of their hands and giving 
them to the market. Uncertainty about the determination and ability of the top 
political leadership to drive through complex reforms encouraged both bureaucrats 
and enterprise directors to undermine the reforms rather than prepare for a period of 
fundamental and long-term economic change.
The political representation of the private sector was institutionalised under the 
communist regime in Poland. Artisans were organised into functional chambers, 
united by a Union o f the Chambers of Handicraft. The Chambers seem to have been 
genuine representatives of the private sector. Their elections were reasonably 
democratic and they repeatedly and sharply criticised official policy.81 
Unfortunately, they were almost always ignored. The Chambers were, in turn, 
dominated by the Democratic Party, a satellite party, which was loyal to the 
communist regime. Members of the party frequently held positions with impressive 
titles, which suggested that they were responsible for the private sector. However, 
they tended to be involved in administrative rather than policy-making functions. 
Sometimes they were symbolically included in announcements of policy changes.82
In the space, carved out by the political opposition between 1975 and 1989, there 
appeared a number o f groups, which claimed to represent the interests of private
80 Jerzy Hausner, BranZowe Grtipy Interesu w Gospodarce Socjalistycznej (Krakow: Akademia 
Ekonomiczna w Krakowie, 1987), 222-223
81 Anders Aslund, Private Enterprise in Eastern Europe: The Non-AgricuJturaJ Private Sector in 
Poland and the GDR, 1945-83 (London: Macmillan, 1985), 41
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entrepreneurs. These groups seem to have been dominated by opposition-oriented 
intellectuals rather than actual entrepreneurs83 and thus are perhaps better classified 
as public interest associations rather than business associations. However, they did 
provide some form of interest representation for the Polish private sector and a 
precedent for business association under the new regime. These groups were 
consistently refused legal registration until 1989. The new mixed ownership sector 
set up something akin to its own business association in 1989.84
It is clear that the state sector possessed great potential for corporatist business- 
govemment relations. It consisted of relatively small numbers of large enterprises, 
which had traditionally enjoyed an insider role in policy-making and 
implementation. They did not, however, have a tradition of a national peak 
association or negotiations with the government itself, or the trade union 
confederations at the national level.
A vital part of Balcerowicz’s analysis of failed economic reforms was the influence 
of state-sector lobbies. The Balcerowicz plan emphasised resistance to these lobbies 
and the destruction of their economic basis. In contrast to most of its post­
communist neighbours, the Polish government did not initiate any tripartite 
negotiations in the first years of the new regime. Indeed, it conducted virtually no 
formal negotiations or consultations with business associations. Legislation defining 
the structures and rights of certain sorts of business associations was passed. 
However, these laws probably reflect inaction rather than a pro-active intervention in
82 AsluncL Private Enterprise in Eastern Europe, 93
83 Timothy Gaiton Ash, '^ Reform or Revolution?'' in his The Uses o f Adversity: Essays on the Fate of 
Central Europe (London: Penguin, 1989), 249-251
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business-govemment relations. They generally recognised the types of 
organisations, which had been set up in 1989 and soon after. They conferred 
virtually no obligations on the government or the state. In the longer term, as 
described earlier, the effect of this legislation was to fragment business 
representation between employer associations, chambers of commerce, artisan 
organisations and “associations” . In the denial of a special, or even an 
institutionalised, relationship with the state and the erection of a confusing and 
fragmented legal structure, official policy tended to encourage pluralism. Moreover, 
the economic effects of the Balcerowicz plan made pluralism more likely by creating 
huge latent groups of small enterprises.
However, there is still some controversy as to the extent to which the communist era 
lobbies recast themselves as post-communist business associations.8:> Since there is 
no reliable relevant data, the only way of deciding this issue seems to be by means of 
detailed case studies. A focus on the most influential associations allows the change 
and continuity hypotheses to compete with each other, both in terms of the 
associations, which are regarded as the most influential, and in terms of the battle for 
influence within those associations.
The Confederation sees itself as a successor to pre-communist Polish peak 
associations. It was founded in 1989 by four associations, which represented the 
opposition movement, the private sector, state enterprises in the process of
84 Jadwiga Staniszkis, The Dynamics o f the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991X 65
85 Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Capitalist and Communist Dictatorships (New 
York: Basic Books, 2000), 169-70; Padgett, Organizing Democracy, 17, 24, 53; Businessman, 
November 2000,16
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“nomenklatura” privatisation and traditional state enterprises.86 The Confederation’s 
first president was elected on an opposition ticket to the Senate in 1989. After his 
resignation, because of rumours of illegal arms deals, he was replaced by his right- 
hand man and the organization’s secretary-general. The next two presidents have 
had strong links to communist and ex-communist politics but have made their living 
in relatively modest private sector operations rather than being captains of 
communist-era monoliths. The Confederation of Polish Employers is a very 
encompassing organization: its members include representatives of virtually all 
interests in the Polish economy.87 In the Confederation the old-fashioned state and 
privatised enterprises have great collective action advantages and dominate the 
Confederation out of proportion with their share of its membership,88 employment, or 
any other measure. This has even been institutionalised in a Constitution, which 
favours the best organised.89 However, it is wrong to see the Confederation as an 
organization, which has been completely hi-jacked by the state sector. Even though 
the state sector is dominant, the vast majority of members are private and their 
concerns are taken into account in the Confederation’s political campaigns. The 
origins and internal politics of the Confederation are equivocal but perhaps tend 
towards the continuity hypothesis.
The Business Centre Club does not claim to be the heir to any tradition in Polish 
business association, but is dedicated to the invention of its own tradition. 
Officially, it was founded in 1991 by a group representing a wide range of political
86 Roman Luczkiewicz, A,B,C ... Konfederacji Pracodawcom Polskich (Warsaw: Federation of 
Energy Employers, 2000); Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 October 2000, Kraj; Interviews: St^pniewski, 27 July 
2000; Interview: Malinowski, 8 September 1999
87 Folder of miscellaneous documents (Warsaw: Konfederacja Pracodawcow Polskich, August 1999)
88 Rzeczpospolita, 11 November 2000, Ekonomia
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and economic backgrounds; former ministers, senators, private entrepreneurs, state- 
enterprise directors, journalists and academics. However, the origins o f the Club 
seem to lie in the vision of its charismatic President, Marek Goliszewski. The Club 
is effectively a private company controlled by one man, the Club’s founder and 
president ever since.90 Here, there is clearly no sign of the dominance of lobbies 
dating from the previous regime. As with the Confederation, the origins o f the Club 
do not clearly favour either of the hypotheses. However, the evidence may tend 
towards the change hypothesis since no communist-era lobbies could join en bloc as 
they did with the Confederation. The internal politics of the Club favour the change 
hypothesis as there is no question of the Club becoming a representative for the 
economic legatees of the old regime as long as Goliszewski is its owner.
The Polish Chamber of Commerce identifies itself, as does the Confederation, with 
pre-communist organisations. Several representatives the opposition-linked 
chambers of commerce movement were elected to parliament in 1989. They 
managed to get a law passed which legalised the chambers, gave them the right to 
give their opinion on laws and bequeathed the assets of the old Chamber of Foreign 
Trade to the new Polish Chamber of Commerce.91 This constituted a straightforward 
takeover of the communist institution by the new organisation rather than a merger.92 
Although state enterprises later joined the founding elite has maintained its leading 
position. In spite of the fact that the Chamber has strong member-chambers from 
state-dominated or privatised sectors, these chambers do not dominate. The 
Constitution is designed so that the different types of member organisations share
89 Statut Konfederacji Pracodawcow Polskich (Warsaw: Konfederacja Pracodawcow Polskich. 
registered 1994), § 17.3.2, § 17.4
90 Businessman, June 1998,68
91 "O izbach gospodarczyclT, Dziennik Ustaw, 5 May 1991, Art 12
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power93 In 2000, no representative of state industry sat on the Chamber’s 
presidium.94 Yet again, the Chamber’s origins tell no unambiguous story but 
probably tend towards the change hypothesis.
The Polish Business Roundtable was founded in 1991 and is explicitly modelled on 
the US Business Roundtable, which was founded in 1972. The founders of the 
Roundtable come from a diverse range of backgrounds: the nomenklatura, the 
intelligentsia, private business under communism, and foreign businesspeople. 
Unlike the other organizations, the Roundtable from its very beginning contained a 
significant proportion of returned emigres.9y Its first president, Jan Wejchert, was 
one of the few who had managed to make very large amounts of money as a private 
entrepreneur under the communist regime. There is some interesting information on 
the origins of the Roundtable’s members, and it is shown in Table 4.5. Although the 
proportions in the table are unreliable, it clearly shows that the Roundtable’s 
membership come from a wide array of backgrounds under the previous regime. The 
Roundtable enjoys a relatively low level of internal conflict and is generally very 
hostile to the state sector. The case of the Roundtable favours the change hypothesis.
92 Interviews: Kloczko, 30 June 2000; B^k 24 July 2000
93 Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza, Statut Krajowej Izby Gospodarczej (Warsaw: Krajowa Izba 
Gospodarcza, 1997)
94 Interview: Kloczko, 30 June 2000
95 Businessman, January 1993, 10; Informacja Prasowa: Polska Rada Biznesu (Warsaw: Polska Rada 
Biznesu, undated)
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Table 4.5: Roundtable Members under Communism
Primary Activity N
University/research institution 6
Economic elite 7
Indigenous business (pre-89) 6
Representatives o f foreign business in Poland 2
Business outside Poland
Political elite 1
Non-elite state employment 1
Foreigner 1
Total 23
Source: Informacja Prasowa: Polska Rada Biznesu. Categories are exhaustive 
but not mutually exclusive. Four members fall into two categories.
The Private Confederation was set up by the leadership of the Roundtable in 1999 as 
a rival to the official Confederation of Polish Employers. This event was a reaction 
to a failed putsch in the official Confederation, the leadership of which was 
perceived to be incompetent, clientelistic and dependent upon the state sector. The 
plan was to replace the then president, Wojciech Komowski, with the Roundtable’s 
better-regarded then president Henryka Bochniarz.96 Obviously, the existence of the 
Private Confederation itself favours the change hypothesis, since it is new 
organisation with very few links to the previous regime. The origins and politics o f 
the Private Confederation clearly favour the change hypothesis.
Overall, the origins and internal politics of the Big Five clearly favour the hypothesis 
that states that Poland’s associational structure is not a superficial adaptation of 
communist-era structures. However, within the Confederation of Employers there is
96 Interview: Barikowicz, 9 August 1999
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a very strong faction, which is based on communist-era heavy industries and has not 
greatly changed its style of lobbying.
A key explanation why the Polish government did not intervene to set up a tripartite 
structure, and therefore allowed pluralism to develop, was that economic reformers 
had the “umbrella” of Solidarity. Virtually since its inception, the Solidarity 
leadership had been aware of the need for drastic economic reform and had been 
prepared to provide it political shelter even if  it meant considerable short-term pain 
for the population in general and its core working class constituency in particular. 
The design and implementation o f the Balcerowicz plan, together with the ongoing 
determination not to reverse it, were all undertaken without consultation with 
Solidarity. Its support was taken for granted. While the trade union distanced itself 
from the reforming governments dominated by the liberal intellectual elements of the 
Solidarity opposition movement, it was not until mid-1991 that it called strikes to 
pressure for a change in economic policy.97 It was in reaction to the new, more 
conflictual, relationship with Solidarity, that the government began negotiating a 
tripartite pact, which was not signed until 1993.
The “Pact on State Enterprises” which set up the Tripartite Commission was not 
signed until 1993. The main intention of the pact was not to reconstruct the interface 
of politics and economics in a corporatist mould, but to ensure that the Solidarity 
union did not become an all-out opponent of reform.98 The agreement was explicitly 
called the “Pact on State Enterprises”. The vast majority of its clauses, and virtually 
all of those that would have substantial consequences, were limited to state
9' Frances Millard, The Anatomy of the New Poland: Post-Communist Politics in its First Phase 
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994), 76, 89
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enterprises." Although the majority of Poles and the Minister of Labour, Jacek 
Kurori,100 were probably committed to a corporatist vision, the government saw the 
pact as a pragmatic and temporary solution to an industrial relations crisis. 
Nonetheless, there was definitely a sense in which the pact was an attempt to reach a 
relatively corporatist agreement in the context of a pluralist interest association 
structure, which had had four years to develop.
The representation of employers was fragmented and unclear. The Confederation of 
Polish Employers was the one consistent representative of business. The Polish 
Chamber of Commerce and the Co-operative Supervisory Board were both invited 
but withdrew during the negotiations. The Business Centre Club was not initially 
invited but later managed to obtain “observer status” as did the National Local 
Government Diet.101 Some of these ambiguities seem to relate to confusion about 
whether the pact related to the budget sector, the state sector or the whole economy. 
However, much of the pluralism in the negotiations is simply a reflection of the 
pluralism of Polish business associations at the time. This was mirrored by pluralism 
on the trade union side: fifteen unions were invited to the talks.102
Corporatist policy-making is unlikely to become a reality if it has to rely on a 
pluralist interest association structure. The weakness and fractiousness of the 
Tripartite Commission’s members have consistently prevented it from becoming an
98 Millard, Anatomy of a New Poland. 109-110
99 lerzy Hausner, '‘The State Enterprise Pact and the Potential for Tripartism in Poland”, in Kyloh, 
George (ed.), Tripartism on Tried (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1995), 113
100 Jerry Wratny, Pakt o Przedsiqbiorstwie Panstwowym w Trakcie Przeksztatcenia (Bydgoszcz: 
Oficyjna Wydawnicza Osrodka Post^ pu Organizaczjnego, 1993); Jerzy Hausner, '‘The State 
Enterprise Pact and the Potential for Tripartism in Poland”, in Kyloh, George (ed.), Tripartism on 
Trial (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1995), 111
101 Wratny, Pakt o Przedsigbiorstwie Panstwowym, 4-5
102 Hausner, T he State Enterprise Pact”, 112
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influential institution. For example, during the third Sejmt the Commission was 
stymied by a boycott by the OPZZ union federation in protest at the policies of the 
Solidarity-led government linked to its bitter rival. In the same period, there was a 
battle between the Confederation of Polish Employers and its upstart opponent the 
Private Confederation.
Overall, the political variable adds little to an explanation based on collective action 
theory. The Polish government may have been able to set up a relatively corporatist 
system, had it moved decisively and early. However, the Tripartite Commission in 
no way demonstrated a serious commitment to corporatism, and was founded four 
years into a rapid and profound transformation which had already given rise to a 
pluralist system of business associations.
3.3 Social variables
Social capital has helped ease the collective action problem for the Roundtable and 
the Private Confederation. Although the Roundtable has an encompassing interest in 
the Polish economy, it is in fact a fairly well integrated network of businesspeople 
rather than a classic latent group. However, the group has avoided rather than solved 
the collective action problem. It is a slightly institutionalised social network rather 
than an organization, which uses social networks to recruit members. This is evident 
in that not only do personal connections serve to recruit members, they also 
explicitly serve to exclude potential members. The group has no ambitions for mass, 
or even substantial membership, and its members stock of social capital does not 
have the potential to gather together really large numbers of businesses. The Private 
Confederation is an attempt to just that. It began with a membership largely drawn
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from the Roundtable and aims to use this as a core from which to build a genuine 
mass employer organisation in contrast to the failed Confederation of Private 
Employers. Although the group has had a lot of success in supplanting the old 
Confederation in policy-making circles, its recruitment successes have been more 
moderate and it has not at all modified the view of a Polish business class, which has 
been fairly comprehensively stymied by the collective action problem. Much of its 
membership consists of defections from the Confederation, some employer 
organisations set up as arms of pre-existing associations, and a smaller number of 
existing employer organisations that had not previously been members of a 
federation. It has not managed to attract large numbers of previously unorganised 
enterprises. The Roundtable and Confederation illustrate that high levels o f social 
capital can merely make collective action marginally more likely when the economic 
structure is not propitious to the formation of business associations.
The absence of social capital has also presented an opportunity for some Polish 
business associations to bolster their membership. As table 4.2 shows this seems to 
be an important motivation for membership of the Business Centre Club. Moreover, 
it is one that has been actively promoted by the Club’s leadership.103 In fact, the 
creation of social capital provides an excellent bridge between the club, service 
provision and lobbying aspects of the organisation. Table 4.3 suggests that access 
to social capital is probably an even stronger motivation for membership of regional 
chambers. These are much weaker organisations than the Business Centre Club, 
with much smaller proportions of large members. Thus, the creation of social capital
103 Iwona Krzesak. "Etnografia Business Centre Club" in Jacek Kurczewski & Iwona Jakubowska- 
Branicka Biznes i Jdasy srednie: Stadia nad etosem (Warsaw: Zaklad Socjologii Obczyajow i Prawa 
Stosowanych Nauk Spolecznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1994), 52; Dlatego Mowiq Wla&nie 
Sympatycyi Czlonkowie BCC (Warsaw: Business Centre Club, 1999), 18-34
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is a particularly convenient type of private good, because it makes minimal demands 
on weak organisations. The Association of Mazowsze and Warsaw Employers is 
similar to the regional chambers in that it has a weak organisation and largely caters 
for small businesses on a territorial basis. The same advantages apply to the creation 
of social capital. Although there is no data on the importance of social capital to 
members, it does seem that it is very important. This inference is drawn from the 
fact that the association seems to have taken the creation of social capital to a 
qualitatively new level by sponsoring an economic project involving many of the 
members. It has founded a new shopping and business centre with its members as 
tenants. In this way, the association is no longer an optional extra, the usefulness of 
which has to be weighed up carefully by members. Instead it is deeply and directly 
part of their business strategies. Again, this use of social capital does not evade the 
collective action problem. If  it had done so, all of these groups would have much 
larger memberships.
4. Conclusions
This chapter has argued that Poland has a pluralist system of business associations. 
Membership of these associations is voluntary. There is competition and overlap 
between different associations. The organizations are weak. They lack members and 
money and are often heavily dependent on a very small number of volunteers. Polish 
business associations play a relatively marginal role in Polish politics. They are 
generally regarded as outsiders instead of vital partners in policy-making. Economic 
variables provide the best explanation for this state of affairs. Of these economic 
variables the large numbers of small enterprises in the Polish economy seems to be a 
key characteristic, which makes the formation of strong business associations very
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unlikely. Political and social variables also play a role, but a more limited one, in 
understanding the pluralism of Polish business associations. One characteristic of 
pluralist business associations, that has not been systematically examined in this 
chapter, is their tendency to have to share the interface of business and government 
with other channels of influence, namely companies, parties and personalism. The 
next chapter examines the relative power of the four modes of business-govemment 
relations.
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Chapter Five:
Competing Modes of Business-Government 
Relations in Poland
1. Introduction
This is the most important chapter in the thesis. It tests the power of the different 
modes of business-govemment relations against each other, using data that should be 
generalisable to the overall situation in Poland. Firstly, the existence of the modes is 
established and explained. In the case of associations, this has been done in the 
previous chapter. In the case of companies, their existence does not need to be 
established, but an explanation for their variable involvement in business- 
govemment relations needs to be offered. Moreover, in state-owned firms, the 
relationship between the company and party states needs to be clarified. Party- 
political and personal connections also need to be disentangled from each other. 
Once they have been separated, explanations for the prevalence of party-political and 
purely personal networks are required. Secondly, I seek to establish which of the 
four modes is the most important. There are, in turn, two elements to this analysis. 
Firstly, I investigate the relative frequency with which the four different modes are 
employed in Poland. Secondly, and most crucially, the chapter seeks to discover 
which of the four modes tends to be the most successful.
2. Identifying and Explaining Modes of Business-Government Relations
2.1 The Company State
Large enterprises are able to gain political influence by astute and professional 
management of their relations with the government. Company representatives lobby 
government not as well-connected individuals, but as representatives of important
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firms. It is the importance of the firm, rather than the characteristics of the individual 
representative, that is vital.
In the US, the UK, in Brussels, and for multinationals everywhere the company state 
is manifest in specialised government relations or public relations divisions. If this 
expertise is not developed in-house, it is contracted out to professional lobbying 
firms. In Poland, this type of professional government relations is virtually always 
restricted to large foreign firms. Lobbying firms get little or no business from Polish 
firms. Polish businesspeople tend to rate their own lobbying competence and 
political connections higher than those of specialised firms, or indeed of in-house 
specialists. One, rather bitter, lobbyist says:
Almost all our clients are foreign. They have no idea about Poland and are very worried about 
the shortage of information about policy discussions, which can only be obtained if you know 
the relevant people. On the other hand, moderately successful Polish businesspeople think the} 
know everything. These guys have very big egos. They think their own personal contacts are 
all the political expertise their firm needs.1 
Another lobbyist says that Polish businesspeople approach them not in the spirit of 
professional “government relations” but rather looking for advice on how to 
engage in corrupt activity without being caught:
Polish firms believe in personal individual '"arrangements" (zalatwic). Of course, Western 
firms are different... Lobbying is associated with bribery7 or under-the-table activity. Western 
firms talk about government relations or strategic consultancy7 ... Polish firms [come to us 
looking for] advice on how to cany7 on this sort of [comipt] activity without there being a 
scandal.2
1 Interviews: Matraszek, 13 July 2000; Dubinski, 17 August 2000
2 Interview: Dziedzic, 1 July 2002
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While most of the literature focuses on private firms, it is clear that state-owned 
enterprises are also likely to directly lobby the government. Again it is the 
importance of the company, rather than the characteristics of the director or manager, 
that is crucial. In Table 5 .1 ,1 present data from the BEEPS survey, which contrasts 
the lobbying behaviour of foreign- and state-owned enterprises with other sorts of 
businesses.
Table 5.1: Lobbying channels for laws, rules, regulations and decrees
Business
association
Firm’s ties to 
public 
officials
Other
channels
Not a 
member of a 
business 
association
N
Some Foreign 
Ownership 17.5 7.5 2.5 72.5 40
No Foreign 
Ownership 18.5 4.4 1.5 75.6 205
Government largest 
type of owner 14.8 14.8 0 70.4 27
Other type of largest 
owner 19.7 3.3 1.9 75.1 213
Source: BEEPS survey 2002
The response of “Firm’s ties to public officials” is closest to the company state, but, 
for some respondents, may also have included the personalist and party states. 
“Other channels” probably relates to the personalist and party states but may also 
refer to professional intermediaries like public relations firms, which would be 
included in the company state. The question refers to lobbying only for public 
goods, the type of lobbying for which business associations are best suited. In terms 
of private goods, there is likely to be a much lower use of business associations and 
higher use of other channels. Since the question about different channels was only 
asked o f business-association members, it is likely that “direct ties” and “other 
channels” are used even more frequently by non-members.
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The odds of a firm with foreign ownership using a channel other than a business 
association to lobby for public goods are almost twice (1.82) those of firms with no 
foreign ownership. The odds of a firm in which state ownership is the largest 
ownership type using a channel other than a business association are almost four 
times (3.79) those of firms dominated by other types of ownership. Although the 
question does not directly address the company state, this evidence clearly supports 
the idea that foreign and state ownership are associated with the company state.
Direct relations are undoubtedly an important, and highly institutionalised, mode of 
conducting relations between many state-owned enterprises and government. One of 
the reasons for the importance of these relations may well be that they do not really 
constitute business-govemment relations. Many state enterprises are still difficult to 
describe as profit-seeking. Instead, their management often seems more concerned 
with preserving good relations with unions and maximising employment in the 
enterprise. So, instead of representing a distinctive business interest, managers are 
intermediaries between unions and the government, or present a united front with 
unions. This unity of representation can be traced back to the communist era. For 
much o f the communist era, unions and management were both part of a relatively 
coherent nomenklatura, and would jointly lobby for a plan that would benefit their 
enterprise or sector. In the 1980s, the Solidarity union was an authentic 
representative or workers’ interests and even the official unions had become 
somewhat more independent. The collapse in coherence of the party-state meant that 
managers often received little support if they adopted a confrontational stance with 
workers. Crucially, the workers’ self-management system, introduced after 1956, 
became a reality. In the late 1980s, managers grew accustomed to genuinely
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responding to the concerns of the workers’ councils. One of the aims o f 
commercialisation was to eliminate workers’ self-management, but share 
entitlements often meant that there were worker-directors. In many cases, where 
unions were powerful, privatization was slow, and competitiveness was lacking, 
management has continued with the tradition of identifying the interests of the 
enterprise with those of its workers.
Perhaps the most extreme example of the unity the unity of the representation of 
workers and employers is in coal mining. The Chamber of Industry and Commerce 
for the Mining Industry was actually founded by an initiative of those involved in 
workers’ self-management and its vice-president in 2000, was a former workers’ 
council representative.3 At that time, there was also a bitter controversy as to 
whether the management of the mines had encouraged and funded a protest in 
Warsaw by their miners. Another example was Jan Janik, head of Polish railways, 
who, after being fired by the Buzek government, was immediately employed by the 
machinists union, in order to attempt to frustrate the restructuring efforts of his 
successor.4
Sometimes, union-management alliances have tried to prevent or delay reforms o f 
enterprises or sectors, which had been planned by government. Equally, the state has 
been reluctant to push through reforms, because so many politicians share the view 
that many state-owned enterprises are not essentially business concerns. Levels of 
employment and the maintenance of a strategic Polish presence in many sectors have
3 Interview: Kiysak, Katowice, 22 August 2000
4 Wprost, No. 1009, 31 March 2002
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frequently been prioritised over market reforms by politicians. The importance of 
politicians and state ownership is considered in the next section.
The Company State and the Party State
State ownership raises the issue of the relationship between the company state and 
the party state. If parties control government and government controls firms, then 
parties may be able to control firms. This suggests that state ownership is an 
indicator of the party state, rather than the company state. In order to understand the 
relationship between state ownership and party politics, we need to understand 
something about corporate governance in Poland, since it is through the system of 
corporate governance that the state controls firms.
Poland’s corporate governance, as in most of continental Europe, is based on two 
boards, an executive board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board, which 
represents the shareholders, appoints the executive board, which is responsible for 
the actual running of the firm. While the supervisory board cannot issue direct 
instructions to the executive board, it does have comprehensive rights to information. 
The combination of the right of appointment and full information mean that 
supervisory boards are in a position to effectively control a firm.
Members of supervisory boards are required to have passed an examination. In 
2000, approximately 30,000 people had passed this examination and there were 
approximately 6000 positions to be filled.5 Therefore, the state has a substantial 
degree of choice when making appointments to the boards of commercialised firms,
5 Roger Schoenman, "Captains or Pirates? The New Economic Elite and their Role in Poland’s
Economic Development'7, paper delivered at the Council for European Studies, Chicago, 2002,16
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which are partially or wholly state-owned. Schoenman claims that a list of 
appointments is usually drawn up by bureaucrats and, as a matter of course, 
substantially changed by politicians.6 Certainly, the incoming leftist-Peasant 
government changed the heads of most of Poland’s very largest th^firms 2001 and 
2002.7 This turnover is remarkable but it is not universal. At this juncture, no 
changes were made in the management of the coal industry. The appointments do 
not constitute a simple case of “jobs for the boys”. The importance of competence 
seems to go beyond mere possession of the directors’ qualification. Most of the 
senior appointees tend to be experienced and competent businesspeople, albeit 
appointed by politicians on, at least, partly political criteria. It is not clear to what 
extent these appointments are party-political or personalist. In a newspaper report on 
appointments made by the leftist-Peasant government in 2001 and 2002, 
approximately half of the appointees mentioned are associated with particular 
politicians (three each with the prime minister and the minister of the state treasury, 
one with the junior minister at the state treasury). The other half is simply identified 
as associates of the left or the Peasant party. Strong factional conflict within parties 
over appointments is alluded to. Given the large number of appointees, it seems 
likely that many are effectively made by ministers in their own interest rather than in 
the interest of the party as a whole. For example, Wprost reports that neither the 
government, nor AWS, effectively controlled the Ministry of the State Treasury 
during the third Sejm. Instead, a small faction of AWS from Nowy Sqcz dominated 
appointments to state companies.8 Unfortunately, it is impossible to present 
systematic evidence, due to the refusal of the state to openly provide data on board 
appointments.
6 Schoenman, '‘Captains or Pirates?”, 17
7 Rzeczpospolita, Ekonomia, 30 September 2002
* Wprost, No. 941,10 December 2000
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The system of supervisory boards means that, at any given time, a large number of 
directly state-owned firms are heavily party-politicised. It does not mean that 
particular firms are associated with political parties over time. When the
composition of government changes, so does the allegiance of the firms. Therefore, 
it is individual businesspeople, rather than firms, who are associated with parties. 
Presumably, this group of party-politicised businesspeople, oscillate from private to 
public sector depending on the composition of government, and never work for any 
firm for more than four years.9 Those who want to make a career in any one firm, in 
either the state, private, or mixed sectors, are ill advised to loyally associate 
themselves with a political party. Indeed, they should try to co-operate with the 
governing parties, irrespective of which parties they are. Essentially, then this is an 
argument that the party state in Poland is manifest in the long-term networks of 
senior businesspeople, rather than in the affiliation of the businesses they manage. 
The nature of the networks of businesspeople is vital to the difference between the 
party and personalist states. The next section tries to unravel the party and 
personalist states in the Polish business elite.
9 The Sejm has a register of members’ interests, which, in theory, should provide some useful 
information on the combination of business and political careers. Unfortunately, it is effectively 
ignored by a huge proportion of deputies. From a random sample of 50, taken in January 2004, 27 
had made no declaration. One of the 50, Wieslaw Kaczmarek, a former SLD minister, made no 
declaration and is famous for his connections to, and involvement in, business. Some others may have 
not replied because they honestly had nothing to report and others involved in criminal activities 
decided the less they revealed the better (On criminal activities, see, for example, Wprost, No. 894,16 
January- 2000). However, most were probably in a grey area like Kaczmarek, in which they were 
involved with legal businesses but thought wanted to keep these matters private, perhaps because of 
conflicts of interest. Most of the information in the register relates to agricultural, academic, 
journalistic and non-profit activities, as well as listing small prizes and gifts. Only four of the 23 
respondents were directors of commercial firms, and only two of these actually' received pay.
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2.2 The Party State
The Party State and the Soft State
There does seem to be a fairly general agreement, amongst Polish academics and 
interviewees, that “personal connections” are more important than the associative or 
company states in the Polish case. For example, in his synthesis of ten years of 
research on business elites, Jasiecki writes,
The weakness of the Polish system of interest representation and decision-making [engenders] 
an excessive personalisation, on the basis of private acquaintance and individual access to 
decision-makers.10
A similar view is deeply embedded in the views of political insiders from all sorts of 
backgrounds. References to “personal contacts”, “personal connections”, 
“acquaintances”, “common background” pour out of any interviewee asked about 
Polish business-govemment relations, usually without any particular prompting on 
the issue of personalism. A trade unionist says simply that business lobbying 
predominantly operates on the basis of “personal connections and financing”.11 A 
business association executive laments that
Poles are individualistic. They like to do things through friends and acquaintances, informally. 
This is the opposite in Germany, where rules and official institutions and organisations are more 
important12 
Similar language is used by politicians:
Definitely, this personal approach, on the basis of social acquaintance, background etc. is the 
most important way of describing a large part of the lobbying here in Poland.13
10 Krzysztof Jasiecki, Elita Biznesu w Poise: Drugie Narodziny Kapitalizmu (Warsaw: Instytut 
Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2002), 279
11 Interview: Gielgus, 13 December 2000
12 Interview: Mordasewicz, 9 August 2000
13 Interview: Jagielienski, 7 December 2000
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Unfortunately, it is not always clear whether this consensus relates to the party state 
or a soft state, permeated by personal networks, as defined in Chapter Three. In the 
academic literature, there does seem to be a divide between those who perceive 
contacts based on political parties and those who understand Polish business- 
govemment relations as based on more strictly personal and particularistic contacts 
This section aims to disentangle the soft state and the party state in Poland. Firstly, it 
is necessary to be absolutely clear about what is meant by these terms in the 
following empirical work. If Poland is a party state, both political and business 
leaders should have connections to a particular group of businesspeople loyal to, or 
dependent on, a particular political party. Before clarifying the idea of personalism a 
vital control variable must be introduced. Politicians’ connections with business may 
not be structured according to party, but may simply represent a division between 
those who are more and less politically successful. Those with long experience at the 
pinnacle of Polish politics may have better, and perhaps different, business 
connections than those who have not held such central political positions. This 
variable will be called political experience. Finally, personalism is when 
connections are largely unrelated to the formal responsibilities of the politicians or 
their membership of a political party. In an important sense, this is a null hypothesis. 
It predicts a lack of structure where the other hypotheses posit some particular 
structure or pattern. There is some relevant empirical literature, which addresses 
these hypotheses in the Polish case.
Frentzel-Zagorska stresses the “political camps” of left, right and centre in Poland. 
Effectively, she argues that Poland is a party state. She uses the same ISP data as 
this thesis does. Her argument is based on the widespread perception of the
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existence of political camps amongst the Polish elite.14 However, only 35 per cent of 
the respondents to the elite survey as a whole claimed they themselves were 
connected to a political camp. In the case of the business elite only five per cent said 
they were associated with a political camp. Since, outside of the political system, 
political camps are perceived to be rather murky groups associated with corruption 
and clientelism, respondents may have been reluctant to admit their affiliation. 
However, the political camps should have turned up in their pattern of personal 
connections and this is investigated below. Roger Schoenman also argues that the 
party state is the key characteristic of state-govemment relations in Poland. He does 
so on theoretical grounds and on the basis of three intensive case studies. As with 
other studies of this sort it remains to be confirmed if inferences can be made from a 
coherent theoretical story and a few case studies to Polish business-govemment 
relations in general. As he points out, this party politicisation thesis is widely 
accepted in Poland and is a political issue in itself.15 This chapter tests the party state 
hypothesis with data, which is much better suited to wide inference.
Staniszkis’s earlier work exemplified a variant of the party-state, which emphasises 
the superior connections of those associated with the political left. She described 
how those well placed under the previous regime were able to take ownership of 
state assets and establish themselves as powerful businesspeople.16 Their political 
connections enabled them to maintain and improve their positions under the new 
regime. Her qualitative and speculative work has been buttressed by quantitative 
research, which shows the preponderance of business careers amongst former
14 Janina Frentzel-Zagorska, '‘Structure of the Polish Political Scene as Seen by the Elite' in Frentzel- 
Zagorska and Wasilewski, The Second Generation of Democratic Elites, 225
15 Schoenman, "Captains or Pirates?”
16 Jadwiga Staniszkis, The Breakthrough in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991)
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functionaries of the communist regime and the preponderance of those functionaries 
amongst the business elite.17 However, this does not necessarily mean that 
businesspeople with a communist background have remained firmly linked to post­
communist political parties or that post-communist parties have refused to associate 
themselves with businesspeople from non-communist backgrounds.
Drag’s work on the ISP survey suggests the importance of political experience. He 
argues that state ownership, income from the state, and various tax breaks and 
licences mean that Poland’s biggest businesses are dependent on the state.18 This 
suggests that those with senior political experience should have both better 
connections to the business class and a distinctive business clientele. Schoenman 
uses comparative data on state ownership to show how the Polish State is still 
relatively engaged in the economy.19 This also suggests that business connections 
should be structured according to positions of state power held by politicians.
Staniszkis’s later work is perhaps closer to the soft state hypothesis.20 She analyses 
an opaque pattern of competing political and economic networks penetrating and 
exploiting the state. Comments by authorities such as Jasiecki and Wasilewski also
11 Jacek Wasilewski, ''La nomenklatura: vers quel destin social?” Revue d'etudes comparatives Est- 
Ouest, 25 (4,), 1994; Ivan Szelenyi & Szonja Szelenyi, "Circulation or reproduction of elites during 
the postcommunist transformations of Eastern Europe: Introduction”, Theory and Society, 24 (1995), 
628; Zbigniew Drag, "Elita biznesu: Autonomiczny segment elity politycznej?" in Wasilewski, Jacek 
(ed.), Elita Polityczna 1998 (Warsaw: Instytut Studiow Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1999), 
72
1K Drqg, "Elita biznesu”, 62-69
19 Roger Schoenman, “Webs of Transition: State-Economy Relations in Romania, Bulgaria and 
Poland", paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, September 
2002
20 Jadwiga Staniszkis, Post-Communism: The Emerging Enigma (Warsaw: Institute of Political 
Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1998)
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suggest personalism, but in no case are these informed impressions backed up by 
substantial evidence.21
Overall, the existing work seems to tend towards the party state hypothesis. 
However, there does seem to be some evidence for all three hypotheses. The 
hypotheses have hitherto not been clearly stated and tested against each other. Of 
course, this has often been due to the fact that the existing literature has usually had 
different purposes from the present work. The following sections employ a statistical 
analysis of the ISP data and qualitative interviews to try and tease out whether 
connections between businesspeople and politicians in Poland are best described by 
the party state or by the soft state.
Interview evidence on the party state
All of the business representatives claimed to be “apolitical” but by this they meant 
they were not linked to any particular party, not that they had no connections with 
the political system. In addition to refusing to identify themselves as linked to a 
party, business representatives struggled to identify their political and economic 
rivals as closely associated with one particular party. Respondents mentioned a 
variety of ways in which this non-partisan politicisation of the business elite was 
manifest. Business leaders knew, and knew well, politicians from different political 
parties.22 Several of them contributed funds, usually illicitly, to virtually the full 
range of parties: “Many of our members are associated with and pay money to both
21 Jasiecki. Elita Biznesu w Polsce, 158; Jacek Wasilewski, ^Polish Post-Transitional Elite" in 
Frentzel-Zagorska & Wasilewski (eds.), The Second Generation o f Democratic Elites (Warsaw: 
Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000), 216
22 This interview evidence is consistent with a lot of anecdotal evidence from elsewhere. For 
example, a detailed article argues that Zygmunt Solorz has a wide array of contacts in competing 
political parties. ("Rozbior wizji", Polityka, 28/1998 -  2149)
176
The ‘Soft State’: Business-Govemment Relations in Poland -  Chapter 5
sides of the political divide”.23 Others had contacts with particular intra-party 
cliques, rather than the party as a whole: “He and his circle are strongly connected to 
President Kwasniewsi’s faction of the SLD, but are not popular with other 
politicians, even on the left ”24 Many of them had successfully lobbied opposing 
political parties for fairly specific benefits: “This is the same in any civilised country. 
Polish businessmen fund politicians to get specific benefits”.25 Success in big 
business, and success as a political leader of the business class, was associated with 
maintaining good relationships with a wide range of senior politicians:
Unfortunately, it is not possible to conduct big business here without relationships with the 
political authorities. This is because of the state of the law and the level of economic 
development. Businesspeople have to contact politicians because laws are not applied 
consistently and too many laws interfere directly in economic activity. These issues are 
recurring so we need to know as many politicians as possible.20
The three political lobbyists backed up the views of the business representatives:
I do not think [that business people are associated with political parties]. Not unambiguously 
in the sense of someone who is in business and is known to be associated with a political 
party-. What is much more common is someone who searches for contacts with politics.2' 
Politicians also claimed that they and their parties had no particular clients in the 
business community:
Relatively rarely does a political party- represent a particular interest in the parliament ... 
Certain deputies represented the interests of particular lobbies. For example, some deputies 
lobby on behalf of various pension funds at the expense of smaller institutions.28 
However, some o f them were eager to say that their political opponents had such 
clients, always citing recent corruption scandals:
23 Interview: Barikowicz, 8 August 1999
24 Interview: St^pniewski, 27 July 2000
25 Interview: Wejchert, 10 September 1999
^  Interview: Uchman, 24 August 2000
2' Interview: Dziedzic, 1 July 2002
28 Interview: Lityhski, 5 July 2002
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Some businesses have strong links to our political opponents. This is part of a business 
strategy to engage in corrupt activity. Although there have also been problems amongst the 
left, I think there has been more scandal during [the third Sejm].29 
Moreover, the interviewees concurred with the analysis presented above, which 
associated the party state with the system of appointment to the supervisory boards 
o f many state-owned firms.
The comments of a small number of interviewees did not clearly distinguish the party 
and soft states. The vast majority, of those who did so, favoured the soft state. This 
consensus was somewhat stronger amongst the businesspeople than among the 
smaller number of politicians. Party politics is tainted in Poland, and connections 
between business and party politics are very strongly identified with corruption. This 
may have led to some under reporting of the level of party politicisation. However, I 
do not believe this to be a significant problem in the interview evidence, because so 
many of the interviewees frankly admitted to heavy involvement with the political 
system and with political parties. The fact that so many of them pointed to 
involvement with several parties was no more likely to be viewed positively by those 
outside Polish business-govemment relations than a loyal association with one party. 
After presenting some qualitative evidence in this section, in the next section, I use 
quantitative methods to try and disentangle the party and soft states.
Quantitative Evidence on the Party State
This section is organized as follows. Firstly, a detailed account is given of the data 
used in the analysis. Secondly, regression analyses of this data are used to assess 
explanations for the variability in how well known the Polish political and business
29 Interview: Jagieli^ riskL. 7 December 2000
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leaders are. Thirdly, multi-dimensional scaling is used to assess the location of the 
leaders in the overall pattern of connections between business and politics. Fourthly, 
cluster analyses are presented. These serve the purpose of corroborating or 
questioning the statistical results from earlier sections.
The quantitative evidence in this chapter is from the ISP survey introduced in 
Chapter One. The survey contained questions about how well respondents knew 35 
political and economic leaders. The list of 35 was not drawn up systematically but 
seems representative of Poland’s most powerful people. 22 are politicians and 
eleven are business figures. The politicians are obviously the holders of key state 
and party political positions at the time. The list of business figures overlaps with 
similar lists produced elsewhere.30 One member of the list was a newspaper editor 
and another was the governor of the central bank. The 35 leaders are listed in 
Appendix Three. Respondents were asked to rate how well they knew each of the 35 
leaders. Missing data on these items reduces the data set of respondents to 135. The 
survey contained five levels: knows very well, knows fairly well, has had contact 
with, knows the name, has never heard of. For the present analysis the last two 
categories are conflated. The last category is not very meaningful since the leaders 
are amongst the best-known people in the country. In addition to being substantively 
problematic this category was not chosen very often by respondents. On average 
only 5.3 per cent of respondents claimed not to have heard of the leader in question. 
If  one businessman (Sobolewski) who was not recognised by 64 per cent is removed 
the average falls to 3.4 per cent. The analysis below is based on the assumption that 
interval-level data is being used. Normally, five categories are assumed to be
30 Jasiecki, Elita Biznesu. 169-70
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necessary for interval-level measurement. However, in the case of national elites the 
tiny difference between not having heard of someone and merely knowing their 
name, as opposed to levels of actual contact, seems a greater violation of the 
assumption of interval-level measurement. This data is called “raw familiarity” in 
the analysis below.
Raw familiarity is combined into an aggregate score, which aims to measure how 
well the respondents know the individual leaders. This is called “average 
familiarity” and it is simply the mean raw familiarity score for any individual leader 
across the whole sample of 135 respondents. This score measures how many 
respondents know the leader as well as how well they know him. Independent 
variables derived from the party-state and political-experience hypotheses outlined 
above were also measured. The first of these assigns a left-right score to each leader 
on a scale of zero to ten. The politicians have been given the mean score for the 
supporters of their party from the Polish General Election Survey of 1997.31 The 
business leaders have been randomly assigned a value from a normal distribution 
based on the mean and standard deviation scores from the sample of business elite 
respondents.32 The various rumours surrounding the partisan identification or 
association of the business leaders were judged to be too unreliable or ambiguous.
31 Only one party tends to rate itself differently than do its supporters. This is the Labour Union which 
is represented here by Marek Pol. The Labour Union claims to be left of the Democratic Left while its 
supporters clearly rate it as well right of the Democratic Left. Basically, the Labour Union holds to 
the classic Western European conception of the left-right continuum as defined by economic policy 
while its supporters conceive of the left-right continuum in a similar way to other Poles. In terms of 
social distance, which is the dependent variable under examination, the Polish interpretation makes 
more sense. Tadeusz Szawiel, "Zroznicowanie w lewicowo-prawicowe i jego korelaty" in Radoslaw 
Markowski (ed.), Wybory Parlamentame 1997: System Partyjny, postawy polityczne, zachowanie 
wyborcze (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, 1999)
32 Two individuals do not fit comfortably into either the business or the political categories. These are 
Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, the Governor of the Polish Central Bank and Tomasz Wolek, the editor of 
Zycie Warszawy newspaper. They7 have been given the mean score for managers from the Polish 
Election survey.
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For example, Andrzej Arendarski of the Polish Chamber of Commerce was a 
member of a right-wing and centrist government in the early 1990s but is now often 
associated with the SLD. Decisions on the measurement of the left-right placement 
o f the business leaders do not make a big enough difference to change the 
interpretation of statistical results. Extreme left and extreme right positions were 
assigned to all business leaders without substantially changing the results o f the 
regression analyses presented below. The second variable aims at capturing the idea 
o f political experience. It is measured by the number of months for which the 
leaders have held cabinet posts, the presidency or the governorship of the central 
bank, since the formation of the first non-communist-led government in 1989.33 This 
measure is somewhat crude since junior ministers and heads of agencies would also 
have met many members of the business elite in the performance of their duties. 
Nonetheless, the measure clearly excludes thpse with merely party political and 
legislative experience who would have had little chance to directly influence 
enterprises. The third independent variable simply distinguishes those who are 
primarily businesspeople from those who are not.
The definitions of the variables, together with summary statistics, are presented in 
Table 5.2.
33 European Journal of Political Research, Political Data Yearbook, 1990-99; Rzeczpospolita archive,, 
www.rzeczpospolita.pl
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Table 5.2: Summary of Variables
Name Definition Minimum,Maximum Mean
Standard
Deviation
Raw familiarity 1 for knows very well, 4 for has never met 1,4 - -
Average
familiarity
Raw familiarity7 score of average 
respondent for each leader
3.19,
3.96 3.64 0.2
Business 1 if the leader is currently primarily a businessperson, 0 if not Dummy Variable
Left-Right 0 for a leader identified with the far left, 10 for far right 2.2, 8.9 5.9 1.9
Experience Number of months spent by leaders in a very senior state post since 1989 0, 75 15.7 19.4
Familiarity
The hypotheses about connections between politics and business contain two basic 
elements: firstly, how well-known a leader is and, secondly, the location of a leader’s 
connections within the overall pattern of connections between politics and business. 
This section deals with the first of these elements. It does so by simply assessing to 
what extent key variables can explain how well-known a given leader is. This was 
done by means of a regression analysis, the results of which are presented in Table 
5.3.
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Table 5.3: Regression Analysis of “How Well Known” Leaders Are
Independent Variable Dependent Variable
Coefficient 
(standard error)
Average Familiarity
Intercept 3.599*(0.109)
Business -0.133***(0.068)
Left-Right 0.02846***(0.015)
Experience -0.00552*(0.002)
R2 0.353
F 5.639*
Notes: N=35. * significant at the 1% level, •'* significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
The equation has a R2 figure of over 0.35. This means that the model can account for 
over 35 per cent of the variance in the dependent variables. It, of course, also means 
that almost two-thirds of the variance is left unexplained. The main conclusion of 
the analysis is that the political experience variable is by far the best predictor of how 
well known the leaders are. Also, the equation indicates a much weaker relationship 
between left-right placement and how well known the leaders are. This relationship 
is driven by the right-wing politicians who are much less well known than other 
politicians. If  they are excluded, left-right placement is no longer statistically 
significant. The isolation of the right wing is probably substantially a result o f the 
timing of the survey. In mid-1998 the right wing had just returned to power in the 
September 1997 election after four years without any parliamentary representation. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that their connections with the business elite are shown to 
be weaker than those left-wing politicians who had been in power for the previous 
four years. This seriously weakens the support the data gives to the party-state 
hypothesis.
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The second element of the hypotheses is the location of a leader’s connections in the 
overall pattern of connections between business and politics. Most simply put, this is 
about who knows the leaders. A useful method for investigating this issue is multi­
dimensional scaling.
Multi-Dimensional Scaling
The ISP data can be used to calculate the social distance between the 35 leaders as 
measured by their connections with the wider business elite. This was done in a 
number of stages. First, a leader-by-businessperson matrix was constructed (35 
leaders by 135 businesspeople), whose cell entries contained the four levels of 
familiarity reported by each business representative for each leader. Secondly, 
correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) were calculated for all pairs of leaders, with the 
135 businesspeople as the number of cases. The higher the correlation the greater the 
similarity between those two columns in the matrix. This produced a 35 by 35 
matrix. Finally, the matrix was submitted to the ALSCAL (Alternating Least- 
Squares) nonmetric Euclidean multidimensional scaling routine in the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences. The purpose of this procedure is to try to represent 
the data in the correlation matrix by a simple geometrical model or picture. Data 
points close to each other represent individuals who are known and not known by the 
same businesspeople from the sample of 135. This is an exploratory technique and 
produces no model, or single equation, which sums up the data.
The selection of the number of dimensions in the final scaling solution is based on 
identifying an ’’elbow” in a plot of the number of dimensions in a solution and the
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stress, or goodness-of-fit, statistic. After the elbow the rate of decrease in stress 
achieved by the addition of further dimensions itself decreases. The selected solution 
has four dimensions and a stress value of 0.13. This would normally be regarded as 
a “fair” fit. As an aid to interpretation, regression analyses were carried out using the 
scores on the scaling dimensions as dependent variables. The results of regression 
analyses of all the independent variables upon each of the four dimensions from the 
scaling solution are presented in Table 5.4. No interaction terms are presented as the 
purpose is to aid a tentative interpretation of the scaling dimensions rather than to 
arrive at a full model of the dimensions. A full and rigorous model is not appropriate 
to the exploratory, as opposed to confirmatory, nature of multidimensional scaling. 
It is important to note that these regressions are being carried out on the results of a 
scaling solution, not on raw data. This means that statistically significant results are 
not as substantively significant as they would be with raw data.
The first dimension can be interpreted relatively confidently. The R2 is 0.735 which 
means that the independent variables can account for 74 per cent of the variance 
amongst the scores of the 35 leaders on the first dimension. Average familiarity is 
statistically insignificant and contributes little to the prediction of scores on this 
dimension. This suggests that the dimension is a relatively pure measure of who 
knows the leaders, as opposed to how well known the leaders are. The most 
powerful variable is the dummy variable for leaders who are primarily 
businesspeople. The model predicts business leaders will score over two points more 
on the first dimension than non-business leaders. This is within a range of only 4.37. 
The other significant variable is the left-right placement of the leaders. The model 
predicts that, for every point farther to the left a leader is placed, his score will
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increase by almost a quarter of a point on dimension one. Again, if the right-wingers 
are excluded, the left-right variable is no longer statistically significant.
Table 5.4: Regression Analysis of Scaling Solution
Independent
Variables Dependent Variables
Coefficient 
(standard error) Dimension 1
Dimension 2 Dimension 3 Dimension 4
Intercept -0.763(2.615)
-6.947**
(3.262)
3.801
(3.878)
7.818*
(2.621)
Average Familiarity 0.366(0.716)
1.672***
(0.894)
-1.098
(1.062)
-2.653*
(0.718)
Business 2.122*(0.289)
0.165
(0.361)
-0.174
(0.429)
0.493***
(0.29)
Left-Right -0.226*(0.065)
0.154***
(0.081)
0.08162
(0.096)
0.255*
(0.065)
Experience 0.006197(0.008)
-0.006561
(0.01)
-0.01493
(0.012)
0.0109
(0.08)
R2 0.735 0.358 0.078 0.542
F 20.81* 4.184* 0.636 8.872*
Notes: Dimensions from 4-dimensional scaling solution above. N=35.
* significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
The second dimension should be interpreted more tentatively. Its R2 is 0.358. This 
time the two most significant predictors are average familiarity and left-right 
placement. The model predicts that for each 0.01 increase in the average familiarity 
score for each leader their score increases by almost 0.17 on dimension two. This is 
within a range of 4.6. The model predicts that for every point farther to the right on 
which a leader is placed his score will increase by almost 0.16 on dimension two. 
The regression analysis uncovers no significant relationships between the variables 
and dimension three.
The R2 for dimension four is 0.542, which allows some confidence in the 
interpretation since the model accounts for over half of the variance in the scores on
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this dimension. Again, average familiarity and left-right placement are the 
significant variables. However, an increase in the average familiarity score for 
leaders reduces the score on this dimension, while a move of one point rightward on 
the left-right scale increases the score by over a quarter of a point. This is within a 
range of 3.86. In contrast to dimension two, where a move rightward is associated 
with better-known leaders, on dimension four a move leftward is associated with 
better-known leaders.
The most obvious characteristic of the multi-dimensional scaling solution is its lack 
o f structure. Even with four dimensions the stress (goodness-of-fit) value is still only 
a “fair” 0.13. Dimension three completely defies interpretation. Dimensions two 
and four are both substantially unexplained by the variables. The highest scores on 
dimension two belong to better-known right-wingers and the highest scores on 
dimension four belong to better-known left-wingers. This favours the party state 
hypothesis. However, again, this is largely driven by the isolation of the right-wing. 
The first dimension is the only one amenable to straightforward interpretation. Since 
average familiarity is unimportant it is a relatively pure measure of the location of 
individuals in the elite network. It predicts a clearly separate location for business 
leaders. This dwarfs the impact of the left-right effect on this dimension. Once 
again, the left-right effect disappears when the right-wingers are left out.
The lack of structure of the solution means that it favours the personalism 
hypothesis. The importance of the contrast between business and political leaders 
undermines the party state hypothesis. If  this hypothesis were true, businesspeople 
would be associated with political groups rather than forming a group of their own.
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However, three of the dimensions have significant left-right effects. This is driven 
by the right-wingers’ position. The solution cannot distinguish between the business 
clienteles of leftist, centrist and peasant politicians. Moreover, it should not be 
forgotten that the isolation of the right wing is probably somewhat exaggerated by 
the timing of the survey. Next, a cluster analysis is employed with the aim of 
corroborating or questioning the results obtained so far.
Cluster Analysis
The cluster analyses are also based on the correlation matrix on which the multi­
dimensional scaling was performed. Cluster analysis simply attempts to classify the 
leaders with the most similar profiles of connections with the business elite into 
groups. Single linkage and complete linkage are the only methods suitable for a 
correlation matrix. The ‘chaining’ effect of single linkage can underestimate the 
number of clusters in a dataset. Therefore, complete linkage is the method of cluster 
analysis used here. The dendrogram, which identifies the exact membership of each 
cluster and allows the reader to assess the selection of the number o f clusters, is 
presented in Appendix four. In Table 5.5, an attempt is made to interpret the clusters 
by relating them to the independent variables used in the previous sections.
The first cluster consists of five right-wing politicians, all with below average 
connections to the business class, three o f whom have senior state experience and 
two of whom do not. This confirms the isolation of the right wing. The second 
cluster consists of 23 individuals, almost two-thirds of the leaders. In terms of 
connections with the businesspeople, 14 are above average and nine below average. 
17 have senior state experience and six do not. Four are businesspeople, six are left-
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wingers, five are centrists, three are peasants, two are right-wingers, and one is the 
leader of the Union of Labour party. The Governor of the Central Bank and a 
newspaper editor are also included. This large, politically diverse cluster confirms 
the lack of structure in the overall elite network and the weakness of the party state 
hypothesis, beyond the isolation of the right-wingers. The connections of the 
peasant, centrist and leftist politicians with the business class cannot be distinguished 
from each other. This cluster is a confirmation of the personalism hypothesis. The 
final two small clusters consist of seven business leaders in total. Five have below 
average connections with the overall business elite while two are above average. 
None of the seven has state experience. This confirms the finding that some o f the 
business leaders have clienteles that are separate from those of the politicians. This 
is inconsistent with the party state hypothesis. The fact that five business leaders 
have below average connections to other businesspeople echoes the earlier finding 
that senior state experience is a powerful predictor of who among the leaders is best 
known. Obviously, this bolsters the political experience hypothesis.
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Table 5.5: Interpretation of Cluster Analysis
Variables Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Clusters 3 & 4
Above Average 
Familiarity All 5 below 14 above, 9 below 2 above, 5 below
Political
Experience 3 Yes, 2 No 17 Yes, 6 No 7 No
Political affiliation 
& business activity All 5 Right-wingers
6 Left-wingers,
4 Businesspeople,
5 Centrists, 8 others
7 Businesspeople
Note: Author’s analysis of ISP data. N=35. Clustering method is Complete Linkage. Clusters 3 and 4 
are placed together since they are relatively small and join together at the next stage of the hierarchical 
agglomeration process (see Appendix 4).
The cluster analysis is fully consistent with the results of the other types of statistical 
analysis. Overall, the quantitative evidence tells a coherent and plausible story. 
There is a marked lack of structure in the connections of the leaders to the business 
class, which means that the data most strongly supports the soft state. The party state 
is only of importance because of the isolation of the majority of the right-wing 
politicians. Some business leaders have clienteles amongst the wider business elite, 
which are clearly separate from those of politicians. These separate business leaders 
are partly distinguished by their relatively weak connections to other businesspeople 
in comparison to non-right-wing politicians: this is evidence of the importance of 
political experience.
Explaining the Party State
Interviewees agreed that the fundamental reason for the relative absence of the party 
state was the turnover of parties in government. No government has yet been re­
elected in post-communist Poland. Indeed, the post-Solidarity parties have twice 
been eliminated from the Sejm itself after having been part of the government at
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some point in the term. This turnover is a very obvious disincentive to business to 
pledge and maintain loyalty to a particular political party. Any business with a 
medium or long-term strategy will avoid becoming too closely associated with one 
political party. This logic seems to be obvious to political insiders. As a lobbyist 
says,
Since the government has changed every four years it makes no sense to declare 
unambiguously for one party. Of course, they are going to try and arrange good relations with 
different politicians.34
The head of the social policy committee of the Sejm was similarly explicit about 
the logic of business relations with different parties:
[T]he most common strategy is to associate themselves with whoever is in government at a 
given time ... Big businessmen are associated with all political options ... Relatively rarely 
does a political party represent a particular interest in the parliament.35
The BEEPS survey results suggest that, in comparison to other forms of corrupt 
business-govemment relations, the funding of political parties is not an important 
issue for the vast majority of firms. The argument, that political parties cannot 
punish disloyal businesses, does seem to hold empirically.
34 Interview: Dziedzic, 1 July 2002
35 Interview: Lityftski, 5 July 2002
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Table 5.6: Impact of Forms of Corruption
None Minor Significant VerySignificant N
Patronage 50.3 22.2 16.4 11.1 189
Contributions to parties 
by private interests
73.8 16.3 6.4 3.5 172
Bribes to avoid 
regulations 46.8
29.6 12.4 11.3 186
Sale o f  decisions in 
commercial courts 58.2
23.7 11.9 6.2 177
Sale o f  decisions in 
criminal courts 75.7
12.4 7.1 4.7 169
Sale o f presidential 
decrees 77.2
12.6 6 4.2 167
Sale o f  parliamentary 
votes 65.5 21.1 8.2 5.3 171
Mishandling o f central 
bank funds 79.4 14.9 3.4 2.3 175
Source: BEEPS survey 2002
Contributions to parties are the least important type of corruption, apart from 
mishandling of central bank funds. Patronage, the form of corruption listed above, 
which seems closest to the personalism of the soft state, is one of the most significant 
forms of corruption. It should also be noted that some of the forms o f corruption, 
like the sale of parliamentary votes, presidential decrees, or judicial decisions, seem 
much more high-risk than merely contributing to a political party. Nonetheless, they 
are viewed as having a much larger and more consistent effect on the business 
environment.
This emphasis on turnover in government is also consistent with the situation in the 
one area of Polish business-govemment relations where the party state does seem to 
be important. The personnel of some firms with state shareholdings change 
according to the composition o f government and are thus firmly associated with one 
party (or political bloc) during their tenure in government. Of course, when the
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government changes the firm is not punished for its loyalty to the previous 
government. All that needs to be done is for changes to be made to its senior 
management.
2.3 The Soft State
Modalities of personalist representation
The previous sections argued that instead of being locked into party-political 
networks, senior businesspeople have their own bank of personal connections. In 
this section, I present some examples of how these personal connections are used, 
and are useful, in the Polish political system.
There are two main ways in which personal connections are employed in business- 
govemment relations. The first is the media. Virtually everybody mentions this as 
one of the strengths of the Business Centre Club. Its president, Marek Goliszewski 
was once a member of the United Workers’ Party. In the late eighties he ran his own 
current affairs magazine Konfrontacje, which, while very critical of the regime, did 
not seem to identify with the Solidarity-led opposition, and featured interviews with 
some senior communists. Both these experiences and constant networking in the 
post-communist era, have provided the vital connections, which got the Business 
Centre Club off to a good start and have maintained its presence in the eyes of 
businesspeople and politicians ever since. A representative of the Polish Chamber of 
Commerce says jealously:
Personal contacts with the media are as important as personal contacts with policymakers. The 
Government does not dismiss people because of a lack of members. The Chamber could not 
promote the view of the Business Centre Club as a mere profit-making lobby with a few 
members. Politicians always ask, '"Who will come from the media?" And Goliszewski’s
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personal connections guarantee a media presence we can’t get even though we’re much bigger 
and are an official organization.36 
The presentation of the Club’s arguments in Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita is
invariably positive. Often Goliszewski’s press releases are paraphrased by the papers
in such a way as to suggest the Club is much more representative than it in fact is.
The Private Confederation of Mrs. Bochniarz has similarly easy access to the media. 
The leadership of the Business Roundtable and the Private Confederation have 
frequently appeared as opinion writers for Rzeczpospolita. This coverage dwarfs the 
coverage given to the original 
Confederation of Polish Employers and 
the powerful media connections of 
Bochniarz are acknowledged by her 
rivals.38 At a crucial stage in the early 
battle between the two Confederations,
Gazeta Wyborcza published a lengthy 
denunciation of Wojciech Komowski’s leadership and the official Confederation 
itself.39 The coverage given to business leaders is much more positive than that 
received by trade unionists. It is likely that personal connections play a substantial 
role. For example, until recently, Mrs Bochniarz sat on the board of Agora which is 
the owner of Gazeta Wyborcza. Agora was also (officially) the main donor to the 
Freedom Union in 1997 and its chief executive is also a member of the Roundtable. 
The General Secretary o f the Business Roundtable and, briefly, also of the Private
36 Interview: B^k, 24 July 2000
3/ Businessman, July 2000, 21; Rzeczpospolita, Kraj, 30 and 31 July 2000, 1 August 2000; Gazeta 
Wyborcza, Kraj, 10 October 2000; Interview: St^pniewski, 27 July 2000
38 Interviews: Malinowski, 8 September 1999; Jesionek, 25 July 2000
39 Gazeta Wyborcza, Kraj, 10 October 2000
Biography: Wojciech Kornowski
A member of the Poznan central committee 
of the PUWP and an activist of the hardline 
Grunwald faction He has owned and 
managed a small network of private 
hospitals since the early eighties. In the 
early and late nineties he set up political 
parties to represent business interests, but 
with dismal election results. Dogged by 
accusations of corruption and incompetence 
in his tenure as president of the 
Confederation. 3/
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Confederation, Ryszard Bankowicz, was the founding editor of Businessman 
magazine and is a well-established Rzeczpospolita columnist. His successor as 
Secretary-General, Lech Pilawski, was also a Businessman journalist. This is no 
conspiracy theory. While these connections are not exactly boasted about in public, 
they are acknowledged and are regarded as simply good politics.
It can be objected that the Polish media, and its quality press in particular, is simply 
ideologically pro-business, which it generally is. However, this inclination does not 
tell us much about which business sources it will favour, and exactly what pro- 
business content it will present. Personal connections between individual business 
leaders and the press enable us to explain the emphases given to different issues in the 
media. Media coverage is not just about being mentioned: it is about column inches, 
photographs, front page, home news or economics, colour graphs or black and white 
tables, etc.
The media is, of course, a vital concern of all politicians in all contemporary 
democracies. However, some features of the Polish party system may make the 
media unusually important in Poland. Generally speaking, the parties have 
comparatively weak social bases, which means they cannot even communicate with 
their supporters, never mind floating voters, other than through the media. The high 
volatility in Polish elections means that parties and politicians are very likely to pay a 
heavy price for adverse publicity. Both the heterogeneity and pragmatism typical of 
Polish parties and coalitions when it comes to economic issues means they are more 
likely to be swayed by media coverage.
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A substantial limitation on the political effectiveness of links between 
businesspeople and the media is that television, and especially public television, is 
the greatest concern of politicians.40 The time constraints of TV news make it 
difficult to give space to business leaders or to address the detailed issues which 
concern them. This is reflected in the use of private TV stations by their owners. Jan 
Wejchert who, together with his long-time business partner, Mariusz Walter, owns 
the independent TV station TVN makes little use of it for political purposes, even 
though he is otherwise highly committed to the political causes of Polish business. 
Neither does Zygmunt Solorz who owns PolSat. In both cases, highlighting the 
political concerns of the business class does not fit into the profile of the stations, 
which are focused on light entertainment
The second, and more obvious, way in which personal connections count is direct 
access to policymakers. This can be particularly effective at an early stage of the 
political process when an idea is being developed in a ministry or elsewhere. It is 
widely agreed that personal contacts are what count here, firstly in terms of finding 
out what initiatives are being taken. A former President of the Roundtable explains 
the approach of his group
We concentrate on the big issues, like taxes. The long-term strategy has to be protected from 
irresponsible politicians. We have to explain that they’re crazy and catch ideas before they 
are bom. We use our connections to hear what they’re up to.41 
A mid-ranking official from the Chamber adopts similar tactics:
We have various informal contacts, even at the stage at which a bill is being drafted in a 
department or a ministry and there we try to find out what aspects of a bill may have
40 Boguslawa Dobek-Ostrowska, ’"Elites and Mass Media in East-Central Europe” in Janina Frentzel- 
Zagorska and Jacek Wasilewski, The Second Generation of Democratic Elites in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000), 60
41 Interview: Wejchert, 10 September 1999
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important consequences for business. This does not result from any legal right but rather 
from our personal contacts and experience, which allows us to reach bills at the lower end of 
the legislative process.42
Trying to identify an issue before opinions have hardened into positions, and while 
decision-makers are more amenable to the force of argument, is a general rule o f 
good lobbying. The point is that, in Poland, the only way to get in early is via 
personal connections. Both business and political interviewees agree on this. A left- 
wing member of the SME Committee told me:
Representatives of these organisations should take part in the preparation of bills, not only 
being consulted on pre-prepared bills -  too late! V e ry  often bills go through the special 
urgent procedure or are just forced through in a rush.43 
The Business Centre Club’s director of lobbying complained that:
We receive bills and are asked for an opinion, although this happens only irregularly. This is 
the fault of the Polish government and the bureaucracy’s low standards. More often, we 
have to use our personal connections to find out what is going on, and see if we can make an 
effective intervention.44
It is little use merely to identify an issue if  the outcome cannot be influenced. Here 
personal contacts are again important. The Secretary General of the Chamber said: 
Personal contacts are important because they give you a chance to convince them. Over 
lunch you can explain it in detail. It’s very important because you can get the time. It’s not 
corruption: it relates to wide, not individual issues.45
The idea of the substitutability of personalist and organizational representation is a 
theme that emerges strongly from both business and political interviewees. 
Personalist representation is often seen as a compensation for the weakness o f
42 Interview: Konwicki, 13 December 2000
43 Interview: Nowicki, 14 December 2000
44 Interview: Uchman, 4 August 2000
45 Interview: Kloczko, 30 June 2000
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business associations. Business representatives might prefer to use the associational 
route to pursue political objectives, but, knowing it is unlikely to be successful, 
instead employ personalist representation. The chefde cabinet of the leftist Minister 
o f Labour and Social Policy argued that,
Employers perceive that trade unions have greater influence in these formal bodies and 
assemblies are more significant with regard to the government They have more means of 
organizational pressure: protests, strikes, withdrawal of political support ... In connection 
with this employers define the situation as domination ... In this situation, the option of 
taking advantage of individual lobbying resources is definitely significant.46
Sometimes, personalist representation is only used after other methods have failed to 
have any impact. There are a number of obvious reasons why the first instinct might 
be to use another channel. The personalist strategy takes up a significant amount of 
time for people who are usually primarily engaged in running fairly large and 
successful businesses. In many cases personal connections are a finite resource.47 
Businesspeople cannot demand meetings every week to discuss pro-business 
policies. For most politicians, there are limited returns from getting engaged in the 
details of economic policy-making. In many cases, they may be taking a risk in their 
careers by committing to the pro-business view.
The vice-president of the mining chamber makes the obvious point that the 
substitutability of organizational and personalist resources depends on the context:
46 Interview: Dhigosz, 2 July 2002
4' Contrast this with the popular idea of '"social capital” which increases rather than diminishes the 
more often it is used. Robert D Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 169
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It’s true that personal connections are very important but some don’t have any personal 
contacts and must go through an organization like ours and in many situations a 
representative organization is taken much more seriously.48
At least as important as the idea of the substitutability of personalist and 
organizational representation is the fact that, in many situations, they can be 
fruitfully combined. The director of lobbying at the Business Centre Club said:
We do take advantage of the personal contacts of our members ... Our regional lodges know 
and meet the local deputies. The regional lodges are given materials by our central lobbying 
office. Local deputies are very keen to listen to the lodges because they must take their 
electorate into account49
The involvement of the organization can reduce the costs of personal lobbying for 
businesspeople by identifying important and winnable battles and researching the 
content matter. Most importantly, it can try to ensure that as many people as possible 
take part, thereby increasing the chances of success and reducing the feeling that 
others are free-riding on the efforts of one person, or a handful of individuals.
It is important to emphasise that these are combinations of personalist and other 
channels. For example, while an association may brief the participants and co­
ordinate a campaign of lobbying, it is personal connections that are being to used to 
gain access to decision-makers, personal connections that ensure that businesspeople 
are really listened to, and largely personalism which ultimately exerts political 
influence.
48 Interview: Krysak, Katowice, 22 August 2000
49 Interview: Uchman, 24 August 2000
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Personalism can provide an important link to the power of the media. Direct access 
to politicians can enable business lobbyists to get into the decision-making process 
early, when it is much easier to have an effect. The soft state, defined by personalist 
representation, is one of four modes of business representation, which may be 
available to business lobbyists. As such, it is substitutable for, and combinable with, 
those other modes. Senior Polish businesspeople do have personal connection to 
Polish politicians, and it is clear that these connections may be useful in business 
lobbying. The next section, investigates the source of these personal connections.
Explaining the soft state
In much of the literature, personal connections are regarded as epiphenomenal. They 
are seen as features of organizations or political parties. Individuals only have 
personal access to decision-makers because they are members of business 
associations, employees of companies or are affiliated with political parties. 
Interviewees tended to refute the idea that personal connections were mere 
epiphenomena. The head of the Katowice Exporters’ Chamber said,
You can say that personal contacts are more important than representativeness of the 
business community. If a director or a president of a firm, or someone in the chamber, 
knows someone high up the hierarchy then it is easier to have an influence.50 
A centrist deputy and chair o f the social policy committee concurred:
In general, at the background of success is not the involvement of associations in the 
legislative process but acquaintances with particular people from the power elite ... for 
decisions, mainly decisions of the government.51
50 Interview: Moczyriksi, 22 August 2000
51 Interview: Lityriski, 5 July 2002
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However, this issue is a classic one, in which controls are needed to sort out the 
relationship between variables, and this is very difficult to achieve in qualitative 
interviews. Therefore, in tables 5.7 and 5.8, I present regression analyses, which 
investigate whether the personal connections of the Polish business elite can be 
explained adequately by organisational or political factors. In all cases, the 
dependent variable is personalism, as measured by the number of persons on the list 
of 35 very important Poles that the business respondents claimed to know well or 
very well.
In table 5.7, I assess whether personalism is an epiphenomenon of the association 
and company states. The association state is measured by membership of a “business 
organisation”. For the company state, I substitute size (income) and foreign and state 
ownership. Both of the equations are very weak. The association variable is 
statistically significant at ten per cent, but the equation only accounts for a pathetic 
four per cent of the variance in personalism. The company state variables fare even 
worse: the R2 figure for their equation is actually negative.
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Table 5.7: Personalism as an Epiphenomenon 
Association and Company States
Coefficient 
(standard error) Association State Company State
Intercept 0.829***(0.314)
1.753***
(0.572)
Association 1.204**(0.47)
Size -1.03(0.000)
Foreign -0.814(0.765)
State -0.34(0.68)
Adjusted R2 0.039 -0.016
F 6.55** 0.396
N 137 116
Notes: * significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
In table 5.8, I present regressions, which assess whether personalism is an 
epiphenomenon of the party state. For the party state variable, I constructed an index 
of partisanship, based on the questions about how well respondents knew members 
of a list of 35 very important people. The measure of partisanship was calculated in 
the following stages:
1. The number of politicians in the left (7), right (7) centre (5) and peasant (3) 
groups known by each respondent was calculated. Knows very well, knows 
well and has had contact with were treated equally.
2. These scores were translated to percentages. So a businessperson would 
know 0-100% of the politicians in a certain group.
3. These percentage scores were standardised, so that businesspeople who knew 
the same proportion of a certain group as the mean for the whole group 
scored zero. Scores above and below the mean are denominated in standard 
deviations.
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4. Each businessperson’s bias towards one group over another was calculated by 
subtracting their standardised score for each group from their score for the 
other groups. This produced six comparative scores.
5. Finally, the six comparative scores were simply added up. The larger the 
score, the more partisan, or party political, are the connections o f a 
businessperson.
The second variable records whether the businesspeople have received political 
nominations to economic posts. The third variable is membership of “mass” 
organisations. This category includes a large number of pro-communist 
organisations, which were separate from the party itself. The final two variables 
relate to communist party membership. The first of these distinguishes those who 
were never members from those who had been members at any point in their life. 
Since many opposition leaders were previously members of the communist party, 
and since many party members joined the Solidarity union, a second, subtler, 
measure of communist party membership, is also included. This is membership after 
1981. At this time, many people left the party because of the imposition of martial 
law and because they felt a stronger identification with the opposition than with the 
regime. Remaining in the party after 1981 is a much better indication of loyalty to 
the communist regime/than membership prior to that period.
The resulting model is very weak. The R2 figure suggests that it explains just over 5 
per cent of the variation in personalism. This can hardly be taken as evidence that 
personalism is epiphenomenal. However, the partisanship variable is clearly 
statistically significant. This relationship seems to be a function of the quantitative
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measures, rather than an indicator that those with the best personal connections are 
exclusively aligned with one party. The relationship is driven by the “non-party- 
political” connections of those with few or no personal connections to the elite. If 
they score zero for two parties, this counts as having equally good connections with 
both parties. The equation was estimated again, this time only including those with 
personalism scores of one or above, that is, those who knew well at least one of the 
politicians on the list of 35. For this sample, the partisanship variable is no longer 
statistically significant.
Table 5.8: Personalism  as an E piphenom enon  
The Party State
Coefficient 
(standard error) All levels o f  Personalism Personalism > 0
Intercept 0.134(0.54)
5.19*
(1.658)
Partisanship 0.339*(0.107)
-0.18
(0.282)
Political appointments 0.792(0.86)
-0.692
(1.433)
-0.524 0.198“Mass” organisations (0.705) (1.983)
PZPR member 0.18(1.014)
1.353
(2.698)
PZPR member -0.608 -2.26
after 1981 (1.038) (2.741)
Adjusted R2 0.053 -0.07
F 2.536** 0.374
N 137 49
Notes: * significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
All of the equations completely fail to explain the variance in personal connections 
amongst the business elite. The ISP data strongly suggests that the soft state is not an 
epiphenomenon of the other modes of business-government relations.
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In Chapter 3, I argued that the farther back in the past, and the less related to elite 
positions, were the sources of personal connections, the purer the form of 
personalism they indicate. A businessman may possess useful personal connections 
because of his past, or present, involvement with other firms. The ISP survey 
includes measures of the number of firms for which respondents had worked and the 
number of directorships they hold. Neither of these experiences constituted 
significant explanations of their connections to the political elite. It is also possible 
to develop personal connections with members of the elite from involvement in 
social organisations, which are neither economic nor political. These sorts of 
voluntary organisations are perceived as hugely important in much of the social 
capital, civil society and civic culture literature. The ISP survey asked whether 
respondents were members in cultural, professional, social (towarzyski), or other 
organisations. I also included a variable, which measured the number of types of 
organisations, of which businesspeople were members. None of these memberships 
has an appreciable effect on the level of personal connections (see Table 5.9).
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Table 5.9: Sources o f  Personalism  
B usiness experience and social m em berships
Coefficient 
(standard error) Business experience
Social memberships
Intercept 0.952*(0.346)
0.998*
(0.377)
Past firms
1.014
(0.639)
Directorships -0.567(0.493)
Cultural organisations -1.386(1.307)
Professional
organisations
-0.441
(0.67)
Social organisations 0.218(0.873)
Other organisations -1.749(2.005)
Total number of 
types o f organisations
0.428
(0.438)
Adjusted R2 0.01 0
F 1.689 0.998
N 137 137
Notes: * significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
If the source of personal connections are the earlier part of a person’s life, those 
connections can be interpreted as more purely personal. This is because they have 
been separated by many years from their original institutional context. Moreover, it 
is very rare to be able to count students or youths amongst the political or economic 
elite of a society, even if they are likely to ascend into the elite in the future. Several 
of the questions in the ISP survey are relevant to this source of personal connections. 
Here, I have selected three educational variables. These are third-level education in 
Warsaw, attendance at Warsaw University, and attendance at the Warsaw School of 
Economics. Warsaw was, and is, the political and economic capital of Poland, and, 
as such, has always offered better opportunities for getting to know future leaders. 
Warsaw University is the largest and most prestigious Polish university. The
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Warsaw School of Economics has long been a centre for the education of business 
and political elites. It played a particularly strong role under the centralised 
communist regime. It was then known as the Central School of Planning and 
Statistics (SGPiS). In the post-communist era, its graduates are widely regarded as a 
particularly powerful business-political network, and are often referred to as the 
“SGPiS clan”. I also include membership of youth organisations. Membership of 
youth organisations was seen as a “fast-track” route into elite positions in the 
communist era.52 The survey also asks how many official positions respondents held 
in youth organisations. As mentioned in Chapter 3, a personal connection is not 
merely a one-to-one relationship: it is an entry point to a network. I have included an 
age variable to control for the tendency of personal connections to accumulate over 
time. An equation using these “youth” variables to predict the level of personalism is 
presented in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10 also presents an equation designed to represent involvement in the 
communist regime. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are many good reasons why 
personal connections formed from within the communist system would be well 
adapted to use in the post-communist context. Most of the variables have already 
been included in previous equations. These are the two PZPR membership variables 
and mass organisations. I also include a variable, which records elite membership in 
1988. As discussed earlier, it was possible, if somewhat unusual, to attain 
responsible positions, without an overt political commitment to the regime.
52 For example, the late communist premier Zbigniew Messner was formerly an official in a youth 
organization. See, George Kolankiewicz & Paul G Lewis, Poland: Politics, Economics, & Society 
(London: Pinter, 1988), 79
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The youth equation is significant at one per cent and explains a modest, but useful, 
14 per cent of the variance in personalism. Positions in Youth Organisations is 
significant at 1 one per cent, attendance at Warsaw University at 5 per cent and 
studying in Warsaw and age are both at 10 per cent. Neither attendance at the 
Warsaw School of Economics, nor mere membership of a youth organisation are 
significant. If a businessperson was not an official in a youth organisation, and 
scores the average for every other variable, the equation predicts they will know 
well, or very well, one of the politicians on the list of 35 (1.035). If they are average 
on everything, but have a have been an official of a youth organisation, the number 
of predicted close personal connections triples (3.026). If all other scores are 
average, but the businessperson has attended Warsaw University, the predicted 
personalism score rises by a factor of 2.5 (from 1.035 to 2.532). In contrast to the 
youth equation, the communism model completely fails to explain the variance in the 
personal connections of members of the elite.
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Table 5.10: Sources of Personalism 
Youth and Communism
Coefficient 
(standard errorj Youth
Communism
Intercept
-1.687
(1-371)
1.137**
(0.456)
Warsaw Education
-1 45*** 
(0.75)
Warsaw University
1.497
(0.598)**
Warsaw School o f  
Economics
0.919
(0.78)
Member o f Youth 
Organisation
0.174
(0.474)
Positions in Youth 
Organisations
2.165*
(0.611)
Age 0.0522***(0.027)
PZPR member -0.287(1.046)
PZPR member 
(after 1982)
-0.349
(1.067)
“Mass” organisations -0.575(0.726)
Elite 1988 0.795(0.56)
Adjusted R2 0.143 0.023
F 4.788* 0.776
N 137 137
Notes: * significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
Having tested some general types of sources of personalism, I now try to build an 
overall explanation by combining the most successful variables from the previous 
statistical analyses. The results of this model are shown in Table 5.11.
The model has an R2 of 17 per cent ant is significant at one per cent. Positions in 
youth organisations is significant at one per cent and partisanship at five per cent and 
age at ten per cent. The other variables are insignificant. If all the scores are average 
the equation predicts that a businessperson will know 0.8 of the leading politicians
209
The ‘Soft State’: Business-Govemment Relations in Poland -  Chapter 5
well. If  they had been an official in a youth organisation, this increases to 2.8. If a 
businessperson scores one standard deviation above the mean for partisanship, and 
scores the average for every other variable, the equation predicts an increase from 0.8 
to 1.3. Unfortunately, this party state effect is subject to the same problem as 
previous analyses: those who know nobody have low partisanship scores. If the 
equation is run again, including only those who know at least one leader well or very 
well, partisanship now has a negative effect. In this case, positions in youth 
organisations, continues to be the most powerful variable, as it does if partisanship is 
excluded.
Table 5.11: Sources o f  Personalism
Best V ariables
Coefficient 
(standard error)
All variables and 
cases Personalism > 0 Less Partisanship
Intercept -2.47***(1.378)
0.673
(4.303)
-1.757
(1.351)
Association 0.373 0.372 0.72(0.482) (1.045) (0.458)
Partisanship 0.224**(0.108)
-0.192
(0.273)
Positions in Youth 1.991* 1.621*** 2.099*
Organisation (0.6) (0.891) (0.606)
Warsaw University 0.745(0.466)
1.212
(1.022)
0.839***
(0.47)
Age 0.048*** 0.062 0.048***(0.027) (0.071) (0.027)
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.055 0.146
F 6.462* 1.563 6.831*
N 137 49 137
Notes: * significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
Personalism is not a side effect of the association, company or party states. It cannot 
be explained by recent business experience, nor can it be explained by membership 
of social organisations, nor even by involvement in the communist regime. The only
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variable, which has a consistent and substantial effect on personal connections is 
having held an official position in a youth organisation.
There is no shortage of anecdotal evidence to back up the conclusion of the 
importance of heavy involvement in youth organisations. For example, the state- 
owned Totalizator Sportowy (National Lottery) transferred its announcements from 
state-owned Polish Television to PolSat, a private station, owned by Zygmunt 
Solorz. The two companies also collaborated on a pension-ftmd, which competed for 
the lucrative business of the new compulsory private pension. Piotr Nurowski, 
Solorz’s right-hand man, had been a youth organization activist with Slawomir 
Sykucki, the head of Totalizator Sportowy?* There were both communist youth 
organisations and an independent youth organisation founded in 1981.54 Leaders of 
both sets of organisations are to be frequently to be found amongst the contemporary 
political and economic elite. For example, in early 2004, the president and prime 
minister were both former activists, as was a vice premier.5;>
The difficulty in finding an explanation for the personal connections is probably due 
to a combination of technical and substantive factors. Poland does not seem to have 
a simple elite channel like that of France. In France, virtually all of the 
administrative elite, most of the political elite, and much of the business elite, have 
all attended the same tiny educational institution, the Ecole Nationale 
d\Administration. Entry to this institution is in turn strongly linked to prior 
attendance at the Institute of Political Sciences. Many o f the students of the Institute 
have traditionally come from a relatively small pool of schools around Paris. In
53 Wprost, No. 902, 12 March 2000
54 Wprost, No. 927,12 November 2000
Wprost, No. 820, 16 August 1998
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contrast, Poland’s elite seems to consist of a large number of relatively small 
networks that cannot be picked up by a survey with only 150 respondents. 
Domanski’s rigorous work on social stratification concludes that, “Many channels 
led people into the category of owners between 1988 and 1993”.56 One unique 
feature of the Polish business class makes long-established and well-integrated 
national networks particularly unlikely. This is the remarkable tendency of post­
communist private business to be based on family traditions -  traditions that were 
frequently interrupted for over a generation.37 Domanski mentions the well-known, 
but perhaps extreme, example of physicist Blikle who bought back his family’s cafe, 
which had been nationalized under communism. Presumably, such a man would not 
have a huge amount in common with the political and economic elite and had to start 
from scratch in the post-communist era.
It may well be that particular social organisations, like the Gdansk branch of the 
Economic Association, or the Warsaw branch of the Club of the Catholic 
Intelligentsia, are the sources of personal connections for some businesspeople. 
Similar arguments might apply to powerful enterprises, like Nowa Huta steel plant in 
Cracow, or academic economists in the SGPiS in the late 1980s. The nature of post­
communism suggests that relatively small and idiosyncratic personal networks may 
have been highly functional. However, these groups would be fairly small and a 
really large-scale survey of a thousand or more might be needed to capture them 
statistically. Obviously, intensive historical case studies would be helpful, but if the
56 Henryk Domanski, On the Verge of Convergence: Social Stratification in Eastern Europe 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 100. See also, Wlodzimeirz Wesolowksi, "The 
New Beginnings of the Enterpreneurial Classes", Polish Sociological Review, 1 (113) 1996, 81-94 and 
Krzysztof Jasiecki, Elita Biznesu w Polsce: Drugie Narodziny Kapitalizmu (Warsaw: Institute of 
Philosophy and Sociology7 of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2002, Ch. 3
57 Domanski, On the Verge of Convergence, 104
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networks really are small and idiosyncratic they would form a very flimsy base for 
generalisation. Notwithstanding various political initiatives by the regime and the 
intelligentsia in the 1970s and 1980s, the probable networks mentioned above 
inhabited different worlds, which had relatively limited contact with each other, until 
they were thrown together by post-communism.
3. Competing Modes of Business-Government Relations
In this section, I use the ISP survey to see which of the modes of business- 
govemment relations is most important in Poland. Firstly, I try to investigate which 
mode is employed most often and, secondly, I investigate which mode is most 
successful.
In the ISP survey, business respondents were asked whether they “tried to influence 
the government in the previous several months”. All but two businesspeople replied 
and 60 per cent reported having lobbied the government. This is the dependent 
variable in the analysis of the frequency of use of different modes. I used a logistic 
regression to discover whether indicators of the different modes of business- 
govemment relations were associated with lobbying. The independent variables 
have all been introduced in previous sections.
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Table 5.12 presents the results of a logistic regression on reported lobbying activity.
Table 5.12: Logistic R egression on L obbying A ctivity
B S.E. Sig. Exp (B)
Association -1.755 0.62 0.005* 0.173
Foreign 1.164 0.789 0.14 3.204
State -1.546 0.705 0.28 0.213
Size 0.000 0.000 0.558 1
Partisanship 0.388 0.163 0.017** 1.474
Personalism 0.474 0.237 0.046** 1.607
Constant -0.453 1.122 0.686 0.636
Cox & Snell R2 0.411
Nagelkerke R2 0.561
Hosmer & Lemeshow Sig. 0.939
Notes: N=115 (27 missing cases, mostly missing size data)
* significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
The model is quite powerful. It easily passes the Hosmer and Lemeshow test and 
the pseudo R2 figures suggest that it accounts for between 40 and 56 per cent of the 
variance in lobbying activity. At the five per cent level, the association, party and 
soft states are significant. Size and the two indicators of the company state (foreign 
and state ownership) are insignificant. However, the association and state variables 
are associated negatively with lobbying activity, while the foreign ownership, party 
and personalism variables increase the likelihood of lobbying activity. I will 
illustrate the effects of the two significant variables, which increase the likelihood of 
lobbying. Firstly, I calculated the probability of having lobbied for the average 
businessperson in the sample. The average businessperson is not a member of a 
business association; and works in the domestically owned state sector. The 
probability of this person having lobbied is 0.56. If  they are average on everything,
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but have a partisanship score one standard deviation above the mean, the probability 
of having lobbied increases impressively to 0.75. If all scores are average, but 
personalism is one standard deviation above the average, the probability increases 
even more impressively to 0.83. More crucial than merely having lobbied is, of 
course, which mode of business-govemment relations is most successful. The 
respondents were asked whether they were successful in the matter on which they 
lobbied. Five of the respondents, who had reported lobbying activity, refused to 
answer. 67 per cent reported success. The results of a logistic regression on reported 
lobbying success are presented in Table 5.13.
Table 5.13: L ogistic R egression on L obbying Success
B S.E. Sig. Exp (B)
Association -0.387 0.734 0.598 0.679
Foreign -0.376 0.959 0.695 0.687
State -1.17 0.91 0.199 0.31
Size .001 .001 0.052*** 1.001
Partisanship 0.193 0.19 0.308 1.213
Personalism 0.859 0.422 0.042** 2.361
Constant -0.346 1.423 0.808 0.708
Cox & Snell R2 0.312
Nagelkerke R2 0.433
Hosmer & Lemeshow Sig. 0.605
Notes: N=65 (19 missing cases, mostly missing size data)
* significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
Again the model is a powerful one, passing the Hosmer and Lemeshow test, and 
accounting for between 31 and 43 per cent of the variance. This time, personalism is 
the only significant mode of business-govemment relations. I f  a businessperson 
scores the average for every variable, the probability of their having lobbied 
successfully is 0.75. If the businessperson has a personalism score of one standard
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deviation above the mean, the probability of reported success approaches certainty 
(p=0.99).
The number of missing cases is substantial and the vast majority of these cases are 
missing because of a refusal to supply financial data. This affects the size variable, 
which is not a direct indicator of one of the four modes of business-government 
relations. Therefore, I run the regressions again without the size variable. The 
number of missing cases is now more acceptable and the results are essentially the 
same.
Table 5.14: Logistic Regression on Lobbying (without size)
B S.E. Sig. Exp (B)
Association -1.022 0.474 0.031** 0.36
Foreign 1.292 0.651 0.047** 3.642
State -0.609 0.562 0.278 0.544
Partisanship 0.327 0.125 0.009* 1.387
Personalism 0.231 2.66 0.103 1.26
Constant -1.095 1.549 0.213 0.334
Cox & Snell R2 0.293
Nagelkerke R2 0.398
Hosmer & Lemeshow Sig. 0
Notes: N=130 (12 missing cases, mostly missing size data)
* significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
While the pseudo-R2 figures are again respectable, the more reliable Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test suggests that the equation as a whole is insignificant. This means 
that the equation should only be treated as very weak evidence. Nonetheless, it 
should be noted that personalism is not a significant variable, but the association, 
foreign ownership and party variables are. As in the previous model, the association
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variable is associated negatively with lobbying, while the party and foreign 
ownership variables increase the likelihood of lobbying.
Table 5.15: Logistic Regression on Lobbying Success (without size)
B S.E. Sig. Exp (B)
Association -0.612 0.616 0.32 0.542
Foreign 0.197 0.801 0.806 1.217
State -0.693 0.755 0.359 0.5
Partisanship 0.123 0.151 0.414 1.131
Personalism 0.537 0.3 0.073*** 1.712
Constant 0.327 1.062 0.758 1.386
Cox & Snell R2 0.213
Nagelkerke R2 0.295
Hosmer & Lemeshow Sig. 0.75
Notes: N=74 (10 missing cases, mostly missing size data)
* significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
The model of lobbying success passes the Hosmer and Lemeshow test and the 
pseudo R2 figures suggest that it accounts for between 21 and 30 per cent of the 
variance. None of the variables are significant at five per cent. Personalism is the 
only variable significant at 10 per cent, and, once again, it is positively associated 
with lobbying success. If  a businessperson scores the average for every variable, the 
probability of their having lobbied successfully is 0.7. If the businessperson has a 
personalism score of one standard deviation above the mean, the probability of 
reported success jumps again to a very high p=0.91.
Overall, the soft state is the most important mode of business-govemment relations. 
The personalism variable significant in the three equations that pass the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test, and it is the most powerful variable in each case. Moreover, its
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substantive effect is considerable in both predicting lobbying activity and lobbying 
success. The one model, which questions the importance of personalism, is of 
dubious significance since it fails to pass the Hosmer and Lemeshow test. It is also 
worth noting that there is no question of the superiority of personalism when it 
comes to success, a much more essential element of importance than mere lobbying 
activity. Of course, it should also be remembered that these models do not suggest 
that the other modes of business-govemment relations are irrelevant, just that they 
are less important than the soft state.
4. Conclusions
This chapter has shown that soft state is probably the most important mode of 
business-govemment relations in Poland. It has almost definitely shown that 
personalism in Poland is too important to ignore. The existing literature on business- 
govemment relations is inadequate for the Polish case because it dismisses 
personalism. The importance of the soft state can only be understood in terms of the 
relative weakness of the other modes of business-govemment relations. Business 
associations are subject to severe collective action problems in Poland because o f the 
large numbers of small firms, the relative absence of trade unions from the 
workplace and the type of industries, which are prevalent in Poland. The weakness 
of social capital amongst Polish businesspeople, and tardy and half-hearted political 
interventions, has not mitigated the collective action problems. The company state’s 
importance is limited by the relatively low levels o f foreign direct investment in 
Poland. The state sector also provides some potential for the company state, but, in 
the Polish state sector, relations with government have often been conducted on the 
basis of alliances with unions, which do not fit into the category of the company
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state. The party state is not a rational option for the vast majority of businesses 
because of the turnover of parties in government. Many state-owned firms constitute 
a sort of party state, in that parties have considerable influence over their behaviour, 
but even these firms are only associated with parties in the short-term. Overall, 
businesspeople seek out connections with powerful politicians of all parties. It has 
not proved possible to provide comprehensive explanation for the source of these 
connections. It is quite likely that this failure is due to the absence of a 
comprehensive explanation. Personal networks are personal. A small number of 
experiences, and institutions, are not able to encapsulate Poland’s business and 
political elite as a whole. Notwithstanding this complexity, leadership in youth 
organisations is clearly an early entry point to business-political networks, which 
pays off for many people later in life.
This chapter has provided an analysis of the four competing modes of business- 
govemment relations in Poland on a general level. It has combined qualitative and 
quantitative data, but with the greater burden falling on the latter. The next chapter 
takes a case-study approach, in an effort to complement the contribution of this 
chapter.
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Chapter 6:
Labour Law Making in the Third Sejm
1. Introduction
This chapter is a case study of labour law making during the third Sejm. The purpose 
of this case study is to support, undermine or elaborate on the conclusion that the soft 
state is the dominant mode of business-govemment relations in contemporary Poland. 
As such, it is not a stand-alone chapter, and is not intended as a comprehensive study 
of labour law making between 1997 and 2001. While the two previous chapters were 
based on general evidence, albeit with specific illustrations, this chapter aims use a 
single case study to contribute to the general research question of the nature of Polish 
business-government relations. This movement from the specific to the general 
requires a short methodological discussion.
2. The Labour Code as a “Case Study”
This section begins with an analysis of the characteristics of labour code reform in 
the context of business lobbying in general. It is vital to keep these characteristics in 
mind when assessing the extent to which this case study has a bearing on the more 
general concerns of the thesis as a whole. Basically, this consists of thinking about 
how “typical” the case study may be of business lobbying and, if it is untypical in 
any way, trying to assess the extent and nature of the deviation.
If  “typical” business lobbying is measured by counting each policy issue as one 
observation, then the labour code is untypical of business lobbying. It is perhaps the 
most public of public goods sought by business. It is non-excludable. The labour
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law applies to objective categories rather than named firms. It is very difficult for 
large enterprises to commute the labour law into private goods by obtaining special 
exceptions and modifications. While many of the more trivial and out-of-date 
regulations are routinely ignored1, the courts tend to vindicate workers who think 
their rights have been infringed.2 Large enterprises are the most likely to have 
unions and to be subject to visits by the labour inspectorate or media investigations. 
Small enterprises are more likely to ignore the labour code to the detriment of 
workers, but if this is brought to the notice of the authorities, they also find it 
difficult to obtain special treatment. The labour code is non-rivalrous: a gain for one 
enterprise in the area of labour regulations does not decrease the gains available to 
other enterprises. In principle, some enterprises may benefit to a far greater extent 
from certain labour regulations than others. However, the proposals, which were at 
stake here, benefited small enterprises more than large enterprises and were 
explicitly designed to do so. Nonetheless, large enterprises were also set to gain 
considerably from the proposals. In this campaign, there was virtually no question of 
competition within the business class, but rather all sorts of businesses stood opposed 
to workers and trade unions. Thus, it represents an unusually common interest 
amongst the business class as a whole.
Obviously, many issues, on which business lobbies, do not concern trade unions and 
very few concern them so directly. Another untypical element of the labour law 
campaign was its intense party politicisation and media coverage. Again, many 
issues of concern to business are of marginal interest to party politicians and the 
media. The wide business unity on the issue may have militated against a need to
1 Wprost, No. 960, 22 April 2001
2 Wprost, No. 1013, 28 April 2002
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use personalist representation to outmanoeuvre opposing business interests. The 
great publicity surrounding the issues also made the personalist “behind-closed- 
doors” approach less feasible. Thus, the general characteristics of the policy issue 
clearly favour other channels of influence, and probably favour the association route 
most of all. If personalist representation is found to be significant in an issue like the 
labour code reform then it is likely that it is also significant, and indeed more 
significant, in other areas where conditions are more propitious.
If “typical” is measured in terms of the amount of time and resources devoted to an 
issue then the labour code is much more typical of business lobbying. It was granted 
greater prominence and received greater resources by business associations than even 
taxation, which was the subject of an intense but relatively brief campaign during the 
third Sejm. Therefore, the labour law campaign tells us a good deal about business 
lobbying as a whole in this period, even before any inferences are drawn.
Most crucially, the “case study” does not consist of one “event” or “observation” but 
many. It may be restricted to one policy area but it involved several major rounds of 
decision-making involving probably hundreds of business people, several business 
associations, parties, institutions and political arenas.3 These policy-making events 
do constitute independent episodes in that no one event was determined by the 
outcome o f the previous event.4 However, the events are, to varying extents, 
reactions to their predecessors. The study is restricted to one parliament in which 
the left was out of power. So, it may be problematic to draw inference to lobbying 
when the left is in power. Nonetheless, as previous chapters have mentioned, the
3 Gar)' King, Robert O Keohane, Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 217-218
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partisan composition of government in Poland does not seem to make a significant 
difference to the nature of business-govemment relations.
The study focuses on the involvement of business in the struggle over the labour 
code. However, it does not exaggerate the role of business by ignoring other obvious 
actors. Most relevantly, at all stages the study considers whether, irrespective of 
business lobbying, outcomes may be explained by party politics, or most plausibly, 
an interaction of lobbying and party politics. The next section looks at the context 
of the labour law campaign in terms of the existing law, the economic situation at the 
time and political developments.
3. Context
3.1 Legal context
The basis of Polish labour law is the code of 1974. Over the last fifteen years, there 
has been a lot of talk about replacing it with a brand new labour code designed for 
the new era. There is a labour law reform commission in place to draft a new code. 
However, the code has been substantially amended in an ad hoc fashion since the fall 
of communism. The first significant amendment made it possible to fire workers.5 
Since then many of the amendments to the code have tended to increase protection 
for workers. Some of these changes were introduced in order to conform to 
International Labour Organisation norms. Others seem to have been the result of the 
strength of trade unions in the Polish party system. In 1997, the leftist and peasant 
government introduced substantial revisions to the labour code, which were seen as
4 King et al, Designing Social Inquiry. 222
3 Teresa Majtas, Prawo Pracy: Zarys Wykladu (Poznan: Wyzsza Szkola Zarz^dzania i Bankowosci w 
Poznariiu, 1999), 21-28; Michal Seweiyriski, ’"Changes in Polish Labour Law and Industrial Relations 
during the Period of Post-Communist Transformation ,^ Bulletin o f Comparative Labour Relations, 31 
(1996), 92-93
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very damaging for business. Business leaders saw this as an indication of trade 
union power but also as a failure on their part. In the Tripartite Commission, the 
Confederation of Polish Employers was perceived to have registered only a token 
protest. Also, business leaders regretted not having taken the initiative themselves to 
try and reform the code in a pro-market direction.
In the third Sejm, a plethora of labour code amendments were proposed and many of 
them passed into law. Most of these were single detailed amendments, such as 
adjustments to the length and conditions of maternity leave. This chapter 
concentrates on the two most important of these various projects: the union proposal 
for shortening the working week and a raft of liberalising measures proposed by 
business. These two opposing projects were linked by all involved and formed an 
ongoing battle over labour law reform for most of the third Sejm.
3.2 Economic context
The new government inherited an econom y which was the most dynamic in East- 
Central Europe. Poland was the first post-communist country to surpass its pre­
transformation Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Although Poland eventually began 
to attract substantial amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI), successfully 
weathered the Russian crisis of 1998, and kept inflation under control, the economy 
deteriorated from 1997 to 2001. There were problems with the budget and with the 
balance of payments and, most importantly, growth slowed and unemployment 
climbed quickly. These problems put a lot of medium-term pressure on Poland. 
Poland's demographic situation means that more and more young people will be 
coming onto the labour market and may push unemployment even higher. Accession 
to the European Union was steadily becoming more and more realistic, and European
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Union concerns about the Polish economy were being transformed into intense 
pressures. In this context, all sides took labour law reforms seriously. From a pro- 
market point of view, they were an obvious way to reduce labour costs and thereby 
re-ignite growth, cut unemployment, and ensure Polish competitiveness in the 
European Union. From a social-protectionist point of view, shortening the working 
week was not just compatible with less unemployment, it might even contribute to 
reducing it. At any rate, if Poland was going to join the European Union some 
people thought this meant that it should have the same high levels of worker 
protection as they perceived to be the norm amongst the “Fifteen”.
3.3 Political context
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) won the 1997 election convincingly. Marian 
Krzaklewski, the man who had united the warring factions o f the right under one 
banner, was the head of the Solidarity union. One of the issues on which he 
campaigned was the demand for free Saturdays. This was the last unfulfilled 
postulate of the original glorious Solidarity strike of 1980. The introduction of free 
Saturdays was included in the coalition agreement with the Freedom Union. The 
Freedomites, especially the then-dominant liberal wing represented by its leader 
Leszek Balcerowicz, were strongly opposed to any further expansion o f workers’ 
rights and instead supported liberalisation of the labour law. A similar position was 
held by the Conservative People’s Party, which formed part o f AWS. Solidarity’s 
electoral wing, the clumsily titled, Solidarity Electoral Action -  Social Movement, 
supported free Saturdays. The other members of the Solidarity bloc combined 
agnosticism and pragmatism on this issue. The main opposition, the Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD), at first, took no position on the labour law issue. In government, 
only a year earlier, they had introduced a significant reform of the labour law. Like
225
The ‘Soft’ State: Business-Govermnent Relations in Poland -  Chapter 6
the new coalition, and AWS, they had a strong labour unionist wing as well as a 
substantial pro-business wing, along with a large measure of virtually pure 
pragmatists.
Marian Krzaklewski did not take the post 
of prime minister, partly because he 
wanted to have a clear run at the 
presidency in autumn 2000. Instead, he 
manoeuvred to have Jerzy Buzek, a 
relatively obscure Social Movement 
deputy and academic, appointed premier.
Buzek’s government identified itself with 
the reforming governments of 1989 to 1993 and contrasted itself with the relatively 
cautious approach o f its leftist and Peasant predecessor. The government undertook 
four great reforms: territorial devolution, pensions, education and the health service. 
None of these reforms were popular, nor did they particularly appeal to any obvious 
Solidarity constituency. In particular, their overall marketising thrust was more of a 
threat than a victory for the Solidarity union. The government, and its constituent 
parties, constantly declined in the polls. In June 2000, the Freedomites walked out of 
the coalition, leaving Buzek with a minority AWS government. The government’s 
deputies were very unreliable and most legislation required elaborate deal making 
and logrolling (known as “commerce” or a “political game” in Polish). The 
upcoming presidential election,6 in which Solidarity union boss and AWS 
kingmaker, Marian Krzaklewski, was a candidate, brought free Saturdays to the top 
of the political agenda, as he needed a legislative victory with which to rally his core
Biography: Jerzy Buzek
Bom in 1940 and a protestant He lived in 
Gliwice in industrial south-western Poland 
where he worked as an academic chemical 
engineer. He joined Solidarity in 1980 and 
has chaired three of its annual meetings, 
including its first, as well as being an 
important organiser in the underground days 
of the 1980s and an "expert'' adviser. Close 
to Marian Krzaklewski since the eighties, he 
had virtually no independent political base 
when he reluctantly accepted the 
premiership. He was seen as a relatively 
independent, consensual leader with centre- 
right views. He failed to enforce discipline 
on AWS or coherence on the government
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supporters. The presidential election in September 2000 was a disaster for 
Krzaklewski, AWS and the government. The incumbent leftist Aleksander 
Kwasniewski was elected in the first round with 53.9 per cent of the vote, with 
Krzaklewski coming a very poor third on 15.6 per cent. The L‘non-party” centrist, 
Andrzej Olechowski, came second with 17.3 per cent. The election result began a 
slow and acrimonious break-up of Solidarity Electoral Action. Perhaps only the 
necessity of a constructive vote of no confidence kept Buzek’s cabinet in power.
The opinion polls of support for political parties, shown in Table 6.1 below, speak 
eloquently of the record of the coalition and the single party right-wing government
Figure 6.1: Support for political parties in the third Sejm
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4. The Twists and Turns o f Labour Code Reform
This section forms the core of the labour code case study. The personalist and non- 
personalist tactics of business are analysed, and their influence is assessed in the
6 Frances Millard, "Presidential Election in Poland, October 2000", Electoral Studies 21 (2000)
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context of party politics and its links with trade unions, public opinion and the 
economy.
4.1 The SME Bill: Almost the Employers ’ Utopia
Although labour code reform had been mentioned in the election campaign and 
included in the coalition agreement between AWS and the Freedom Union, the 
government made no proposals on the issue in its first year. Indeed, it was not 
obvious that it would ever do so, since it was already working on four other huge and 
complex reforms. In combination with endemic political infighting, the four reforms 
were relatively quickly to overwhelm the coalition. However, at the time of the 
introduction of the first major labour code bill, the coalition was still fairly popular 
and fairly united. The Polish economy was still being touted, within and without the 
country, as a success story and an example to other post-communist states.
Labour code reform was introduced onto the political agenda by a coalition of 
business associations. The alliance consisted of the Confederation of Polish 
Employers, the Business Centre Club, the Polish Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Association of Polish Artisans, representing small craft businesses. The Polish 
Business Roundtable was not included, probably because the identification of its 
members with big business was seen as a liability in the context of the political 
strategy behind the bill. The Polish Confederation of Private Employers had not yet 
been set up. The Association of Warsaw and Mazowsze Employers, a member of the 
Confederation of Polish Employers, representing small businesses, is sometimes 
mentioned as an equal partner in the campaign. As with most cooperation between 
Polish business associations, there was no formal umbrella group. However, most of
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the co-ordination, administrative support and technical analysis seem to have been 
based at the Business Centre Club.
The associations had gone to great trouble to prepare a long, detailed and radical bill, 
which would have probably substantially increased labour market flexibility and 
reduced labour costs. One of the key themes of the bill was its emphasis on small 
enterprises. Small enterprises had been the great success of the Polish transformation 
but had been neglected by policy-makers of virtually all institutional affiliations and 
political predilections, during the first years of the transformation. However, by the 
mid-1990s, the importance of small enterprises, and the importance of policy towards 
them, was becoming an orthodoxy. A Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) 
committee, which had full status as a standing committee of the Sejm, was set up. 
Both the Freedom Union and AWS looked favourably on SMEs. The Freedom 
Union wanted to support entrepreneurship and received substantial electoral support 
from all sorts of private business. AWS was, overall, suspicious of large private 
business, especially foreign business, but was particularly attached to the doughty 
native small businessperson. Some of the party’s deputies had a definite Poujadist 
air about them. As in perhaps any political system, it was hard for any party to 
criticise a bill that was seen to aid small business. However, there was no doubt that 
the bill was aimed at the labour market in general, and not just small business. It 
would also have had important consequences for large employers in most sectors.
The main features of the bill can be classified according to whether they applied to 
all enterprises, and not just small enterprises, and also according to whether they 
benefited business at the expense of workers, or were neutral in terms of workers’ 
rights. The principal measures affecting all sizes of enterprise were:
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1. Substantial extensions in the maximum allowable overtime.
2. Halving of both statutory rates of overtime pay.
3. Previously no more than two sequential fixed-term contracts could be signed. If an 
employer wanted to continue to employ a worker, he had to offer her a permanent post. 
The bill removed this obligation in the case of any of the previous contracts being longer 
than six months.
The remaining measures applied to more detailed situations: the removal of the 
obligation to consult with trade union federations in addition to the union at the 
enterprise level; easier and greater compensation awards for employers and against 
workers in a variety of situations; removal of the employers’ obligation to pay for 
medical tests for job candidates and their obligation to provide paid leave for workers 
to seek new employment when it is the worker who has terminated the contract, etc.
The principal measure affecting small enterprises were:
1. An exemption from the obligation to post work and pay regulations for enterprises 
employing less than twenty.
2. Exemptions for various sizes of enterprises from a range of safety and hygiene 
regulations.
3. Removal of the lump sum payment to retirees for firms of less than twenty employees. 
Several measures did not threaten workers rights. Probably the most significant of 
these was the removal of the obligation to pay for the first 35 days of sick leave, a 
m easur^vhich had been introduced only in 1996.7 This cost was to be borne by the 
state, which receives social insurance contributions from employers. Other worker- 
neutral measures related to alimony payments, life insurance, and annual leave. Not 
just the whole issue of labour code liberalisation, but also the specific measures of 
this bill, arose again and again in Polish politics for the rest of the third Sejm.
' Wprost, No. 990, 18 November 2001
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The business associations decided to co-operate with the SME committee of the Sejm. 
The bill encountered no opposition in this committee but suffered a crushing defeat at 
its first reading in a plenary session of the Sejm. In retrospect, business association 
leaders, members of the committee and others all agreed that the content of the bill 
and the political strategy were unrealistic. The Freedom Union chair of the social 
policy committee said:
The original proposition made by the Small and Medium Enterprise Committee was far too 
radical ... The trade unions and the social protectionist people in general thought it represented 
”wild capitalism"“ (dziki kapitalizm).*
At the time, however, employers maintained that their bill was politically realistic. 
However, they did not do so convincingly. For example, as evidence of the spirit o f 
compromise in their bill, they pointed out that it did not legalise lockouts, and other 
features of the Polish employers’ Utopia. The bill had little to offer workers. Some 
of the attempts to interpret measures as pro-worker were almost pathetic, such as the 
idea that sequential temporary contracts would offer workers “stability” or that the 
relaxation of health and safety regulations would lead to greater job security. The 
bill may have had more to recommend itself to the unemployed, because lower 
labour costs and easier hiring and firing might encourage employers to take on more 
workers and less-skilled workers who were not in demand. Most crucially, it was 
treated almost as a provocation by trade unions. They interpreted it as a direct 
challenge to their political power and also as a direct challenge to the state’s vocation 
to protect workers against untrammelled capitalism. They were particularly irritated 
by statement^/which argued that the labour code was “pro-worker” and should be
8 Interview: Lityriksi, 5 July 2002
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amended so that there would be “equality” between workers and employers.9 In the 
opinion of the unions, and many others, this undermined the whole justification for 
the existence of a labour code in the first place. They argued that the code had to be 
“pro-worker” and that the whole point of labour laws was to compensate workers for 
their obvious inequality vis a vis employers in the free market.
However, the bill's various supporters also thought the strategy for getting the bill 
through parliament was perhaps even more politically flawed than the content of the 
bill. The Business Centre Club’s director of lobbying mused:
Perhaps our initial methods in the Labour Code campaign were not the most suitable. At first 
we did not try to convince key people or ordinary7 deputies that the bill was a good idea. We 
should have expected that, because of the union links on both sides, the first reaction would be 
to vote against our proposal.10 
The independent Peasant vice-chair o f  the small enterprise committee complained.
1 wanted to go slower and have a fundamental discussion about the interests of employers and 
workers -  a meeting of deputies and senators. No one listened to my proposals. A large number 
of proposals, clearly made by the business community, were not going to succeed in a pro-union 
parliament without a lot of preparatory* work.11 
The SME committee contained no real political heavyweights and had no history of 
sponsoring major, or politically controversial, legislation. In presenting the bill to 
this committee, the business associations were only preaching to the converted. The 
bill had not been shown to the government or to Solidarity. Here, the lame excuse 
was that the bill related to small enterprises, and since small enterprises have 
negligible union membership there was no reason to talk to the unions. This line was 
not going to convince anybody. When faced with this bill, the unions, AWS and SLD
9 This interpretation seems to be shared by the general public. See Wprost, No. 1009,31 March 2002
10 Interview: Uchman, 24 August 2000
11 Interview: Jagielihksi, 7 December 2000
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never even considered doing anything but rejecting the bill. In fact, they gave the 
impression that this would be a good opportunity to show business and the SME 
committee where real power lay, and to discourage any such proposals in the future. 
Humiliatingly, some of those who had spoken in favour of the bill in the small 
enterprise committee were instructed by SLD and AWS to vote against the bill in 
plenary session and did so.
At this point, the business associations and their political allies decided to do what, 
with hindsight, it seems they should have done in the first place. This was to try to 
talk to social protectionist deputies and trade unions behind closed doors and attempt 
to convince them of the merits of the bill and see which elements of it might be 
acceptable to them. Business also decided to focus on government, which, if 
amenable, did still have the potential to push through significant and politically 
charged legislation. In effect, this represented a shift towards personalist 
representation. In order to get a genuine hearing from many deputies and executive 
politicians, it was necessary to make a personalist approach behind closed doors. 
Business representatives contacted politicians on a “proper name” basis rather than an 
“associational affiliation” basis. Representatives did not say, “I’m calling on behalf 
of the Confederation of Polish Employers”. The reaction to this might well have 
been: “I’ve got nothing to do with the Tripartite Commission” or “That Labour Code 
bill of yours doesn’t have a chance”. Instead, representatives announced something 
along the lines of, “This is Si^kiewicz speaking, I would be very appreciative if you 
could give me some time to discuss a matter of great economic importance”. 
However, this round of personalist representation was initiated and co-ordinated by 
the associations. The labour code proposals had been drafted by the associations and
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it was they who called on their more influential members to try and win over whoever 
they knew in the political world.
No one was particularly sure about the effect of this change of tactics. Some were 
optimistic that some politicians had been won over. A centrist politician said, “In my 
opinion, the effect of this lobbying and information campaign as to why the Labour 
Code should be changed can be judged as positive and advantageous”.12 However, 
the director of the Roundtable was bitterly cynical:
You might say to them [the trade unionists] that, for example, employers could afford to give 
employees a new gold watch every week, but eventually, fairly quickly, the business would be 
bankrupt and both employers and workers would lose. In private, these guys nod. However, 
officially, publicly, politically, they’re demanding gold watches for everybody! It was like this 
with the labour code. They forget they even know you.1'
Of course, there is a big difference between a vaguely social protectionist deputy and 
a professional trade unionist. The former presumably were more open to persuasion, 
whereas the latter would find a shift in their position on the labour code difficult to 
justify as a defence of their members’ interests and the interests of the union itself. 
There definitely was a shift of opinion within the parliament towards liberalisation 
and there was a much more decided shift within the government. The campaign of 
personalist lobbying presumably made some contribution to this shift but it is 
impossible to say to what extent.
12 Interview: Szejnfeld, 6 December 2000
13 Interview: Bankowicz, 9 August 1999
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4.2 Party and Government Bills: Less work, Lower costs
While this campaign was ongoing, the left and the right published their own private 
members’ bills on the labour code. These bills were mainly intended to fulfil union 
demands for a shorter working week but the leftist bill also paid attention to the issue 
of labour costs and made some gestures towards the liberalising measures of the 
SME bill. Over this period, it was obvious that the Polish economy had slowed 
down from the impressive growth of the previous few years. An important reason for 
the slowdown was the Russian crisis of 1998. The stability of the Polish economy in 
this period was seen as a great success, especially as it suggested that Poland was 
locked into the stable Western economic zone, as opposed to the unstable zone of 
emerging post-communist markets. Politically, both the government, and its recently 
begun reforms, were becoming increasingly unpopular. It was also clear that the 
government was weak and unstable, and that the premier was in a particularly 
constrained position. Pro-union AWS deputies were keenly aware that the return of 
the right had not yet delivered anything to its most powerful constituency.
Neither of the party political bills rivalled the length, detail and comprehensiveness 
of the SME committee bill. The Solidarity bill was proposed in the Senate. Its main 
provisions were as follows:
1. The forty-two horn- week was to be reduced to forty hours with no reduction in pay.
2. Free Saturdays in place of old designated free days.
There were also several measures spelling out the practicalities of this change, to the 
benefit of workers wherever possible. In addition, there were some pro-worker and
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pro-union adjustments to regulations for some special categories of worker, which 
were particularly common in some of the old heavy industries where unions were at 
their strongest. Like many AWS bills, this bill was sponsored by a faction of the 
party, rather than being the result of a compromise negotiated amongst the factions 
and brokered by its leadership.
In contrast, the SLD bill was approved by the relatively strong leadership of the party 
and was probably a compromise between the pro-union and pro-business factions of 
the left. The bill was proposed in the Sejm and was designed to ensure that AWS 
could not take the credit amongst workers, as the party that had shortened the 
working week. However, it also had something to offer employers and was, to some 
extent, inspired by the small enterprise bill. The bill simply declared a 40-hourweek 
and increased the overtime limit from 150 to 200 hours per year. The post­
communist bill would have raised labour costs significantly but it was less o f a threat 
to employers because it did not provide for free Saturdays and did raise the overtime 
limit. Both the left and the right tried to dispel the impression that the passage of 
their bills would be an outright victory for unions. Both bills were justified by a 
desire to equalise conditions among workers: in many state sectors such as steel, 
energy and mining, the 40-hour week already existed. The SLD also argued that the 
reduction in working hours would compensate for a reduction in production by an 
increase in employment.14
It would have been strange for any government, even one as busy and disorganised 
as Jerzy Buzek* s, not to intervene in such a central political and economic issue. 
Indeed, with a feeling of expectation amongst the unions, Krzaklewski*s
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commitment to free Saturdays, a wave of personal contacts from business and two 
bills from the two biggest parties in parliament it probably had little choice. 
Crucially, it was far from obvious what sort of stance the government would take. In 
fact, it seemed that the government was engaged in a tortuous process of deciding its 
position. It is important to remember that the government took a long time to “make 
up its mind” and arrive at a fairly settled position on the labour code. Within the 
cabinet, there were always people who were more or less openly disagreeing with 
and opposing the government’s position as it twisted and turned from 1999 to 2001. 
The uncertainty within the government seems to have been even greater than that 
within the AWS parliamentary party. While the AWS deputies did not appear to feel 
it necessary to reach a settled consensus on this, or on most issues, the government 
clearly had to do so, if it was intent on governing. Also, those, whose political base 
and political inclinations may have suggested that they would take an unequivocally 
pro-union view, felt quite strongly their responsibility for the wider economy, and 
that this was the main issue on which the government’s performance would be 
assessed by the electorate. As the economy continued to stagnate, and 
unemployment began to rise, liberalising the labour law became more and more 
tempting. By the end of its tenure, there was no more talk of Poland having received 
a knock from the Russian crisis. Poland had longer-term problems, many o f which 
were exacerbated, or at least not addressed, by some the government’s policies and 
its inability to formulate and implement policies in other areas.
14 Rieczpospolita, Prawo, 16 September 1998; Ekonomia, 29 July 1999
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Within the cabinet the liberal finance minister, Balcerowicz, was the champion of 
liberalisation, and he was supported consistently, if  not particularly forcefully, by the 
AWS and Christian Democrat economy 
minister, Janusz Steinhoff. Two pivotal 
players, who seemed inconsistent, were the 
premier Jerzy Buzek and the AWS Minister 
of Labour and Social Policy, Longin 
Komotowski. Buzek had his roots in the 
Solidarity Union but as a professor, rather 
than a member of the working class. Over the course of the parliament, he drew 
closer to Henryka Bochniarz, and seemed persuaded by many pro-business 
arguments. After the liberals had left the government, he continued to sponsor her 
Private Confederation in its bitter competition with the older Confederation o f Polish 
Employers. Komotowski’s political background clearly suggested a pro-union 
stance and he had no obvious connections to any business leaders. However, he was 
worried about unemployment and his department did initially publish a relatively 
pro-business bill.
Business leaders were able to make an important intervention in the intra-executive 
politics leading up to the government’s first labour code bill. This intervention was 
not made through informal contacts with ministers, nor was it made through any 
access the business associations may have had to the executive. Business leaders 
were well represented on the Committee for Economic De-Regulation, which was 
appointed by Finance Minister Balcerowicz. Appointments to this committee were 
not made on the nomination of associations, or even because of the position anyone
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held in an association, or even because of the size and power of their enterprises. 
Neither were they made on the basis of links to the Freedom Union, through, for 
example, its Economic Forum satellite organisation. They were made according to 
Balcerowicz’s judgement of the sort of contribution individual personalities would 
make.15 In particular he appointed several members of the Roundtable, including 
Henryka Bochniarz, who were well known to him. Balcerowicz knew Bochniarz 
from their academic days at the then Central School o f Planning and Statistics. They 
had also been in government together in the early 1990s. Bochniarz’s personal 
connections are far too wide for her to be described as a party political appointment 
in terms of her personal political influence deriving primarily from her association 
with the Freedom Union. Many of the other people on the committee were even 
more clearly not associated with a particular party or even dissociated from politics 
in the sense of being classic “independent experts”. Appointments to this committee 
were on a personal basis and can be classified as personalist connections of the 
appointees. Many other appointments in the Polish political system could be 
described in a similar way.
The committee had been set up both to identify deregulatory potential in the Polish 
economy, which could be followed up by the relevant ministry, and to introduce an 
“over-regulation check” into the decision-making of the government. In this context, 
the committee was responsible for inserting a wide range of liberalising measures 
into the government bill. Some o f these were straightforward resurrections of 
measures from the SME bill, while more were inspired by the earlier measures but
15 Interviews: Bochniarz. 5 August 1999; Szejnfeld, 6 December 2000; B^k 24 July 2000
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had been substantially amended to make them less radical. Over half of the 
committee’s suggestions appeared in the government’s bill.16
The government published its bill in September 1999. In essence, it was a 
compromise between the pro-union bills of AWS and SLD and the pro-business bill 
of the SME committee. In terms of the union demands, it stipulated immediate free 
Saturdays and the gradual phasing in of the 40-hour week and added the bonus of 
two extra days on the annual minimum leave. It adopted the following measures 
from the original business bill:
1. The extension of maximum overtime
2. The halving of overtime pay
3. The abolition of restrictions on sequential temporary contracts.
It amended the following ideas from the small enterprise bill: obligation of
employers to pay for sick leave, the removal of paid job-seeking days, the reduction 
of special job protection for union officials and unpaid sick days without a medical 
certificate. Komolowski’s Ministry of Labour said that more liberalising measures 
might be added to the bill, but that these would be subject to negotiation between 
employers and unions.17
The trade union reaction to the bill was truly furious. They claimed to have 
discussed the labour code in the Tripartite Commission only a few months earlier and 
had not been alerted that anything other than the shortening of the working week was 
being considered. The trade unions regarded some of the government’s arguments as 
disingenuous. For example, the government, following the lead of business and the 
media, talked a lot about European Union norms. However, the unions rightly
Rzeczpospolita, Ekonomia, 13 September 1999
1' Rzeczpospolita, Ekonomia, 13 September 1999
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pointed out that these norms were the maximum hours per week set by the European 
Union, and that many member states had much shorter statutory working weeks. 
They made it clear that they were opposed to most of the bill’s liberalising measures 
and were bitterly opposed to the most important ones: lower overtime pay, longer 
overtime hours and sequential temporary contracts.
The government’s attempt at a grand compromise was killed off at a meeting of the 
Tripartite Commission in October. The unions made it clear that deputies linked to 
their organisations would vote against any such bill. At this time the Confederation 
of Polish Employers was still the only business representative in the Commission. It 
denounced the unions for not engaging in “social dialogue” about the original bill 
and the government for not consulting it about the shortening of the working week. 
It claimed to be in favour of “consensus and social peace, not class war” and to be 
ready to reach a compromise.18 Its appeal had no effect and indeed was not even 
reported in the business or general press.
4.3 The Single Party Government: Forty(-Two) Hours; Five Days 
With the failure of its initial compromise bill, the government then decided simply to 
implement the unionist desiderata of shorter working hours and a five-day week. 
While the unions and AWS deputies wanted to implement the 40-hour week 
immediately, the government proposed that the shorter working hours would be 
phased in over two years. The decision to adopt the gradual approach was partly the 
result of intense media criticism and, more tellingly, a respectable poll in November 
2000, which suggested that 76 per cent of Poles thought the number of working hours 
should be left unchanged. Although respondents thought it would benefit workers,
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and would, more often than not, benefit them personally, they thought the change 
would damage enterprises and the national economy.19
By this stage, the issues were well within the political arena. The support in the Sejm 
for different proposals was becoming clearer and clearer. Thus, opportunities for 
successful direct lobbying by business had largely passed. However, with 
unemployment soaring, less than a year to a general election, and the governing party 
undergoing a meltdown, politicians had an eye on public opinion. Here, it can be 
argued that the personal connections of business leaders were helpful in winning over 
not just the elite leader-writers but also public opinion itself.
Arguing that the personal connections of businesspeople affected the media coverage 
of labour law policy-making is much more difficult than arguing that their personal 
connections affects the coverage of their statements and the activities o f their own 
business association. Obviously, this is because the labour code was an important 
area of policy and one that could expect to receive a good deal of coverage anyway. 
However, it was widely agreed by political insiders that business leaders did affect 
the media coverage and that this in turn affected politics. The centrist head of the 
social policy committee of the Sejm said that:
Some of the employers have really great connections with the media, and on the matter of 
working hours, they managed to convince the majority of public opinion that the shorter week 
was not a reasonable idea. I think this opinion poll probably had a great effect on the 
government20
The leftist chef de cabinet of the Minister of Labour concurred:
18 "Oswiadczenie Konfederacji Pracodawcow Polskich", Polska Scena Politvczna 19/98
19 Representative adult national sample. N=497 Source: Centre for Public Opinion Research, 
http://www.cbos.pl
20 Interview: Litynski, 5 July 2002
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In the sphere of the media, business is more influential. Journalists give greater credence to the 
arguments of their friends from the business community than the) do to trade unions. Particular 
business leaders have a high reputation amongst the media ... This general influence with the 
media was visible in the debate over the length of the working week."1
4.4 Epilogue
After the gradual shortening of the working week became a certainty, the battle over 
labour law continued. The Freedom Union resurrected a version of the SME bill. 
The People’s Conservatives, who had now left AWS, proposed a bill which 
effectively introduced two labour codes -  a rigorous one for large enterprises and a 
liberal one for small enterprises. Both bills were voted down easily by SLD, AWS 
and the Peasants. However, it is clear that the debate had moved on somewhat. The 
leftists claimed to be in favour of liberalisation, but were intending to introduce their 
own bill once in government, rather than supporting the “election stunts” of others. 
The OPZZ federation, affiliated to the SLD, said it might be in favour of some 
liberalisation but only in the context of a general package aimed at combating 
unemployment. The government asserted that it was committed to liberalisation. 
However, Labour Minister Komolowski said that such changes would be impossible 
without union support and that he was trying to achieve consensus between 
employers and unions. How serious he was is difficult to gauge. Solidarity itself was 
publicly implacably opposed to virtually all liberalising measures.
In the end, the government’s solution of a gradual shortening of working hours and 
immediate free Saturdays was passed with the support of the Freedom Union. There 
was a fierce controversy as to why the Freedom Union supported this bill when it had
21 Interview: Dlugosz, 2 July 2002
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consistently opposed the shortening of the working week and had vociferously 
demanded substantial liberalisation. The Freedom Union and AWS pointed out that 
an agreement on Free Saturdays had been part of the original coalition agreement 
signed by both parties in 1997. The opposition alleged that Freedom Union support 
had been traded for Leszek Balcerowicz’s appointment as governor of the Central 
Bank.22
The last, and most dramatic, episode of labour law legislation in the third Sejm, was a 
bill which banned working on Sunday in firms employing over five people. This bill 
was the apotheosis of the Poujadists in AWS and was passed with the aid of the 
Peasants, small parties and independents. It was aimed mainly at foreign 
hypermarkets, which many saw as destructive of Polish business, family life and 
workers’ rights. There was a chorus of denunciation from the opposition, the elite 
press, and business. Even the government itself opposed the bill. The bill was vetoed 
by the President, who saw it as blatant electioneering and disastrous economics.23
4.5 Discussion
The case study shows fairly clearly that personalist representation was an important 
part of the business campaign for labour code liberalisation. The bill proposed by the 
SME committee was an initiative of the business associations and the efforts of the 
Confederation of Polish Employers in the Tripartite were also clearly associational. 
The one-to-one lobbying of deputies and executive politicians was based on personal 
contacts, as was the presence of business leaders in the De-Regulation Committee.
22 Interviews: Kuklinski 14 December 2000; Nowicki, 14 December 2000; Szejnfeld. 6 December 
2000
23 Wprost, No. 990,18 November 2001
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Much of the media coverage of the issue can be put down to the widely 
acknowledged personal connections of some business leaders.
It is less clear that personalist representation was effective. By the end of the 
parliament, business was bitterly disappointed to be no better off than it had been at 
the beginning. However, this leaves out the ups and downs and twists and turns of 
the campaign. Here it can be said that personalist representation had some significant 
success and that this success compares well with that of other channels. The business 
associations’ bill, which was proposed by the SME committee, never had a chance of 
passing. It only appealed to the relatively small core of unequivocally pro-business 
deputies. Nonetheless, it undoubtedly had an important agenda-setting effect. It got 
political leaders interested in the issue, even if they regarded the bill as far too radical. 
It also incensed trade unions, which saw it, not just as an attack on the fundamental 
interests of workers, but also as a flagrant challenge to the political power and 
prestige o f the unions themselves. The success or failure of personalist representation 
in a campaign of one-to-one lobbying of deputies and executive politicians is difficult 
to assess. It may have had some influence in preparing the way for a pro-business 
shift in the executive. Overall, however, it seems to have little effect in its aim of 
building a parliamentaiy majority for labour code liberalisation. Business 
involvement in the Tripartite Commission was entirely ineffectual. Seemingly the 
most successful o f all the business resources was their membership of the De- 
Regulation committee. This committee of advisors picked on a personal, rather than 
organisational basis, by Balcerowicz, was able to write a broad raft of pro-business 
proposals into a bill which was approved by the government and presented as settled 
government policy. After the expurgation of virtually all the pro-business 
amendments, it seems probable that the aggressive ongoing campaign in the media
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had an effect on public opinion, which, in turn, affected the government’s plan to 
gradually phase in the new working week.
Another way of assessing the effectiveness of business associations and personalism 
on the campaign is to see whether they add anything to an account centred on party 
politics. Here, it is clear that business associations set a detailed agenda and began 
the real politics of this issue when their bill was proposed by the SME committee. Up 
to this point, there had been no substantial party political proposals on the labour 
code. Also, the adoption of a pro-business bill by government and the detailed 
content of that bill are difficult to understand purely in terms of party politics. The 
premier and other AWS ministers were not strongly committed one way or the other 
on the labour code, or, indeed, on economic policy in general. In this sort of 
situation, it was possible for the De-Regulation Committee to make an important 
contribution. Public opinion, presumably influenced by the pro-business media, 
probably had an effect in getting the AWS to compromise on the shortening of the 
working week. However, in terms of the ultimate legislative outcome, party politics 
was the deciding factor.
The labour law case study bears out some of the general arguments about the 
modalities of personalist lobbying outlined in the previous chapter. Personalism does 
seem to have been resorted to when the associational approach failed in the SME 
committee and the Tripartite Commission. In both cases, this was a reaction to the 
superior political power of trade unions. It is also easy to see how the campaign as a 
whole was a combination of personalist and associational strategies. I f  one o f either 
of the personalist or associational elements were to be ignored this would make for a 
very misleading account of the business effort in this policy area. In addition, the
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combination of the two types of representation can be seen clearly in the particular 
tactic of the one-to-one mobilisation. Here, it was personal representation, which 
gained access to policy-makers but the businesspeople came armed with analysis and 
rhetoric developed by associations. This is most clear in the example of the Business 
Centre Club, which all but briefed its Regional Lodges on how to present their case. 
One of the themes of the general discussion of personalism was the utility of 
personalism as a means of early-warning lobbying. Obviously, the labour code 
campaign does not fit neatly into that category, since it was initiated by business. 
However, the relative success of the De-Regulation Committee in getting to 
government before it had the chance to commit itself, is resonant of the general 
discussions.
It is worth reiterating how the characteristics of the labour law policy arena bear on 
the relevance of the conclusions of the case study to the general subject of business- 
govemment relations in Poland. The issue constituted perhaps the most public of 
public goods available to the business class. That personalism played a substantial 
role in the campaign for this most public of public goods suggests that the general 
arguments made earlier in the thesis are more likely to be trustworthy. These 
arguments relate to issues that are on average much less public, and less politicised, 
than the labour code. In those areas, it is reasonable to suppose that personalism can 
be considerably more successful than it was in the labour law campaign.
5. Conclusions
This chapter has added a case study to the more general analyses o f the previous 
chapters. The conclusions of the case study are much more equivocal than those of 
the general discussions. However, the fact that the labour code seems to be one of
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the least propitious policies for personalist lobbying suggests personalism is likely to 
be important in less politically salient and narrower policy issues. This chapter, of 
course, should not be read in isolation. It is much more powerful when read in the 
context of previous chapters, which have shown the relative weakness of the 
associative, company and party states in comparison with the personalism of the soft 
state.
This chapter, and the preceding two chapters, constitute the empirical core of this 
thesis. The conclusion of these chapters is that the soft state, a mode of business- 
govemment relations summarily dismissed in the literature, is the probably the most 
important channel of business influence in Poland, and is, most certainly, too 
important to ignore. The final chapter considers to what extent this conclusion can be 
generalised be extended from the late 1990s to the future, and to what extent it can be 
generalised from Poland to other post-communist countries.
248
The ‘Soft’ State: Business-Government Relations in Poland -  Chapter 7
Chapter 7:
Conclusions
1. Introduction
This chapter begins with a summary of the preceding chapters. Section Two goes on 
to assess whether the contemporary system of business-government relations in 
Poland is transitional or is likely to endure. The third section compares Poland to 
neighbouring post-communist countries. Both of these analyses have a bearing on 
the big questions about the homogeneity of capitalist democracy, which motivated 
the original choice of post-communist business-government relations as the subject 
of this thesis. The fourth and final section places the conclusions of the thesis in the 
context of the nature of post-communism.
2. Summary
This thesis has argued that the soft state is the most important mode of business- 
government relations in Poland. In Chapter Three, it was shown how this possibility 
is not seriously considered in the existing literature. Previous studies of business- 
government relations have been dominated by the study of interest associations. It is 
clear that this is far too restrictive in terms of the range of actors. Grant’s addition of 
the company and party states accounts for a much larger proportion of business- 
government relations in the West. However, in the Polish case it is necessary to go 
further and include personal connections between businesspeople and politicians as 
an important mode of business-government relations.
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Chapter Four showed that Polish business associations are weak and pluralist. The 
most convincing explanation for this situation was found to be the logic of collective 
action, which stresses the size and number of enterprises in a potential group. 
Chapter Five investigated the alternatives to business associations in the Polish case. 
It argued that the company state was of limited relevance because of the limited role 
of multinationals and the tendency of many state-owned enterprises to employ joint 
representation with unions. The relevance of the party state is highly circumscribed 
by the high turnover of governing parties in Poland. Finally, the soft state seems to 
be the most important mode of business influence in Poland. While the sources of 
personal connections are complex and idiosyncratic, heavy involvement in youth 
organisations is a remarkably strong indicator of the level of personal connections 
between senior businesspeople and politicians. In Chapter Six, a case study of labour 
law-making in the third Sejm bolstered the argument, by showing that personalist 
representation was both used, and useful, in the most public and most important of 
the political campaigns of Polish business in recent years.
In order to clarify what this thesis has concluded, it is useful to state what it has not 
concluded. It has not concluded that the associative, company or party states are 
irrelevant. Associations play an important role in Polish business-government 
relations, often in combination with personalist representation. The company state is 
especially significant in the important foreign-owned sector. The party state defines 
business-government relations in some vitally important large state-owned firms. 
However, none of these categories represent the predominant form of business- 
government relations in Poland, so Poland cannot be described as an association, 
company or party state. Moreover, even if Poland were described as a combination
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of all three, so much of Polish business-government relations would be ignored that 
the classification would be seriously misleading. Personalism is the mode of 
interaction which is barely acknowledged by existing approaches but which is central 
to Polish business-government relations.
This thesis has presented an original theoretical synthesis, which stresses the mutual 
dependence of the four modes of business-government relations. However, most of 
the thesis consists of an empirical argument that contradicts the emphases and 
assumptions of the vast majority of the literature on business-government relations. 
This raises two issues. The first is whether the thesis consists of a snapshot of a 
changing system or whether it is a portrayal of a relatively stable system. The 
second is whether this thesis has been an interesting case study in Polish 
exceptionalism or has something more fundamental to say about post-communism.
3. Potential changes in Polish business-government relations 
This method of this section is to look at existing and likely trends in the principal 
independent variables identified in Chapter Three. Substantial changes in these 
independent variables would suggest substantial changes in Polish business- 
government relations.
The main variable for predicting the strength of business associations was the 
number of enterprises in the constituency of a given association. In general, as 
Chapter Four showed, the Polish economy is characterised by large numbers o f small 
enterprises. Although, some of these small enterprises are likely to grow into 
medium-sized enterprises, there is no indication that Poland is developing into an
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economy based on medium-sized manufacturing, such as Northern Italy or Germany. 
Thus, most sectors will remain as highly latent groups. Some sectors of the Polish 
economy are privileged groups, in which one giant enterprise has an incentive to 
bankroll an association to the benefit of many smaller firms. A combination of 
privatization, de-monopolisation and regulatory reform, much of it driven by the 
European Union, means that many of these privileged groups are becoming 
intermediate, or even, latent groups.
Chapter Four also argued that the mode of production of most Polish firms, trade 
union weakness at the firm level, and trade union influence on the political system, 
meant that the business class as a whole, rather than the sector or region, was the 
most relevant constituency for most Polish businesses. This is, o f course, a highly 
latent group. The mode of production of Polish enterprises is becoming more 
unfavourable to the formation of business associations, as the economy moves 
towards services. Associations generally have much less to offer service enterprises 
than they do to industry, especially those involved in diversified quality production. 
Trade unions are still losing members and influence at the plant level. The collapse 
of AWS probably means a permanent withdrawal of Solidarity from electoral 
politics. This means that even the incentive to form associations at the national level 
has been weakened.
Social and political variables can have a marginal effect on the logic of collective 
action. Social capital amongst Polish businesspeople should be growing. Private 
business is no longer a brand new activity and Polish businesspeople are no longer 
neophytes. This may make collective action in business associations somewhat more
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likely. On the other hand, ironically, the lack of social capital, and the weaknesses of 
the legal and regulatory system, provided an incentive for joining business 
associations, as they could provide a forum for making potentially profitable 
connections with other businesspeople, as well as some guarantee of the 
trustworthiness of those businesspeople.
In politics, there is some potential for intervention to boost business associations. 
The European Union officially promotes a quasi-corporatist approach to business- 
government relations. However, this has so far had a negligible effect on Poland, 
and, indeed, on existing members of the European Union. The rise of Jerzy Hausner, 
an SLD academic and committed corporatist, to vice-premier and Minister of the 
Economy has probably done something to rescue the Tripartite Commission from 
obscurity. Civic Platform, a party with very close connections to the Business Centre 
Club and the Private Confederation, has become the main opposition, and will, in all 
probability, dominate the next government. On the other hand, prominent members 
of both the SLD and Civic Platform have recently supported the foundation of a new 
association to rival the Business Centre Club and Business Roundtable. The new 
organisation, called “Leviathan” after an inter-war organisation, also contains 
prominent members of existing associations, such as Jan Kulczyk. Perhaps a more 
powerful factor, than either party politics or the European Union, is the influence of 
the avalanches of corruption scandals, which have overwhelmed both the right and 
the left while in government. A right-wing deputy told me that,
There’s a lot of talk in Poland about corruption at the moment. Direct talks with businesspeople,
that somebody might know, are only one step removed from corruption. Of course, it doesn’t
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necessarily mean anything but it can be interpreted in the wrong way ... In general, these days, 
we want to work with employers’ organisations.1 
H ow ever, not even this final factor means that there is the political w ill, never mind
the political capability, to change the economic structure, so that an association state
becomes a possibility. Overall, little change in the importance of Polish business
associations is likely in the foreseeable future.
The company state is chiefly associated with large foreign and state-owned 
enterprises. While foreign direct investment in Poland was negligible in the early 
nineties, it increased enormously in the late nineties, and after a pause, is now 
increasing again. Poland is becoming a country in which foreign capital is an 
important player in the economy, and in which foreign enterprises totally dominate 
some important sectors, such as car manufacturing. Thus, it is predictable that that 
company state will increase in importance in Poland. The relationship between the 
company state and state enterprises, was found to be more equivocal. Many state 
enterprises, relate to government in a way, which is difficult to describe as business- 
govemment relations. These firms are not primarily profit-seeking and their 
relations with government are co-ordinated with trade unions. Many other state 
enterprises are heavily influenced by party-political appointments to their boards. 
Privatization continues in Poland, and the state sector gets ever smaller. 
Nonetheless, change is so slow that there is no substantial basis on which to alter the 
basic analysis of business-government relations in the state sector.
In some countries, connections between party politics and business have been 
strongly affected by the positions that parties take on economic policy. Hitherto,
1 Interview: Kukliriski. 14 December 2000
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this has not been the case in Poland, as the left and right blocs have had ill defined, 
and often difficult to distinguish, economic policies. There is a possibility that this 
will change in the near future. If, as seems likely, Civic Platform and Law and 
Justice form the core of the next government, they will have a reasonably coherent 
centre-right identity on economic policy, without the complication of any trade 
union links. If the SLD’s strong organisation avoids electoral disaster, it will then 
be a left-wing opposition, defined by European social democracy. However, this 
scenario is obviously too neat. The SLD continues to be a strongly pro-business 
party. For example, its former leader, Leszek Miller, recently openly considered the 
introduction of a flat-rate income tax,2 a policy, which is almost the holy grail of 
neo-liberalism. Law and Justice is a law-and-order, traditional values party, which 
is not strongly associated with economic policy, never mind ffee-market policy.
A politicised economy, in which the state frequently can, and does, intervene in 
individual enterprises, is strongly associated with the party state. Apart from 
continuing privatization, there is likely to be some diminution in the politicisation of 
the Polish economy. The European Union applies enormous pressure in this area. In 
contrast to the encouragement of business associations, this is a direct and 
fundamental policy of the European Union. Reducing politicisation is part of the 
implementation of the acquis communautaire (the body of EU law) and the 
implementation of the single market. For example, Poland recently had to introduce 
a new statute on public procurement, which would ensure that European firms could 
compete on an equal footing with their Polish counterparts. This has effectively 
removed one of the main benefits which political parties, and indeed politicians,
2 To put this in context, a flat-rate tax policy was seen as evidence of the craziness of Steve Foibes 
who contested the Republican nomination for US president against George W Bush.
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could offer to specific firms. The budgetary crisis is putting further pressure on the 
state to reduce interference with business and eliminate revenue-draining concessions 
to particular businesses. Finance Minister Kofodko and Economy Minister Hausner 
have both introduced plans to sweep away the huge numbers of tax breaks and 
licences in the Polish economy. Hausner has changed the regulations governing tax 
offices to reduce the potential for capricious tax assessments, as well as appointing 
an “entrepreneurs’ ombudsman” to defend businesspeople who think they have been 
badly treated by the bureaucracy.
There are several powerful factors, which should limit the de-politicisation of the 
Polish economy. Firstly, de-politicisation is too complicated a procedure to happen 
quickly. Secondly, de-politicisation cannot be fully implemented without a major 
change in the public service personnel, but the recruitment of a professional civil 
service has made little progress. Thirdly, while a handful of senior decision-makers 
may feel intense pressure to repair the economy and control the budget deficit, 
individual ministers, junior ministers, members of ministerial cabinets, etc. have 
strong incentives to retain the instruments of politicisation in order to maximise their 
own power, and deliver corrupt benefits to themselves and their parties.
The most powerful explanation for the relative absence o f the party state is the high 
turnover of governing parties. If parties are only temporarily in power, it makes no 
sense for a business to make anything more than a temporary commitment to a party. 
At this stage, it seems virtually impossible that the current Polish government will be 
re-elected. There is the potential, and has been for some time, for a centrist party to 
govern in combination with the left, but, so far, this “historic compromise” has not
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come to pass. This might make it rational for businesses to commit to a successful 
centrist party. Overall, however, a shift towards the party state seems unlikely.
The only variable which had a substantial effect on the level of personal connections 
was having held a leadership in a youth organisation. Although these organisations 
still exist, are still popular, and still receive state funding, this variable will not be so 
powerful in the future. Under communism, youth organisation leaders could expect 
to meet senior politicians, even the prime minister and president, and the 
organizations were seen as a channel of recruitment for the higher echelons of the 
party and the nomenklatura. Some of the factors mentioned earlier are also likely to 
attenuate personalism. The fear of corruption scandals is likely to reduce politicians’ 
receptivity to personalist lobbying, but by how much, and to what effect, is 
impossible to tell. The de-politicisation of the economy is likely to work against 
personalism, which seems more functional for narrow than wide lobbying. However, 
it is worth remembering that personalism was important in lobbying on the labour 
code, a highly public good.
One o f the central points of this thesis is that the modes of business-government 
relations must be considered in relation to each other. From this perspective, a 
modest move towards the company state seems the most likely change in business- 
government relations in Poland. The soft state is the dominant mode of business- 
government relations at this point in time. A shift away from personalism to the 
association state is improbable because of the formidable collective action problems 
posed by the structure of the Polish economy. A shift towards the party state is 
unlikely because some of the factors that may undermine personalism will also
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undermine party politicisation. Moreover, continuing electoral instability stymies the 
party state. The company state is supported by the powerful trend towards foreign 
ownership, which is likely to continue. How large this change will be, and whether it 
will lead to anything more than a minor modification in the classification of Polish 
business-government relations, is impossible to tell.
3. Poland’s post-communist neighbours
Like the previous section, this section looks at the key variables identified earlier in 
the thesis, this time applying them to an analysis of Poland’s post-communist 
neighbours.
It does seem that the pluralism and weakness of Poland’s business associations is 
fairly typical of other post-communist countries:
Only the Czech Republic and Slovakia have anything approaching [unified] confederations ...
The prevailing pattern is of several competing general business associations.3 
Although, as in Poland, there is little reliable data on membership for post­
communist countries, it is clear that membership is low, especially in the private 
sector.4 Strikingly, these tendencies are also evident in Eastern Germany, which has 
been subsumed into the very strong associative structure of the Federal Republic of 
Germany.5
The other post-communist countries are also examples of the relative weakness of 
political interventions to increase the importance of business associations. Their
3 Stephen Padgett, Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany: Interest Groups in Post-Communist 
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 76
4 Padgett, Organizing Democracy, 74. An exception here is the compulsory chamber of commerce in 
Hungary7.
5 Padgett, Organizing Democracy, 80-99
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attempts to foment corporatist policy-making through tripartite agreements have not 
been very successful:
[The] entire interest group system is too loosely constituted to be able to bind its members to 
the terms of corporatist exchange ...[and] institutions of corporatist policy-making ... 
[Tripartite institutions are more accurately described as] attempts by hard-pressed 
governments to legitimise the social costs of economic transformation.6 
The Czech Republic’s much-vaunted tripartite structure may be an exception,7 but 
even this case has more recently been re-evaluated as less significant than has often 
been thought.8 It is clear that its associational structure is far too divided for it to be 
compared to a corporatist archetype like Austria. Although business associations 
may be more important in many post-communist countries than in Poland, it does 
seem reasonably clear that post-communist countries cannot be described as 
association states.
The most striking predictor of the strength of business associations is the number of 
small firms. The large numbers of small firms is emphasised by Padgett in his 
review of the literature on post-communist business associations and his case study 
of Eastern Germany.9 However, this problem may be greater in Poland, simply due 
to its greater size and therefore much greater absolute numbers of enterprises. While 
the vast majority of enterprises in any economy are small enterprises, there are 
important differences across OECD economies. Two distinguishing characteristics of 
the Polish economy seem fairly clear. The first is the “missing middle”. There is
6 Padgett, Organizing Democracy, 3
' Mitchell Orenstein, '‘The Czech Tripartite Council and its Contribution of Social Peace" in Attila
Agh and Gabriella Ilonszki (eds.), Parliaments and Organized Interests: Die Second Steps (Budapest: 
Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies, 19%); David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist 
Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East-Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), passim, esp. 178
* Martin Myant, Brian Slocock and Simon Smith, 2000. "Tripartism in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics", Europe-Asia Studies, 34 (2000), 723-739
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nothing unusual about the small number of large enterprises in Poland, but many 
industrial countries have a much greater proportion of medium sized-enterprises (50 
to 250 employees). The category of small enterprises usually means less than fifty 
employees. Poland is distinguished from many other countries by the dominance of 
very small enterprises of less than twenty or even ten employees. Both of these 
characteristics militate against collective action. Neither is unique to Poland. The 
Czech Republic and Hungary seem to share both of the characteristics. 
Unfortunately, states vary somewhat in the number of employees used to categorise 
enterprises10 and this means comparison cannot be made with precision. However, it 
can be concluded confidently that there is nothing unique about the distribution of 
different sizes of enterprises in the Polish economy.
Political interventions may have been more important outside Poland. Poland did not 
set up a tripartite structure until 1993 and was the last East-Central European country 
to do so. In several countries this was done almost immediately, with the express 
aim of founding corporatist systems, which would facilitate the management and 
legitimation of social change.
Social capital does seem to be lower in Poland than among its most advanced post­
communist neighbours, especially the Czech Republic.11 However, what really 
matters is the level of social capital amongst the business community. One 
interesting study suggests that the level of social capital amongst Polish
9 Padgett, Organizing Democracy. 91-93
10 The categories for Poland and the Czech Republic are 0-19, 20-49, 50-249, 250-499, 500+ and for 
Hungary 0-9, 10-99, 100-499, 500+. The OECD small and medium enterprise outlook (Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2000), 211-2.
11 See for example, Padgett, Organizing Democracy, 100
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businesspeople is relatively high for a post-communist country and is just lower than 
in the Czech Republic.12
Since the study of associations so dominates the literature, it is not possible to assess 
the importance of the other modes of business-government relations outside Poland 
by looking at secondary sources. Instead, I will take the more indirect approach of 
investigating the explanations for the other modes in Poland’s neighbours. It was 
suggested that, in Poland, the company state is associated with the foreign-and state- 
owned sectors. In Table 7 .1 ,1 use the BEEPS data to compare Poland with four of 
its neighbours. The Czech Republic is the only other country in which the company 
state is associated with both foreign and state ownership. In Hungary, only foreign 
ownership is associated with the company state and, in Slovakia and Slovenia, only 
state ownership is associated with the company state. These data suggest that Poland 
is far from exceptional in this area, but it also suggests that generalisations from the 
Polish case to post-communism cannot be made. Therefore, in the following I will 
only compare Poland to those countries, which have similar relationships between 
the company state and foreign and state ownership, respectively.
12 Martin Raiser, Alan Rousso, Franklin Steves, Trust in transition: cross-country and firm evidence, 
working paper no. 82, (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003)
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Table 7.1: Lobbying channels for laws, rules, regulations and decrees
Foreign v domestic State v private
Odds o f  direct v 
association lobbying N
Odds o f  direct v 
association lobbying N
Poland 1.8 245 3.8 240
Czech Republic 1.6 149 4.3 149
Hungary 1.9 148 1.06* 147
Slovakia ** 137 3 138
Slovenia 1.05 125 2.65 125
Source: BEEPS survey 2002. The respondents were asked whether the) were members of business 
associations and, if so, whether, when lobbying for laws, rules, regulations and decrees, they used 
their business association, the firm’s ties to public officials or other channels. The latter two 
categories have been conflated to compute the odds ratios. See section 2.1 of Chapter Five for a more 
detailed discussion of this methodology.
* The Hungarian exception may be related to the fact that it is the only one of the countries with 
compulsory chambers of commerce.
** No foreign enterprises reported direct lobbying. The N for foreign enterprises in the Slovenian 
sample is only 17.
Poland has had consistently lower levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) than 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. In 2000, FDI represented 33% of GDP in 
Hungary, 26% in the Czech Republic and 15% in Poland.13 This suggests that the 
company state may be a more central phenomenon in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary than it is in Poland. There may well be greater potential for the company 
state in those countries with higher FDI than Poland. It is more difficult to speculate 
about other countries in the region, since the relationship between foreign enterprises 
and the company state does not seem to be a universal one in post-communism.
Figures on the proportion of GDP contributed by the state sector are unreliable, 
partly because of the complexities of ownership transformation described in Chapter 
Two, and partly because of the incentives for governments to exaggerate their 
success in economic reform. Nonetheless, it seems fairly clear that Poland and
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Slovenia have considerably larger state sectors than Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic.14 Of the five comparisons (Hungary and the Czech Republic on foreign 
ownership and Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic on state ownership) two 
suggest Poland is less likely to be a company state, two more likely, and one puts 
Poland at a similar level to its comparator. The Czech Republic is the only country 
in which both comparisons seem to hold. In that case, foreign ownership suggests a 
stronger company state than Poland, while state ownership suggests a weaker 
company state. Overall, I very tentatively conclude that the relative unimportance of 
the company state in Poland is likely to be repeated in neighbouring states.
East-Central European countries have the reputation of being party states, or 
something similar. In Poland, this reputation was shown to be misleading. The party 
state seems to be restricted to a relatively narrow but important sector of Polish 
business-government relations and cannot be regarded as the predominant form o f 
business-government relations in that country. The situation may be similar in other 
countries. In the absence of direct evidence, I will again look at the relevant 
independent variables.
I agreed with the arguments of the literature that a high degree of politicisation o f the 
economy presents politicians with instruments, which can be used to ensure the 
loyalty of businesses to political parties. It is reasonable to argue that countries, 
which score close to Poland on the World Bank’s indicators described in Chapter 
Five, have roughly similar levels of politicization to Poland. Poland’s scores on 
Government Effectiveness, the Rule of Law, and Corruption were compared with the
13 Imogen Bell (ed.), Central and South Eastern Europe (London: Europa, 200IX 310
14 Imogen Bell (ed.), Central and South Eastern Europe (London: Europa, 2002)
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scores of post-communist EU candidates and are presented in Appendix 5.1:> The 
method was to identify those countries the ninety per cent confidence intervals of 
which did not overlap with the interval for Poland. If there is no overlap we can be 
ninety per cent sure that the differences in the scores are statistically significant. In 
terms of Government Effectiveness, Bulgaria and Romania had no overlap with 
Poland: their scores were much lower. When it comes to the rule of law, all other 
countries overlap with Poland. Finally, for the corruption score, Latvia’s score is just 
short of an overlap with Poland while Bulgaria and Romania are again a long way 
behind. The limitations o f the measures mean that the confidence intervals are very 
wide and this is partly responsible for the overlap between Poland and the other 
states. However, the overlap between Poland and the other countries is so 
overwhelming on each of the three elements of governance that it can be concluded 
that Poland’s level of politicization is not a specifically Polish characteristic, but 
rather a feature of post-communism.
However, the thesis argued that politicisation, on its own, is not enough to bring 
about the party state. If there is a high turnover of governing parties, business will 
have little or no incentive to be loyal to a political party. The high turnover of 
governing parties is a general feature of post-communist politics. However, it does 
seem that Poland is among the more extreme cases. In 2000, of 11 East-Central 
European countries where elections were more or less free and fair, in four no party 
had managed to win the largest number of votes twice in a row. These countries 
were Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria. Amongst the 11 states the overall
15 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria. Romania.
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probability of a party winning a plurality two elections in a row was 0.29.16 The 
probability of a government being returned to power is most likely somewhat lower 
than this. In general, it seems that turnover of governing parties is likely to weaken 
the party state in other post-communist states, albeit, in most cases, not to the same 
extent as in Poland. In summary, the absence of the party state is probably a 
widespread feature of post-communist capitalist democracies.
Predictably, relevant literature and data is most sorely lacking in the case of 
personalism. However, especially in more descriptive accounts, there is some 
evidence of the importance of personalism. Notably, Padgett’s emphasis on the 
importance of personalised leadership of interest associations in other post­
communist countries is familiar from the Polish case.17 The phenomenon of 
politicization facilitates personalism much more directly than it encourages the party 
state. Youth organizations were a vital part of the social and political structure in all 
communist states, so it is fairly likely that involvement in these organizations is a 
good predictor of the level of personalism in other countries. However, in Poland, 
and elsewhere, many of the personal connections between the business and political 
elites, have complex, and probably idiosyncratic, sources, which have been the 
subject of some speculation, but virtually no systematic study.
Poland shares a weak association state with its neighbours, although associations 
may be somewhat stronger in other countries. In all of these cases, the formation of 
strong associations is made extremely difficult by an economic structure so
16 Author’s calculations for Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Albania and Macedonia Data from Paul Lewis, Political Parties in Post-Communist 
Eastern Europe (London: Routledge, 2000), 62-67
l ' Padgett, Organizing Democracy, 127
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overwhelmingly dominated by masses of small firms. In some countries, early 
political interventions and relatively high social capital may have made a slight 
difference. The evidence on the company state tends to point towards a weak 
company state amongst leading post-communist capitalist democracies. However, it 
is very hard to tell how reliable this conclusion is because there is no direct evidence. 
Moreover, the correlation between foreign and state-owned enterprises and the 
company state, while common, is far from universal in post-communist states.
In the case of the party state, we are again lacking direct evidence. This time, 
however, the logic and available evidence seem more compelling. Poland shares a 
high degree of politicization with other post-communist economies, but the 
undoubtedly high turnover of governing parties in post-communist democracies 
makes it plainly irrational for any business to enter into a medium or long-term 
relationship with a particular political party. The evidence for the soft state outside 
Poland is the weakest, but there is also no evidence to the contrary. Certainly, 
politicization makes personalism likely, and it is hard to resist assuming that, in the 
absence of other alternatives, politicians and businesspeople have adapted, or 
created, personal connections to deal with this situation. In post-communist 
capitalist democracies, the soft state (Poland’s present) and the company state 
(Poland’s most likely future) seem like the most credible modes of business- 
government relations.
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5. Polish business-government relations and post-communism
This section probes the extent to which Polish business-government relations are 
“post-communist”. Post-communism is meant in two principal ways. The first 
meaning of post-communism refers to the fact that many of the characteristics of 
countries, such as Poland, are legacies of the communist-era or are results of attempts 
to transform that legacy. This might be called causal post-communism. The second 
meaning is a path-dependence hypothesis, which states that because of their 
distinctive pasts former socialist countries will evolve into socio-political systems 
qualitatively different from those in the West or elsewhere. I call this distinctive 
post-communism.
Of the independent variables found to be useful above, only two seem not to be 
causally post-communist (early political interventions in the associational structure, 
foreign direct investment). Most, however, are causally post-communist (economic 
structure, social capital, state enterprise, politicisation of the economy, party turnover 
in government, the importance of youth organisations). However, as I argued in 
Chapter One, I believe only one of these variables to be distinctively post­
communist. This factor is politicisation of the economy. Clearly, other economies 
are politicised, but the politicisation of the post-communist economy is qualitatively 
different to that experienced elsewhere. Politicisation does not create a party state, 
unless it is combined with some continuity in the party composition of government. 
Weak parties and high turnover in government is a legacy of communism, but is an 
outcome that it is also to be found elsewhere. Politicisation is also necessary for a 
soft state. This thesis has generally taken the view that politicisation is not sufficient
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for a soft state and that it must combine with extensive and intensive personal 
connections amongst the elite. Such connections exist in Poland. In Chapter Three, 
many variables, including a whole list of characteristics of communism were 
hypothesised to be conducive to personalism, but Chapter Five found only one 
variable, having held a position in a youth organisation, to be significant. Since, 
youth organisations were given such a prominent and privileged role under 
communism, they can probably be classified as a distinctively post-communist 
variable. Nonetheless, this hardly constituted one of the fundamental or defining 
characteristics of communism, as did the relationship between the polity and the 
economy.
So, the current system of business-government relations is substantially post­
communist, in the strong sense, of being distinctively post-communist. However, it 
is too early to say that post-communism represents a new type of capitalist 
democracy. In order to do this, the distinctively post-communist factors need to 
“lock in”. They need to become so strongly entrenched that the costs of trying to 
eliminate or modify them are prohibitively high. Some of the evidence of de­
politicisation mentioned earlier suggests that post-communism has not locked itself 
into business-government relations. There are perhaps two reasons for this. Firstly, 
businesspeople who were early beneficiaries o f a politicized economy have an 
interest in subsequent de-politicization. For example, the beneficiaries of alegal 
privatizations who then push for clearly defined and zealously defended property 
rights. Secondly, the most fundamental aspect of the European Union is the internal 
market. The Union is defined not so much by free trade, but by an increasingly 
homogeneous regulatory structure, which is hostile to politicization of the economy
t
I
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by nation-states. While the power of the EU in this area is real and enormous, the 
enduring diversity of regulatory structures amongst member states, and the enduring 
politicization of economies like Italy’s should not be forgotten. Against this, there 
are firms, which rely on enduring politicization to give them a competitive 
advantage. Of course, as repeated many times above, relying on politicization as an 
ongoing strategy is foolhardy because it puts a business at the mercy of an unstable 
and intensely competitive political elite. That political elite is the other principal 
factor tending towards a lock in of post-communist politicization. Clearly, there are 
also caveats regarding the political elite. The important centrist bloc in Poland has 
consistently been in favour of de-politicization, as have elements of the left and right. 
Moreover, the prospect of re-election is central to a politician’s perspective. The 
economy is central to re-election and the balance of opinion amongst the political 
elite is probably that de-politicization would be better for the economy. With 
pressure from the EU, weak support from business, internal divisions, and a serious 
budgetary problem, the political elite will probably not cleave to a politicized 
economy.
6. Conclusions
Polish business-government relations consist of four different modes, defined by 
associations, companies, parties, and personal connections. The soft state, permeated 
by personal connections, is the most important of the four channels. The existing 
literature is inadequate to capture the nature of Polish business-government relations. 
Previous studies tend to ignore personalism and rarely treat the different modes as 
alternatives and complements to each other. Moreover, they have not taken seriously
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the post-communist context of East-Central Europe. Poland’s personalist business- 
government relations are distinctively post-communist, as they are grounded in the 
distinctively post-communist politicization of the economy. While the soft state is 
likely to remain important in the foreseeable future, in the medium-term the company 
state may become the dominant mode of business-government relations. Post­
communist business-government relations may be destined to converge with the 
widely prevalent company state. However, for the moment, and for perhaps two 
decades in total, it constitutes a new type of capitalist democracy.
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Interview Schedules
Note:
The interviews were semi-structured. None of the interviewees was asked all o f these 
questions. Most interviewees were asked most of these questions, and most 
interviewees were also asked more detailed questions, which arose in the conduct of 
the interviews. Therefore, these schedules represent quite accurately the overall 
content of the qualitative interviews, but do not represent exactly what was asked in 
any particular interview.
Businesspeople:
When businesspeople lobby the political system do they prefer to use a business 
association, contacts in a political party, or personal acquaintances in government?
What are the main sources of division between Polish business associations?
Does state ownership limit the effectiveness of the Confederation of Polish 
Employers?
Is the Tripartite Commission influential in socio-economic policy in Poland?
Are you associated with a particular political party?
Are many other businesspeople associated with particular political parties?
For example? What about X and Y?
Is your firm associated with a particular political party?
Are many other firms associated with particular political parties?
For example? What about X and Y?
Is your business association associated with a particular political party?
Are many other business associations associated with particular political parties?
For example? What about X and Y?
Do businesses contribute funds to political parties? To more than one political party?
Are there specific characteristics of lobbying in the state sector? In the foreign-owned 
sector?
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Do you have personal connections with politicians? With whom? From which 
parties?
Are personal connections important in business lobbying?
Are personal connections also important in lobbying on general issues?
Were personal connections important in the business campaign to amend the labour 
code? For example?
Politicians:
Do politicians prefer to consult with business associations, individual firms or 
acquaintances from the business community?
Which are the most influential business associations?
What are the sources of division amongst these associations?
What is the best indicator of success in lobbying, the representativeness of a business 
association, the number of employees in a firm, or the personal connections of a 
businessman?
Why are personal connections important in the Polish political system?
Are personal connections also important in general issues?
In your opinion, are the majority of individual members of the business elite affiliated 
with particular political parties?
Are there differences between political parties?
What types of businesspeople tend to be associated with political parties? In which 
sectors?
What role did your committee play in the battle over the amendment of the labour 
code?
What was the key factor influencing legislation on the labour code in the third Sejm?
Did businesspeople use personal connections in the matter of the amendment of the 
labour code?
Is the Tripartite Commission influential in socio-economic policy in Poland?
What do left and right mean in the Polish political system?
Is the distinction between left and right important in economic and business policy?
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Interviews
Ryszard Barikowicz, Polish Business Roundtable, Warsaw, 9 August 1999
Mieczyslaw Bqk, Polish Chamber o f Commerce, Warsaw, 24 July 2000
Henryka Bochniarz, Polish Confederation of Private Employers, Warsaw, 5 August 1999
Bronislaw Dankowski, Democratic Left Union, Warsaw, 6 December 2000
Dagmir Dtugosz, Democratic Left Union, Warsaw, 2 July 2002
Krzysztof Dubiriski, SEC Strategic Consultancy, Warsaw, 17 August 2000
Agnieszka Dziedzic, Feedback / Hill and Knowlton, Warsaw, 1 July 2002
Jerzy Gielgus, Solidarity, Warsaw, 13 December 2000
Dariusz Grabowski, Polish Raison d’ Etat, Warsaw, 4 December 2000
Roman Jagielinski, Democratic Peasant Party, Warsaw, 7 December 2000
Marek Janicki, Polish Business Roundtable, Warsaw, 19 August 1999
Boleslaw Jesionek, Asssociation o f Warsaw Industrial Employers, Warsaw, 25 July 2000
Marek Kloczko, Polish Chamber of Commerce, Warsaw, 30 June 2000
Michal Konwicki, Polish Chamber o f  Commerce, Warsaw, 13 December 2000
Piotr Krysak, Mining Chamber o f Industry and Commerce, Katowice, 22 August 2000
Miroslaw Kuklinski, Solidarity Electoral Action, Warsaw, 14 December 2000
Jan Lityriski, Freedom Union, Warsaw, 5 July 2002
Roman Luczkiewicz, Federation of Energy Industry Employers, Warsaw, 17 November 2000
hvona Nierkoncz, Warsaw Chamber of Commerce, Warsaw, 14 September 2000
Andrzej Malinowski, Polish Confederation o f Employers, Warsaw, 8 September 1999
Marek Matraszek, CEC Government Relations, Warsaw, 13 July 2000
Zdzislaw Moczynski, Chamber o f  Exporters and Importers, Katowice, 22 August 2000
Jeremi Mordasewicz, Business Centre Club, Warsaw, 9 August 2000
Zbigniew Niemczycki, Polish Business Roundtable, Warsaw, 1 September 1999
Jozef Nowicki, Democratic Left Union, Warsaw, 14 December 2000
Irena Rej, Polish Chamber o f Commerce “Polish Pharmacy”, Warsaw, 20 December 2000
Andrzej St^pniewski, Warsaw and Mazowse Employers’ Association, Warsaw, 27 July 2000
Adam Szejnfeld, Freedom Union, Warsaw, 6 December 2000
Tomasz Uchman, Business Centre Club, Warsaw, 24 August 2000
Jan Wejchert, Polish Business Roundtable, Warsaw, 10 September 1999
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List of Leaders from ISP Survey
Arendarski, Andrzej 
Balcerowicz, Leszek 
Bielecki, Czeslaw 
Bochniarz, Hemyka 
Borowksi, Marek 
Cimoszewicz, Wlodzimierz 
Geremek, Bronislaw 
Goryszewski, Henryk 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Hanna 
Gudzowaty, Aleksander 
Kaczmarek, Wieslaw 
Kaczyriski, Jaroslaw 
Kluska, Roman 
Krzaklewski, Marian 
Kwasniewski, Aleksander 
Lewandowski, Janusz 
Miazek, Ry szard 
Miller, Leszek 
Niemczycld, Zbigniew 
Olesiak, Kazimierz 
Paga, Leslaw 
Pawlak, Waldemar 
Pol, Marek 
Rokita, Jan Maria 
Siwiec, Marek 
Skowroriski, Andrzej 
Sobolewski, Zbigniew 
Solorz, Zygmunt 
Suchocka, Hanna 
Syryjczyk, Tadeusz 
Tomaszewski, Janusz 
Walendziak, Wieslaw 
Walesa, Lech 
Wolek, Tomasz 
Zaraska, Witold
Polish Chamber o f Commerce 
Freedom Union 
Solidarity Electoral Action 
Polish Business Roundtable 
Democratic Left Union 
Democratic Left Union 
Freedom Union 
Peasant Party 
Polish Central Bank 
Bartimpex
Democratic Left Union 
Solidarity Electoral Action 
Optimus
Solidarity Trade Union 
Democratic Left Union 
Freedom Union 
Peasant Party- 
Democratic Left Union 
Curtis Group
Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciej 
Warsaw Stock Exchange 
Peasant Party 
Union of Labour 
Solidarity Electoral Action 
Democratic Left Union 
Elektrim
BIG Bank Gdariski 
Polsat
Freedom Union
Freedom Union
Solidarity Electoral Action
Solidarity Electoral Action
Christian Democracy o f the Third Republic
Zycie Warszawy
Exbud
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Dendrogram from Cluster Analysis
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
Leader
Name Num
Pawlak 22
Suchocka 29
Pol 23
Syryj czyk 30
Goryszewski 8
Walesa 33
Olesiak 20
Paga 21
Gronkiewicz 9
Geremek 7
Miazek 17
Bielecki 2
Kwasniewski15
Siwiec 25
Borowski 5
Cimosyewicz 6
Miller 18
Balcerowicz 3
Bochniarz 4
Arendarski 1
Niemczycki 19
Kaczmarek 11
Lewandows ki18
Kaczynski 12
Walendziak 32
Rokita 24
Tomaszewski31
Krzaklewskil4
Kluska 13
Sobolewski 27
Skowronski 26
Zaraksa 35
Solorz 28
Wolek 34
Gudzowaty 10
10 
— + -
15 2 0  25
J
J
1
J
J
J
J
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Comparative Governance Figures
Government Effectiveness Rule of Law Corruption
Estimate
90 per cent Confidence Interval
Estimate
90 per cent Confidence Interval
Estimate
90 per cent Confidence Interval
Lower Higher Lower Higher Lower Higher
Poland 80 70.51282 84.61538 70.30303 62.04819 78.31325 72.72727 66.45161 82.58065
Czech R. 75.48387 67.30769 83.97436 70.90909 64.04819 78.31325 70.77922 64.51613 80.64516
Hungary 76.12903 67.30769 83.97436 74.54545 65.66265 83.13253 77.92208 68.3871 83.22581
Slovakia 54.19355 33.97436 70.51282 58.78788 47.59036 66.86747 62.98701 44.51613 69.67742
Slovenia 74.83871 60.89744 84.61538 77.57576 66.86747 86.14458 83.76623 77.41935 89.03226
Estonia 69.03226 47.4359 81.41026 69.09091 69.24096 78.31325 77.27273 67.09677 83.22581
Latvia 61.29032 36.53846 73.07692 60 47.59036 68.6747 49.35065 27.09677 64.51613
Lithuania 62.58065 38.46154 75.64103 61.81818 47.59036 69.87952 63.63636 43.22581 70.96774
Bulgaria 17.41935 7.051282 39.10256 47.87879 33.73494 62.04819 30.51948 12.25806 52.25806
Romania 27.74194 12.17949 51.92308 50.90909 36.74699 64.45783 37.66234 18.70968 56.77419
Notes: Figures in bold are scores which do not over 
Source: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance 
Research Working Paper 2195 (Washington, DC: T
lap with those for Poland.
Details in Daniel Kaufmann, Art Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, Aggregating Governance Indicators. World Bank Policy 
he World Bank, 1999)
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